



THE AFRICAN CAPACITY
BUILDING FOUNDATION

FONDATION POUR LE RENFORCEMENT
DES CAPACITES EN AFRIQUE


Specialized Agency of the African Union



AFRICA CAPACITY REPORT 2019

Fostering Transformative Leadership For Africa's
Development

With Foreword by HE Paul Kagame



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Fostering Transformative Leadership For
Africa's Development

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Foreword

Despite strong headway, Africa's economic transformation is far from finished. Across the continent, there is a clear consensus that we have to change how we do business. As this year's Africa Capacity Report reminds us, the pace of progress will be set by the effectiveness of our leadership in both the public and private sectors.

This valuable Report provides a snapshot of leadership capacity in Africa based on independent survey data. Most importantly, it offers concrete recommendations for improving performance, combining both technical elements and the mindset changes that are necessary for success. The African Capacity Building Foundation is to be commended for the excellent work.

This Report is especially timely in the context of the institutional and financial reform of the African Union, where we are working to make our continental body more agile and responsive to Africa's development goals. Crucial milestones of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development

Goals are approaching rapidly. We are also on the cusp of putting the historic African Continental Free Trade Area into operation. Realizing these initiatives requires sustained, transformative leadership.

The Report calls for increased investment in leadership capacity development at all levels, especially in government service. These findings merit careful attention by all of us, followed by appropriate action. This is an undertaking that the African Capacity Building Foundation, as the African Union's specialized agency on capacity development, is uniquely well placed to spearhead and support, together with all African governments and development partners.



H.E. Paul Kagame

President of the Republic of Rwanda and
Chairperson of the African Union

Preface

The 2019 *Africa Capacity Report* (ACR 2019) is the seventh in the series and like those preceding it, measures the capacity of African countries to pursue their development agenda, focusing on key determinants of capacity for development.

The theme for 2019 is “Fostering Transformative Leadership for Africa’s Development.” Leadership is critical to the continent’s Agenda 2063, a home-grown strategic framework for socioeconomic transformation by 2063, and to the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The ACR 2019 defines transformative leadership as leadership that brings about positive radical changes. In a development context, it is leadership that engenders widespread, demonstrable improvements in peoples’ lives as evidenced by rising incomes, longer life expectancies, comprehensive social safety networks, and universal access to basic services.

In this regard, transformative leadership requires developing and persuasively communicating an agenda for long-term success, fostering supportive institutions, and creating short-term opportunities as an additional incentive. Moreover, transformative leadership must inspire and mobilize the population, deploy the best technical capabilities to implement the transformation

program, and cultivate the necessary political coalition to ensure sustainability.

ACR 2019 addresses the capacity dimensions of transformative leadership. It looks at the major elements of transformative leadership in Africa, highlights the leadership capacity gaps related to achieving sustainable development on the continent, and identifies strategies for addressing them.

Essentially, the Report and its key index—the Africa Capacity Index (ACI)—offer much needed inputs to inform decisions about what should be done differently and what kinds of resources are required to strengthen transformative leadership capacity to achieve inclusive and sustainable development in Africa.

Notably, some progress has been made toward transformative leadership in Africa. And there is some evidence that long-term socioeconomic performance can be attributed to transformative leadership, as is illustrated by Rwanda, even though it is difficult to directly establish a causal connection from transformative leadership to socioeconomic development. Further, the framework for transformative leadership is being improved in a number of countries through constitutional changes aimed at institutionalizing the values and ethics of transformative leadership—in Ghana and Kenya, for

example, on human rights, transparency, accountability, and codes of conduct for public officials. And most countries have established institutions to train transformative leaders.

Achieving transformative leadership is a Herculean task, requiring substantial resources (funding and people) and the commitment of political, bureaucratic, business, religious, traditional, and civil society leaders. It requires support from the citizenry, and that requires public education to raise awareness of its importance. Despite the crucial role of transformative leadership, limited resources have been dedicated to building it. Capacity development initiatives for transformative leadership have been sporadic, uncoordinated, and unsustainable. This makes a strong case for a coordinated leadership capacity development programme as a priority to cover all sectors at all levels—a task that the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), as specialized agency of the African Union on capacity development, is ready to spearhead.

The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) has already placed capacity building for transformative leadership at the centre of its operations. In its Strategy 2017–21, the Foundation identified “institutional weaknesses and inadequate leadership” as the key challenges impeding achievement of the AU Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. The strategy also identified the need for “change and transformative capacity,” with transformative leadership as a major aspect

targeting institutional building and leadership development in government, private sector, civil society, and traditional leadership systems.

Institution building is key to development and to building transformative leaders. Both individual leaders who can drive change and strong institutions that endure beyond individual leaders’ tenure in office are essential. Capacity building efforts should thus target the top political leaderships, including the top management in the public and private sectors.

Governments must invest massively in building competencies in their public services. Capabilities, systems, and processes must be strengthened in economic planning and finance units and entities responsible for social, health, and education strategies. Equally important is strengthening the capacity of accountability and compliance entities, such as ombudspersons and anti-corruption and audit units.

The private sector is a powerful engine of growth, but it needs more support from African governments to overcome the challenges that block the emergence of transformative business leadership. The principles of good corporate governance should be followed in a manner that does not disadvantage any class of corporate actor or create trade barriers. The standards of corporate governance must be seen as African standards that are developed, formulated, and ratified by Africans for the well-being of Africa.

Traditional leaders, civil society, and the media should be encouraged to play a larger role in building leadership capacity on the continent by setting up platforms of peer learning that periodically bring together opinion makers in key sectors, leading experts and practitioners, and young people with demonstrable leadership potential to deconstruct complex challenges and find solutions.

To achieve all this, African countries should earmark dedicated budgets for developing leadership capacity. Despite competing

priorities and dire economic conditions in many African countries, having a sustained budget for leadership capacity development will advance Africa's development in the long run. Along with support of development partners, budgeting for this purpose is a strategic decision to enhance prospects for Africa's inclusive and sustainable development and good governance.

Prof. Emmanuel Nnadozie

Executive Secretary

African Capacity Building Foundation

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The 2019 Africa Capacity Report (ACR 2019) reflects the efforts of a broad and diverse group of experts, both inside and outside the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF or the Foundation). The ACR 2019 was prepared by a core team led by the Knowledge and Learning (K&L) Department of the ACBF, under the overall supervision of its Executive Secretary, Professor Emmanuel Nnadozie. The Report's production received support and contributions from staff in all other departments of the Foundation that worked hard to meet the tight and sometimes unpredictable deadlines.

The actual drafting of the Report was led by Thomas C. Munthali, Director of the Knowledge and Learning Department, assisted by Robert Nantchouang, Barassou Diawara, and the K&L Department staff. The following colleagues in ACBF also comprised the *ACR 2019* core team: Alfred Gumbwa, Beruk Negash, Frejus Thoto and Patience Yakobe.

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Thomas Chataghalala Munthali, PhD

Director, Knowledge and Learning
The African Capacity Building Foundation

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Overview

Since 2011, the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) has published an annual Africa Capacity Report (ACR). The ACR measures and examines the capacity of African countries to pursue their development agenda, focusing on key determinants and components of capacity for development. ACBF defines capacity as the “ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully” and capacity development as the process by which “people, organizations, and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and maintain capacity over time” (ACBF 2011: 30)

Over the years, the ACRs have cast a wide net. The theme of the 2011 inaugural report was “Capacity Development in Fragile States.” The 2012 edition explored “Capacity Development for Agricultural Transformation and Food Security.” In 2013, the third edition focused on “Capacity Development for Natural Resource Management.” The 2014 edition identified “Capacity Imperatives for Regional Integration in Africa.”¹ The fifth edition in 2015 looked at “Capacity Imperatives for Domestic Resource Mobilization in Africa.” Finally, the 2017 Report reflected on “Building Capacity in Science, Technology, and Innovation for Africa’s Transformation.”

The theme of this year’s Report is “Fostering Transformative Leadership for Africa’s Development.” Leadership is critical to

implementation of the continent’s Agenda 2063, a home-grown strategic framework for the socioeconomic transformation by 2063, and the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), also known as Agenda 2030.

ACR 2019 defines transformative leadership as leadership that brings about radical change. In a development context, it is leadership that engenders widespread, demonstrable improvements in peoples’ lives, as evidenced in rising incomes, longer life expectancy, comprehensive social safety networks, and universal access to basic services.

ACR 2019 addresses the capacity dimensions of transformative leadership. It looks at the major elements of transformative leadership in Africa, highlights the leadership capacity gaps related to achieving sustainable development on the continent, and identifies some strategies for addressing them.

Essentially, the 2019 Report and its key index—the Africa Capacity Index (ACI)—offer much needed inputs to inform decisions about what needs to be done differently and what kinds of resources are required to strengthen transformative leadership capacity to achieve inclusive and sustainable development in Africa.

ACR 2019 complements ACBF’s capacity building interventions on the continent

by advocating for the integration of capacity building in Africa's wider development efforts. The capacity dimensions and imperatives for transformative leadership are crucial as African countries, the African Union and regional economic communities, and non-state actors develop strategic frameworks and build capacities in pursuit of sustainable development.

Highlights of the Africa Capacity Index 2019

The ACI is a snapshot of capacity in Africa. It is a composite index computed from a quantitative and qualitative assessment of four sub-indices or indicator "clusters." The policy environment cluster considers the conditions that must be in place to make transformational change and development possible. The processes for implementation cluster assesses the extent to which countries are prepared to deliver results and outcomes. The development results at country level cluster refers to tangible outputs that encourage development. And the capacity development outcomes cluster measures change in the human condition.

The ACR aims to include all African countries in its estimates of the ACI. Thirty-four countries were included in the inaugural issue in 2011 (42 in 2012, 44 in 2013 and 2014, 45 in 2015, and 44 in 2017). This 2019 Report covers 46 countries. Somalia is a new entrant this year. South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are re-included since the technical obstacles

preventing their inclusion in the 2017 ACR have been resolved. Cabo Verde could not be covered as data for that country were not available in time.

Results of the Africa Capacity Indicators 2019

The results for the 2019 ACI are generally satisfactory, driven mainly by a strong policy environment. The ACI ranges from 70.8 for Mauritius to 24.0 for Guinea-Bissau (table 0.1), where scores of 0 < 20 are very low, 20 to < 40 are low, 40 to < 60 are medium, 60 to < 80 are high, and 80 to 100 are very high. No countries are in the very low or very high extremes of capacity, 10 are in the high capacity bracket (22 percent), 5 are in the low bracket (11 percent), and 31 are in the medium bracket (67 percent; figure 0.1 and table 0.2).

Achievements by indicator cluster

By indicator cluster, the pattern has not changed much since 2011. The policy environment cluster remains the strongest and the capacity development outcomes cluster the weakest (table 0.2). Since 2014, the development results at country level cluster has more or less caught up with the processes for implementation cluster.

More than 93 percent of countries are ranked high or very high on policy environment, reflecting countries' launching of policies and strategies such as national development plans and visions and strategies for development. Some improvement is called

Table 0.1 | **Country results on the Africa Capacity Index 2019, by rank and index score**

Rank	Country	ACI 2019 value	Rank	Country	ACI 2019 value
1	Mauritius	70.8	24	Djibouti	52.1
2	Burkina Faso	67.0	25	Mauritania	51.7
3	Malawi	66.2	26	Zambia	51.2
4	Ghana	65.2	27	Ethiopia	51.2
5	Tanzania	64.5	28	Comoros	51.0
6	Mali	64.1	29	Uganda	48.5
7	Tunisia	63.8	30	Gabon	48.4
8	Rwanda	63.3	31	Kenya	46.3
9	Namibia	61.1	32	Zimbabwe	46.1
10	Morocco	60.5	33	Somalia	45.4
11	Nigeria	59.6	34	Gambia	43.9
12	Benin	58.4	35	Chad	42.9
13	Liberia	57.8	36	Congo	42.5
14	DR Congo	57.1	37	Cameroon	42.4
15	Côte d'Ivoire	56.2	38	Sierra Leone	42.2
16	Mozambique	55.9	39	Eswatini	41.3
17	Guinea	55.8	40	Algeria	40.2
18	Burundi	53.9	41	Egypt	40.1
19	Niger	53.8	42	Togo	39.9
20	Lesotho	53.7	43	Central African Republic	37.0
21	Senegal	53.6	44	South Sudan	36.0
22	Botswana	53.1	45	Madagascar	34.8
23	South Africa	52.2	46	Guinea-Bissau	24.0

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

for in the processes for implementation cluster, as almost 60 percent of countries are ranked as medium or below.

Capacity development outcomes remain the most pressing issue. Only

2.2 percent of countries in that cluster rank in the highest brackets, a small but significant improvement from 0 percent in 2016. As reported in previous ACRs, boosting performance on indicators in the capacity

Figure 0.1 | Africa Capacity Index 2019, country distribution by capacity bracket



Very high capacity (No countries)
High capacity (10 countries) Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Tunisia
Medium capacity (31 countries) Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, DR Congo, Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Low capacity (5 countries) Central African Rep., Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, South Sudan, Togo
Very low capacity (No countries)

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

development outcomes cluster is difficult because few countries allocate adequate resources to capacity building. Further, two-thirds of countries have not complied with the 2003 Maputo Declaration that committed them to allocating at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture.

Of the 10 case study countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa), 3 (Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda) are in the high bracket on the ACI (which has a total of 10 countries), while 7 are in the medium bracket (of a total of 31 countries).

Importance and challenges of leadership for Africa's transformation

African leaders seem well aware of the urgency and challenges of socioeconomic transformation. This recognition is demonstrated in their adoption of "The Africa We Want: The Agenda 2063" at the 50th Anniversary of the African Union (AU) in May 2013. Agenda 2063 sets out Africa's long-term development vision of "an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena" (AU 2015). Agenda 2063, which identified seven aspirations and 20 goals, was followed in January

Table 0.2 | **Distribution of countries on the Africa Capacity Index 2019, by capacity bracket and indicator cluster (percent)**

Capacity bracket	Policy environment	Processes for implementation	Development results at country level	Capacity development outcomes
Very high	69.6	13.0	39.1	0
High	23.9	28.3	21.7	2.2
Medium	4.3	34.8	32.6	37.0
Low	2.2	23.9	6.5	47.8
Very low	0	0	0	13.0
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

2015 by adoption of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–23). In September 2015, the international community adopted the Sustainable Development Goals under the auspices of the United Nations Agenda 2030. African member states also committed the continent to implementing national and regional development programs that are aimed at achieving the 17 goals and 169 targets of the SDGs by 2030.

Social and economic transformation require radical change. Agenda 2063 and the Ten-Year Implementation Plan recognize the critical role in Africa's transformation of leadership that is visionary, recognizes and nurtures talent, creates space for individual expression, and motivates and brings out the best in people. They highlight the importance of change readiness and mindset shifts in mobilizing for the successful implementation of Agenda 2063. Historical evidence, too, indicates that successful transformation has occurred mostly in countries

that were governed over long periods by a capable, credible, and committed government under strong political leadership that is skilled in devising and advancing growth strategies and mobilizing and motivating people to make the necessary sacrifices.

Transformative leadership requires developing and persuasively communicating an agenda for long-term success, fostering supportive institutions, and creating short-term opportunities as an additional incentive. Moreover, transformative leadership must inspire and mobilize the population, deploy and empower the best technical capabilities to implement and coordinate the transformation program, and cultivate the necessary political coalition to ensure sustainability.

Transformative leadership is less about the leader or chief executive and more about the leadership group, drawn from the political and management segments of the state, the private sector, and civil society,

who are capable of directing change toward desired outcomes. Transformative leadership nurtures the institutions and processes that enable the country to take advantage of whatever windows of opportunity are open, building on favorable conditions in the external environment and finding ways to weather and rise above “bad” conditions.

The historical example of the developmental state, discussed in chapter 2, is a model of successful socioeconomic transformation. The developmental state uses a powerful development-oriented ideology to mobilize society around a core set of socioeconomic objectives and resolutely deploys state and non-state resources and capacities to design and implement policies and programs in pursuit of those objectives.

The Report identifies three important underpinnings of the developmental state. The first is *building consensus on the desired future*. While the process may involve different degrees of inclusiveness, consensus building is the necessary starting point. The second is *policy coordination and coherence*. The developmental state leadership teams fostered the appropriate institutional environment that ensured their sustained ability to design coherent policies, coordinate key stakeholders, and maintain the transformation agenda consistently over the long term. Third is *policy credibility and commitment*. Once a country established its long-term national vision, it designated or created specific institutional entities to lead the execution of concrete action plans. These plans

were revised as circumstances changed, but the long-term vision remained essentially intact, and there was unwavering goal orientation and discipline in implementation.

The state of leadership in Africa

In Africa as elsewhere, political leadership sets the tone, attitude, and behavior in policy design and implementation and management of resources for promoting national development and also sets the tenor in developing capacity for leadership at all levels. However, poor political leadership has been highlighted as a major obstacle to Africa’s socioeconomic development. This results partly from the impact on political systems of the continent’s colonial history and severe postcolonial internal social fragmentation. As a consequence, African leaders tend to operate in political systems that are highly personalized and leadership-dependent. At the same time, the literature has devoted inadequate attention to the contribution of bureaucratic, traditional, and corporate leadership in the continent’s socioeconomic transformation.

Relations between political leadership and other leaders are fraught with tension, depending on the interests of the political leadership and sometimes of other leaders and the period in which such relations evolved. There is also a capacity imbalance between the political leadership and other forms of leadership. The qualifications, experience, and expertise of political leadership are in many cases not comparable to

those of other forms of leadership, which are typically more experienced and qualified than political leaders. This sometimes explains the animosity and tension between political leadership and the other forms of leadership.

Leadership in Africa faces multiple challenges, including ideological fragmentation, uncritical mimicking of external ideas and institutional forms, weak policy and program design capacity, weak policy coordination and implementation, inadequate mastery of necessary job skills (inadequate domain competence²), embedded weaknesses in working systems and processes, paucity of appropriate data, and leadership networking challenges.

Leadership capacity building initiatives in Africa

Most African countries embed transformative leadership capacity development in their national development strategies. They typically focus on improving government effectiveness, transparency and accountability, and compliance with rules and procedures; restructuring the knowledge and innovation system; cultivating mindset change, proper work ethic, pursuit of excellence, respect for time, attention to detail, and sense of urgency; developing the skills of public servants across the board (including in leadership); strengthening key capabilities of people and the state; and building a capable and developmental state.

Three broad mechanisms for strengthening leadership capacity can be identified: specialized leadership training institutions, mentorship, and peer learning. Specialized leadership capacity building institutions arguably constitute the largest proportion of leadership development mechanisms in Africa. They include centers of excellence in leadership and management development that typically provide leadership training through formal lectures, seminars, informal leader-to-leader interactions, and experiential learning that encourage leaders to learn by reflecting on and sharing their experiences. Examples are the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, the Kenya School of Government, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, and the Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management. The continent also has a large number of conventional tertiary institutions that confer professional master's degrees in public or business administration in addition to traditional academic higher degrees.

Mentorship, a leadership development approach whereby leaders guide others who are believed to have leadership potential, is inherent in the succession dynamics of traditional leadership in many parts of Africa. In some areas of Ghana, for instance, new traditional leaders are required to enter into seclusion for several months to be schooled in the customs, values, and practices of their society (see Ghana case study). Mentorship is also inherent in the structure of some political parties across

the continent. A good number of current political leaders have undergone long periods of apprenticeship throughout their career. Among the case study countries, the current heads of state of Egypt, Nigeria, and Rwanda had armed forces leadership backgrounds before venturing into politics. Those of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa had long leadership stints in the private sector. All also held other political leadership positions prior to assuming their countries' highest office.

Peer-learning mechanisms are also valuable for strengthening political leadership. These have included retreats for political office holders, often together with the top echelons of the civil service, to reflect on strategic issues. They have also included larger events such as seminars, workshops, and conferences convened to facilitate mutual learning among senior-level staff. Peer learning mechanisms are growing in importance in Africa, particularly since the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism in 2003, a tool for sharing experiences, reinforcing best practices, identifying deficiencies, and assessing capacity-building needs.³

The imperative of building tomorrow's leadership today is widely recognized across the continent. Over the last 20 years, leadership programs have been launched to strengthen the capacity of young people on the continent and nurture the next generation of African leaders. Sponsored

by African and international entities, and with some differences in approach and focus, they all have in common a focus on strengthening the leadership capacity of tomorrow's leaders.

Country achievements in nurturing transformative leadership

To establish an institutional framework for transformation, some countries have made constitutional changes to institutionalize the values and ethics of transformative leadership. For instance, Kenya's 2010 Constitution aims to be a foundation for efficiency, integrity, and accountability in governance. Similarly, Ghana's recent National Public Sector Reform Strategy is part of a process of strengthening capacities needed to realize its long-term vision.

Achievements have also been registered in another domain of top leadership, vision and strategy. Though still insufficient, there is now a strong core of top leadership development institutions that could become vehicles of change on the continent. In Nigeria, for instance, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, established almost 40 years ago, has trained several of the country's top leaders. Other African countries have successfully put in place similarly institutions.

Another important domain of public sector leadership is mastery of technical and operational issues, areas that define a capable state. Here, too, significant achievements have been registered. Across the

continent, the public sector now has access to a variety of institutions dedicated to building the cadres required for a capable state. Many, including some that have been supported by ACBF, are globally recognized.

Socioeconomic impact of transformative leadership

While it is not easy to establish direct causality between leadership development strategies and socioeconomic transformation, a long-term association between a country's leadership and strong socioeconomic performance is compelling. Among the case study countries, Rwanda stands out in showing the strongest association between its leadership and the country's socioeconomic transformation. Rwanda is in its third decade of uninterrupted economic growth and social progress, which has been mediated by the leadership's strong commitment to rapid transformation.

Leadership capacity gaps in Africa

The Report identifies several challenges in transformative leadership development. First, political leadership across African countries does not have a uniformly deep understanding of the substantive issues of development and transformation. While leaders at the highest levels typically have a good grasp of the structures and dynamics of governance needed for socioeconomic transformation and of the major internal and external factors that shape countries' development prospects, that is not always true at lower levels.

Moreover, there is significant ideological fragmentation across the continent. African leaders are no doubt committed to economic integration and strong political collaboration. Nonetheless, there is continuing tension between the endogenous wisdom and experience and the knowledge inherited from the continent's colonial history. This is compounded by the impact of religions (in particular Christianity, Islam, and animism) on the ideological values of development. These different forms of fragmentation have brought great ideological divergence to development and transformation perspectives. Furthermore, while the influence of the dueling ideologies of the Cold War on African leaders have eased, they still cast a shadow on a continent-wide vision of Africa's future. Additionally, the countries' different colonial experiences continue to shape relations among African leaders.

Second, most of the institutions and processes for developing transformative leadership capacities have not fully bloomed. While leadership capacity building is implicit in national development strategies, there are very few comprehensive and explicit national leadership capacity development policies or strategies. Across the continent, policy processes still borrow widely from external ideas and institutional forms. Institutional forms of governance have not been fully adapted to African culture and values. At the technical level, countries have in place a full panoply of administrative entities that duplicate the form of similar entities

abroad, but they do not necessarily perform these functions effectively.

Third, there are serious challenges in policy and program design, coordination, and implementation capacities across the continent. The public sector is responsible for the formulation and implementation of public policies and programs. It delivers services, manages accountability, and collects revenue. The performance of these functions by the public sector in African countries is still largely weak and unsatisfactory. This is due partly to the inadequacy of institutional designs and partly to inadequate domain expertise, poor institutional memory on important technical issues, weaknesses in systems and processes, and inadequate data. Weaknesses in systems and processes in areas like recruitment, procurement, and elections management have resulted in corruption and inflation of procurement contracts, election disputes, and politicization in the appointment of public servants.

In most countries, leadership development initiatives have been hampered by lack of technical, financial, and human resources. Most initiatives have struggled with finding the resources they need to attain their objectives. The country studies point out that most capacity building institutions need their own capacity upgrade in human resource development, technology, and infrastructure.

Fourth, networking is weak across leaders in political, public sector, bureaucratic,

business, religious, traditional, labor, and civil society spheres. This is largely because leadership mentoring and capacity development are not institutionalized or internalized. Accordingly, there is almost no sharing of best practices and experiences except in informal contexts that are not taken seriously.

Finally, the widespread lack of a transformative mindset among the continent's leaders and their inability to lead by example frustrates the transformation drive. The country case studies highlight corruption at the leadership level as a major example of an inappropriate mindset.

Strategic leadership capacities

The transformation agenda advanced by the African Union is anchored in visionary leadership, public sector competence, and the energy of stakeholders from all sectors. It is critical to strengthen these strategic capacity elements at all levels. Capacity building should target the top political leadership, including top management in the public, private, and civil society sectors. The Report takes the position that socioeconomic transformation requires the mobilization of leaders from all these sectors.

It is also necessary to strengthen the capacity of leaders in technical aspects of socioeconomic transformation, including making effective leadership decisions; leading and facilitating strategic thinking; analyzing the challenges, critical uncertainties, and global drivers of change in the 21st century; communicating clearly; and fully

understanding and deploying information and communication technology.

Some capacity constraints can be eased by setting up peer learning platforms that periodically bring together opinion makers, expert practitioners, and young people with demonstrable leadership potential to deconstruct complex challenges in key sectors and find solutions. Setting up networks of alumni of these events could also serve as a mechanism for discovering successor generations of leaders and policy-makers.

The continent must foster strong socio-economic leadership coalitions that can maintain the long-term strategic agenda beyond the tenure of particular individuals. While security of leadership tenure is desirable, it should not mean enshrining any individuals or particular groups in perpetual leadership positions. This implies that leadership capacities should be built in all social, economic, and cultural sectors.

Countries should institute measures for building social capital that embrace political leaders, traditional leaders, top public sector managers, the media, civil society organizations and trade unions, academic institutions and think tanks, professional standards organizations, business associations, and religious bodies.

As long-term political stability is critical to transformation, the continent must expand national, regional, and continental capacities in conflict analysis and social dialogue, conflict prevention, and conflict mediation and resolution. This would strengthen the

capacity to nurture standing arrangements for inclusive and nonviolent conflict resolution. Such provisions could include local, regional, or national peace councils that engage with protagonists in resolving conflicts.

Key capacity messages

- Transformative leadership cuts across public, private, traditional, and civil society organizations. Building transformative leadership capacity is a Herculean task requiring resources, commitment, and support from political, bureaucratic, business, religious, traditional, trade union, and civil society leaderships.
- African countries must invest massively in bolstering competencies in their civil services. Capabilities, systems, and processes must be strengthened in policy entities such as economic planning and finance and entities responsible for social, health, and education policies. Equally important is the capacity for ethical and compliance oversight, such as ombudspersons, anticorruption institutions, and audit entities.
- Even while recognizing competing priorities, African countries should create dedicated budgets for leadership capacity development in all key domains. A sustained budget for leadership capacity development will in the long run yield great dividends for Africa's development.
- Given the economic importance of business leaders, and the social and cultural importance of religious, civil society

and traditional leaders, strengthening their capacities is also essential to drive transformation.

- Countries should institute measures for building social capital and strengthening networks that embrace political leaders, traditional leaders, top public sector managers, the media, civil society organizations and trade unions, academic institutions and think tanks, professional standards organizations, business associations, and religious bodies.
- It is also critical for the continent to nurture leadership succession through inclusive capacity building exercises involving young people.
- At the continent and regional levels, the leadership capacities at the African Union/African Union Commission and the regional economic communities need to be strengthened through immersion in strategic visioning and change management approaches.

Chapter 1

Africa's capacity development landscape in 2019

The Africa Capacity Indicators measure and empirically assess African countries' capacity for achieving their development agenda. The indicators also highlight key determinants and components of capacity for development. Data for the indicators were gathered through field surveys in all the countries covered. (For an explanation of how the indicators are built, country profiles, and a compendium of the statistics collected, see the technical note in the second part of this Report.)

Elements of the Africa Capacity Indicators

Gathered into the four indicator clusters described below, the indicators are used to compute the composite Africa Capacity Index (ACI), which provides a snapshot of the state of capacity in Africa. A thematic index was also calculated for this year's Report.

Indicator clusters

The policy environment for capacity development cluster considers the conditions that must be in place to enable transformational change and development, notably effective and development-oriented organizations and institutional frameworks. Broad participation and good governance underpin the indicators in this cluster, which has four components:

- Whether countries have a national strategy for development, including a strategy for agricultural development (reflecting the importance of transforming agriculture and achieving food security), and their degree of legitimacy.
- Countries' commitment to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the goals of Agenda 2063.
- Country-level focus on better use of limited resources for capacity development, as measured by policies for development cooperation set out in the 2011 Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.
- The degree of inclusiveness that supports the country's long-term stability, as measured by gender equality and other socially inclusive policies.

The processes for implementation cluster assesses how ready countries are to deliver results. It focuses on the creation of an environment that motivates and supports individuals and on country capacity to manage relations with key stakeholders inclusively and constructively and to establish frameworks for managing strategies, programs, and projects. Equally important are processes for designing, implementing, and managing national development strategies to produce socially inclusive development outcomes.

The development results at country level cluster refers to tangible outputs that encourage development. The main components are a national program for capacity development; a policy framework for statistics development, creativity, and innovation; success in implementing the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation; and gender equality and social inclusion.

The capacity development outcomes cluster measures change in the human condition. Indicators capture financial commitment to capacity development, the gains in agriculture and food security, and other changes in the human condition.

Thematic indices

Four thematic indices are calculated using the same dataset as for the primary ACI but are grouped in different combinations by theme (see discussion below). A specific theme index was also computed this year on the institutional mechanisms for implementing and monitoring Agenda 2063 and the SDGs at the country level.

Highlights of the Africa Capacity Index 2019

Seven years after the inception of the ACI, several changes were made in the variables included in calculating its capacity indicators. These changes were made in response to decisive changes in the development landscape in Africa and in the global community. In 2015 Africa adopted Agenda 2063, whose first 10-year plan covers the period 2014–23, while at

the global level the United Nations adopted the SDGs. In addition, the ACBF's new status in 2017 as an African Union specialized agency for capacity-building in Africa made it especially urgent to pay greater attention to the capacity dimension of the African Union's development agenda for Africa. Some variables that were better suited to measure progress made in previous development programs, such as the Millennium Development Goals, were replaced by indicators that better reflect current development agendas.


Country coverage in 2019

This Report aims to include all African countries in its analysis. The inaugural edition in 2011 covered 34 countries. The current edition covers 46 countries (map 1.1). Somalia is included for the first time. South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are re-included since the technical obstacles preventing their inclusion in the 2017 African Capacity Report have been resolved. Cabo Verde could not be covered as data for that country were not available in time.

Results for the Africa Capacity Indicators

Results are generally satisfactory, driven largely by a strong policy environment. The ACI ranges from 70.8 for Mauritius to 24.0 for Guinea-Bissau (table 1.1), where scores of 0 to < 20 are very low, 20 to < 40 are low, 40 to < 60 are medium, 60 to < 80 are high, and 80 to 100 are very high.

Map 1.1 | **Geographic distribution of African countries on the Africa Capacity Index 2019, by capacity bracket**



No countries are at the very low or very high extremes of capacity. Ten countries are in the high capacity bracket and five are in the low bracket, but no country is in the very low or very high bracket (figure 1.1).

The bulk of countries have medium capacity. Two-thirds of countries (67.4 percent) fall within the medium capacity bracket,

21.7 percent are in the high bracket, and 10.9 percent are in the low bracket (see figure 1.1).

Achievements by indicator cluster

The pattern of results on the four indicator clusters has not changed much since 2011. The policy environment for capacity development cluster remains the strongest

Table 1.1 Country results on the Africa Capacity Index 2019, by rank and index score


Rank	Country	ACI 2019 value	Rank	Country	ACI 2019 value
1	Mauritius	70.8	24	Djibouti	52.1
2	Burkina Faso	67.0	25	Mauritania	51.7
3	Malawi	66.2	26	Zambia	51.2
4	Ghana	65.2	27	Ethiopia	51.2
5	Tanzania	64.5	28	Comoros	51.0
6	Mali	64.1	29	Uganda	48.5
7	Tunisia	63.8	30	Gabon	48.4
8	Rwanda	63.3	31	Kenya	46.3
9	Namibia	61.1	32	Zimbabwe	46.1
10	Morocco	60.5	33	Somalia	45.4
11	Nigeria	59.6	34	Gambia	43.9
12	Benin	58.4	35	Chad	42.9
13	Liberia	57.8	36	Congo	42.5
14	DR Congo	57.1	37	Cameroon	42.4
15	Côte d'Ivoire	56.2	38	Sierra Leone	42.2
16	Mozambique	55.9	39	Eswatini	41.3
17	Guinea	55.8	40	Algeria	40.2
18	Burundi	53.9	41	Egypt	40.1
19	Niger	53.8	42	Togo	39.9
20	Lesotho	53.7	43	Central African Republic	37.0
21	Senegal	53.6	44	South Sudan	36.0
22	Botswana	53.1	45	Madagascar	34.8
23	South Africa	52.2	46	Guinea-Bissau	24.0

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

and the capacity development outcomes cluster the weakest (table 1.2). Since 2014, the development results at country level cluster have caught up somewhat with the processes for implementation cluster.

More than 93 percent of countries are ranked high or very high on policy environment for capacity development, reflecting countries' promulgation of policies and strategies for development, such

Figure 1.1 Africa Capacity Index 2019, country distribution by capacity bracket



as national development plans and vision strategies.

Processes for implementation need some improvement. Almost 60 percent of countries rank in the medium capacity or lower category.

Capacity development outcomes remain the most pressing issue. Only 2.2 percent of countries rank in the high bracket on that cluster, a slight rise from zero percent in 2016. As noted in previous Reports, capacity development outcomes are difficult to achieve because most countries allocate few resources to capacity building. Further,

a large majority of countries (66%) have not complied with the 2003 Maputo Declaration calling for allocating at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture.

Trends in the African Capacity Index by indicator cluster

Because the variables used to calculate the ACI changed this year, the 2019 capacity indicators will serve as the reference for comparisons going forward.

Scores on the ACI improved slightly from 2014 to 2017. However, while there was a slight improvement in the high bracket between 2017 and 2019 (from 20.5 percent to 21.7 percent), a larger share of countries

Table 1.2 | Distribution of countries on the Africa Capacity Index 2019, by capacity bracket and indicator cluster (percent)

Capacity bracket	Policy environment	Processes for implementation	Development results at country level	Capacity development outcomes
Very high	69.6	13.0	39.1	0
High	23.9	28.3	21.7	2.2
Medium	4.3	34.8	32.6	37.0
Low	2.2	23.9	6.5	47.8
Very low	0	0	0	13.0
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

fell in the low bracket (from 4.5 percent to 10.9 percent), thus resulting in a smaller share of countries in the medium bracket (from 75.0 percent to 67.4 percent; figure 1.2). Reasons for the increase in the share of countries in the low bracket are likely related to the large number of countries that fall in the low and very low brackets on readiness for implementation of Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, which requires increasing investments in and awareness of institutional mechanisms for capacity building.

Of the 43 countries that were surveyed in both 2017 and 2019, 22 (51.2 percent) saw an improvement in capacity while 21 (48.8 percent) saw their capacity scores decline (figure 1.3). Four countries switched from lower to higher brackets, while three countries switched from higher to lower brackets. Over the years, the Central African Republic has remained in the low bracket, even though its ACI value rose by 3.9 point, from 33.1 to 37. While Cabo Verde's ACI


could not be calculated for 2019 because necessary data were not available during the field data collection period, it has been among the best performers in previous years.

Achievements by thematic area

Achievements are encouraging overall.


More than 60 percent of countries are in the high or very high bracket on three of the four thematic indices (table 1.3). The best performance by far is for the thematic area of youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality, and social inclusion, with 93.5 percent in the very high or high capacity bracket; no country has a very low score, and 4.3 percent of countries have a medium score. Satisfactory performance in this thematic area is due to countries' ratification, implementation, and reporting on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,

Figure 1.2 Africa Capacity Index levels by capacity bracket, 2017 and 2019



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2017 and 2019.

Figure 1.3 Shifts in individual country scores on the Africa Capacity Index between 2017 and 2019



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2017 and 2019.

Table 1.3 | Performance of countries on four thematic indices of the Africa Capacity Index 2019, by capacity bracket (percent)

Capacity bracket	Policy choices for capacity development	Development cooperation effectiveness related to capacity development	Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality, and social inclusion	Partnering for capacity development
Very high	6.5	32.6	60.9	0
High	67.4	47.8	32.6	28.3
Medium	17.4	10.9	4.3	34.8
Low	8.7	6.5	2.2	21.7
Very low	0	2.2	0	15.2
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

the mainstreaming of gender in development planning, the allocation of resources to gender-related activities, and, more generally, policies tackling social inclusion. For the youth and vulnerable groups subcomponent of this thematic area, performance was slightly lower (84.8 percent of countries ranking high or very high) than for the entire thematic area. A quarter of countries have not yet ratified the African Youth Charter, and more than a third (36 percent) do not have a formal strategy for supporting vulnerable groups such as the elderly and people with disabilities.

Partnering for capacity development remains a thematic area of concern. Only 28.3 percent of countries are in the high capacity bracket, in part because less than half the countries have established a national assistance coordinating unit for capacity development.

Institutional mechanisms for Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals index

For this year’s Report, a special thematic index was computed on how African countries are implementing Agenda 2063 and the SDGs and what institutional mechanisms they have put in place for achieving the two agendas (see technical note for details on how the index was constructed). Box 1.1 presents an overview of survey instrument questions and responses related to this index.

Overall, countries need to do more in developing the institutional mechanisms for achieving satisfactorily implementation of Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. Less than half of the countries (43.5 percent) rank in the very high or high capacity bracket on this thematic index, and more than a third (34.7 percent) rank very low or low

Box 1.1 | Survey questions and results on the Institutional Mechanisms for Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals index

On preparations for Agenda 2063 implementation, countries were surveyed on the following:

- Conducting awareness-raising on Agenda 2063.
- Designing tools to assist policy-makers in integrating Agenda 2063 into national development plan.
- Integrating an inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for Agenda 2063.
- Putting in place a capacity development plan to ensure effective implementation of Agenda 2063 at the national level.
- Putting in place any institution/unit/framework to coordinate implementation of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
- Putting in place any institution/unit/framework to mainstream Agenda 2063 and SDGs into national development plans.



Conducting awareness-raising on Agenda 2063:

More effort needed

- Have conducted awareness-raising initiatives on Agenda 2063 **59.1%**
- Preparation of the initiative is under way **15.9%**
- Have not started yet **25.0%**



In-country specific tools designed to assist policy-makers in integrating Agenda 2063 into national development plan: Serious efforts needed

- Have designed tools **33.3%**
- A tool is being designed **42.2%**
- Have not started yet **24.5%**



Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for Agenda 2063: Serious efforts needed

- Have integrated a follow-up and review mechanism **29.6%**
- A mechanism is being put in place **40.9%**
- Have not started yet **29.5%**




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Box 1.1 | Survey questions and results on the Institutional Mechanisms for Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals index (continued)


Putting in place a capacity development plan to ensure effective implementation of Agenda 2063 at the national level: Serious efforts needed

- Have in place a capacity development plan for effective implementation **25.6%**
- Capacity development plan is under way **37.2%**
- Have not started yet **37.2%**




Putting in place any institution/unit/framework to coordinate implementation of Agenda 2063 and SDGs: Serious efforts needed

- Have created a specific institution **31.8%**
- Have created a department or unit within an existing institution **59.1%**
- Have not started yet **9.1%**



Putting in place any institution/unit/framework to mainstream Agenda 2063 and SDGs into national development plans: Encouraging efforts, but more needs to be done

- Have created an institution/unit/framework to mainstream Agenda 2063 and SDGs into national development plans **64.4%**
- Preparation for mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs is under way **31.1%**
- Have not started yet **4.5%**



On preparation for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), countries were surveyed on the following:

- Conducting awareness-raising on SDGs
- Putting in place an integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for the SDGs
- Putting in place a capacity development plan to ensure effective implementation of SDGs at the national level.



(continued)

Box 1.1 | Survey questions and results on the Institutional Mechanisms for Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals index (continued)


Conducting awareness-raising on SDGs: Very good results requiring a little extra effort

- Have conducted awareness-raising initiatives on SDGs **79.6%**
- Preparation of the initiative is under way **13.6%**
- Have not started yet **6.8%**




Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for SDGs: More effort needed

- Have integrated a follow-up and review mechanism **55.6%**
- A mechanism is being put in place **37.8%**
- Have not started yet **6.6%**



Putting in place a capacity development plan to ensure effective implementation of SDGs at the national level: More effort needed

- Have in place a capacity development plan for effective implementation **43.2%**
- Capacity development plan is under way **27.2%**
- Have not started yet **29.6%**



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

(table 1.4). The Central African Republic and South Sudan, in particular, need urgent support to roll out the development agendas.

Top performers on the Africa Capacity Index 2019

Ten countries have high capacity. Six of these countries were also in the high bracket in 2017 and 2015, and Malawi rejoined this bracket in 2017 after dropping

out in 2015. These countries have excellent performance in three indicator clusters: policy environment for capacity development, processes for implementation, and development results at country level. However, like other countries in Africa, they face challenges in achieving capacity development outcomes (figure 1.4). The countries are quite diverse, varying in geographic size and location (but only two are landlocked and none are in Central Africa), income level (from low-income to upper middle-income),

Table 1.4 | **Country performance on the Institutional Mechanism for Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals index 2019**

No.	Country	Index value	Rank	No.	Country	Index value	Rank
1	Egypt	90	Very High	24	Mauritania	50	Medium
2	Zimbabwe	90	Very High	25	Namibia	50	Medium
3	Côte d'Ivoire	80	Very High	26	Tunisia	50	Medium
4	Ethiopia	80	Very High	27	Benin	40	Medium
5	Malawi	80	Very High	28	Chad	40	Medium
6	Mauritius	80	Very High	29	DR Congo	40	Medium
7	Niger	80	Very High	30	Guinea	40	Medium
8	Tanzania	80	Very High	31	Botswana	30	Low
9	Burkina Faso	70	High	32	Cameroon	30	Low
10	Comoros	70	High	33	Gabon	30	Low
11	Mali	70	High	34	Madagascar	30	Low
12	Nigeria	70	High	35	Mozambique	30	Low
13	Zambia	70	High	36	Uganda	30	Low
14	Ghana	60	High	37	Djibouti	20	Low
15	Kenya	60	High	38	Lesotho	20	Low
16	Liberia	60	High	39	Eswatini	20	Low
17	Rwanda	60	High	40	Senegal	20	Low
18	Sierra Leone	60	High	41	Algeria	10	Very Low
19	South Africa	60	High	42	Gambia	10	Very Low
20	Togo	60	High	43	Morocco	10	Very Low
21	Burundi	50	Medium	44	Somalia	10	Very Low
22	Congo	50	Medium	45	Central African Republic	0	Very Low
23	Guinea-Bissau	50	Medium	46	South Sudan	0	Very Low



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2019.

Note: See technical note for a discussion of the methodology.

and membership in regional economic communities (all but Namibia are members of at least two). Two countries are in the Small States group of countries (Mauritius and Namibia).

Low performers on the Africa Capacity Index 2019

Five countries have low capacity. Though they have made notable efforts in creating



a policy environment for capacity development, these five countries perform poorly on the other three clusters, especially on capacity development outcomes, on which

80 percent rank very low (figure 1.5). They are less diverse on some parameters than the best performers. All are low-income and least developed countries; are concentrated

in three of the five AU regions (Central, East, and West Africa); and belong to two regional economic communities. Two are landlocked, and only Guinea-Bissau is a Small State. They are all ranked as fragile states, except for Madagascar, which however, was affected by conflict in 2016.

Key messages and policy recommendations

Key messages

Several key messages can be distilled from the ACI results:

- The variables that were used to calculate the Africa capacity indicators since 2011 were revised for 2019 to reflect the new development agenda for Africa (Agenda 2063) and the international community (SDGs) and the greater attention to capacity.
- Coverage of the Report has increased from 34 countries in 2011 to 46 in 2019. Somalia is a new entrant, while Cabo Verde could not be included because of challenges in meeting data collection timelines.
- Achievements by indicator cluster have not changed much since 2011. The policy environment for capacity development cluster remains the strongest. Capacity development outcomes remains the weakest and is the most pressing issue for most countries. Capacity development outcomes are difficult to achieve because most countries allocate insufficient resources to capacity building. Further, two-thirds of countries (66 percent) have not complied with the 2003 Maputo Declaration by allocating at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture.
- Achievements by thematic area are encouraging overall. For instance, more than 60 percent of countries are in the high or very high capacity bracket on two thematic areas. The best performance was recorded for youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality, and social inclusion, with 93.5 percent of countries in the very high or high capacity bracket, 4.3 percent of countries in the medium bracket, and no countries in the low capacity bracket. This is due largely to most countries' ratification, implementation, and reporting on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the mainstreaming of gender in development planning, the allocation of resources to gender-related activities, and, more generally, to policies promoting social inclusion.
- Countries are putting in place formal policies and strategies for development such as national development plans and vision strategies. Countries are responding to pressure from citizens and development partners to implement longer term development blueprints and best practices from experience with the Millennium Development Goals.

- Ten countries have high capacity and five have low capacity. The high performers have excellent performance in three indicator clusters: policy environment for capacity development, processes for implementation, and development results at country level.
 - A special theme for 2019 is the institutional mechanisms put in place for Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. Less than half the countries (43.5 percent) rank in the very high or high capacity bracket, and more than a third (34.7 percent) rank very low or low.
- Policy recommendations***
- Four policy recommendations deserve to be highlighted.
- Because capacity development outcomes are the most pressing issue, the capacity development initiatives of the African Union Commission and the ACBF should be deepened and sustained to ensure needed coordination and guidance for greater success.
 - Despite some progress in capacity development, more needs to be done. African countries need to show more commitment and support to capacity development initiatives. Political leadership is important in consolidating and guiding leadership in other spheres of society to achieve concurrence on how to develop capacity in each country.
 - While countries have done well in putting in place formal policies and strategies for development, there is room for improvement in internalizing the plans and the vision strategies to bolster ownership and consensus among citizens and across the political spectrum. This will ensure the continuity and sustainability of the plans and vision strategies when governments change.
 - African countries are at different stages of capacity development, reflecting their diverse histories, culture, politics, economies, societies, and geography. Accordingly, strategies must be based on each country's context, but with an emphasis everywhere on excellence, adaptation, and sustainability.

Chapter 2

Understanding transformative leadership

This chapter provides the broad analytical framework for the Report. It examines the context for transformative leadership in Africa, highlighting major development challenges and critical demographic and technological uncertainties about the future that African leaderships will have to address. A brief discussion of the transformation imperative in Africa follows, along with a consideration of possible lessons about transformative leadership that can be learned from the experience of developmental states. It concludes with a summary of the key capacity dimension messages and policy recommendations.

Context for transformative leadership in Africa

During the first decade and a half of the 21st century, Africa experienced strong economic performance, with annual economic growth averaging 5 percent. Among the contributing factors were high commodity prices and improvements in macroeconomic management, governance, and business environment. A majority of countries shared in the growth boom, and the period of sustained growth led to rising per capita incomes and steady improvements in education, health, and living standards.

Major challenges to development

More recent economic growth performance has been less impressive. Africa's economic growth rate reached a decade low of 1.7 percent in 2016, down from 3.1 percent in 2015. Current projections for the medium term are for 3.5 percent growth in 2018 and 3.7 percent in 2019 (table 2.1), thanks to expected moderate increases in commodity prices underpinned by more favorable domestic conditions, including in the oil, agricultural production, and solid mining sectors in some countries. Economic recovery in Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, three of the continent's largest economies, is also a contributing factor.

Growth remains constrained, however, by several domestic factors. These include foreign exchange controls in Angola and Nigeria; weather-related shocks, especially in East Africa; and political uncertainty leading to low business confidence in some countries (UNDESA 2018). There are also continuing security threats in East Africa and in the Sahel region.⁴

The continent also has much unfinished business in the structural transformation of economies. Structural transformation—the reallocation of economic activity from less to more productive sectors of the economy—has historically been the fundamental driver

Table
2.1 African output growth, 2014–19

Region	2014	2015	2016	2017 ^a	2018 ^b	2019 ^b
North Africa	1.8	3.2	2.8	4.8	4.1	4.1
East Africa	7.0	6.7	5.4	5.3	5.8	6.2
Central Africa	5.4	1.7	0.6	0.7	2.1	2.5
West Africa	6.1	3.2	0.3	2.4	3.3	3.4
Southern Africa	2.7	1.9	0.6	1.2	2.3	2.5
Africa	3.8	3.1	1.7	3.0	3.5	3.7

Source: UNDESA 2017b and 2018.

a. Estimated.

b. Forecast.

of economic development. The current pattern of structural change in Africa is very different from the one that produced high growth in Asia and, before that, in Europe. Unlike in those regions, and despite good overall growth performance, the manufacturing sector in Africa has not expanded enough to generate a substantial increase in its share of employment, and agricultural productivity remains low. Instead, employment has been shifting mainly to the services sector (AEO 2013; Enache et al. 2016). The rapid expansion in services sectors has resulted in large numbers of not particularly productive urban migrants working in services. More effective strategies are needed to create economic structures that are highly productive and able to generate employment for a growing population.

Poverty and inequality also continue to challenge Africa. Accompanying the good growth performance, the poverty rate declined significantly, from 54.3 percent in

1990 to 41 percent in 2013. In absolute terms, however, the number of people living in poverty remains as high as it was in 2002 level because of high population growth. Africa, which had less than 15 percent of the world's poor in 1990 had more than 50 percent in 2013 (World Bank 2016). Inequality also remains higher in African countries than in most other developing countries, a constraint to economic growth and poverty reduction (ACBF 2017b). The Gini coefficient average in Africa is 0.44, the second highest after Latin America, although the range is broad, from 0.31 in Egypt and Niger to 0.65 in South Africa and 0.66 in Seychelles. Furthermore, 7 of the 10 most unequal countries in the world are in Africa (AfDB, OECD, and UNDP 2016).

Africa's infrastructure deficit (see box 2.1), the largest among developing regions, is another major challenge (ACBF 2016a). The potential growth benefits of bridging Sub-Saharan Africa's infrastructure quantity

Sub-Saharan Africa has enormous infrastructure deficits

- Power is the most deficient infrastructure sector, with spending needs estimated at \$41 billion annually between 2005 and 2015 for operations and maintenance, new capacity, and rehabilitation of existing transmission and generation.
- The transport sector requires spending of approximately \$18 billion a year, half of it for maintenance, to build sufficient regional, national, rural, and urban road connectivity, along with adequate rail, port, and airport infrastructure.
- The information and communications technology sector needs annual investment estimated at \$9 billion, including \$2 billion for maintenance, to service existing demand.
- The water sector's annual funding gap is \$11 billion.
- The region needs to spend about 0.9 percent of GDP a year on sanitation—0.7 percent for investment and 0.2 percent for operation and maintenance.
- Sub-Saharan Africa loses about \$17 billion annually to inefficiencies in infrastructure operations and spending.
- Opportunities for efficiency gains include improving budget execution rates; reallocating existing budgets to subsectors with the highest economic returns, such as power; bringing user charges closer to cost-recovery levels; and promoting service quality for all utilities.

Source: ACBF 2016a.

and quality gaps are large. Catching up to the median of the rest of the developing world would increase growth in GDP per capita by an estimated 1.7 percentage points a year and closing the gap relative to the best performers would raise this growth by 2.6 percentage points per year (World Bank 2017).

Two critical uncertainties

Compounding these challenges, Africa must also deal with two critical uncertainties over the next few decades. The first is the demographic transition and the second is

technological change, the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab 2016).

Demographic transition

Population is rising faster in Africa than in any other region. Africa's share of the global population is projected to reach 25 percent in 2050, accounting for 60 percent of the expected global population increase between 2017 and 2050. Together with the demographic decline in the rest of the world, that means that the population will be much younger in Africa than in the rest of the world (UNDESA 2017d). Most of

Africa's population growth will occur in cities. By 2050, more than half (56 percent) of the population in Africa is projected to be living in cities. Over this period, some 2.5 billion people will be added to the urban population worldwide, with almost 90 percent of this increase occurring in Asia and Africa. These demographic trends mean that capitalizing on the energy and creativity of young people, especially in cities, and creating productive employment for them are key to future prosperity. But it will also be an immense challenge (see box 2.2).

Technology capacity

Although Africa is reorienting its development policies to include science, technology,

and innovation at various levels, its overall capacity in these areas is weak. The African Union's Agenda 2063 identifies science, technology, and innovation as key enablers in achieving development goals. The Africa Capacity Report 2017 showed that building capacity in these areas is one of Africa's biggest challenges, since few public institutions have staff adequately trained in science and engineering (ACBF 2017a). African countries also do poorly at retaining their highly qualified scientists and engineers, and the migration of African skilled scientists and other experts has further depleted Africa's capacity in these areas.

Against this African reality, the intensifying pace and breadth of technological

Box 2.2 | Turning the youth employment challenge in Africa into a development dividend

The continent's youth population is projected to double by 2045. Meanwhile, Africa is not creating the number of jobs needed to absorb the 10–12 million young men and women entering its labor markets each year. An emerging challenge is high unemployment among educated youth, including graduates of higher education institutions in several African countries. Lack of employment opportunities for the rapidly growing youth labor force in Africa is a ticking time bomb, as disaffection among young people can lead to conflicts that undermine social cohesion and can threaten political stability.

From a long-term demographic perspective, and in light of the continent's recent impressive growth performance, African countries face the challenge of turning their growing youth population into a development bonus. Africa's demographic transition provides opportunities for the continent to become the next global center for manufacturing and service industries. However, for Africa to benefit from this demographic dividend, its young people need to be productively employed and integrated into society.

Source: AUC et al. 2013.

advances globally are already profoundly affecting economies, societies, and ecosystems. A new UN report examining the impact of the technological revolution on labor markets and income distribution describes how technologies are increasingly encroaching in areas where human abilities were once deemed indispensable (UNDESA 2017a). There have been recent breakthroughs in several clusters of technology—from gene editing to machine learning and advanced materials. Rapid growth in large datasets and the capacity to store and use them are providing new resources for research, analysis, and problem solving, and artificial intelligence systems are increasingly able to solve complex problems autonomously. Additive or 3D manufacturing is beginning to change how products are made. All these advances will be important drivers of change globally, and Africa needs to be actively involved.

Technological change offers African countries the possibility of leapfrogging older technologies to accelerate growth and job creation, as has already been demonstrated in mobile banking. However, the rapidly expanding scope of contemporary technology change also poses a potentially serious threat to employment. The new technologies could have an especially great impact in agriculture, which employs 60 percent of developing country workers. For instance, drones could be used to scout crops as well as to reduce the manual work involved in seed planting and fertilization.

The greater threat, however, is likely to be to the industrialization process, although there is also an opportunity here. The new technological revolution could help many African countries address some structural constraints, such as distance from major markets and low economies of scale. Moreover, flexible manufacturing processes require lower investment than old specialized machines. The absence of tooling costs reduces fixed outlays and facilitates small production runs (UNDESA 2017a). On the other hand, the new industrial revolution could mean that African countries lose their lower-cost manufacturing advantage and thus their prospects of shifting workers from primary production to factory jobs. In particular, the new developments may encourage companies to move their manufacturing process closer to home and “re-shore” previously outsourced jobs. The result might be premature de-industrialization for African countries, substantially exacerbating Africa’s youth unemployment problem.

Leadership response to change

Whether these demographic and technological changes threaten or benefit African transformation will depend largely on how African leaderships respond. Governments must raise their game in fostering innovation-led growth and play an active facilitating role through support to national (public and private) institutions of research and innovation, provision of infrastructure (such as broadband), support to business

incubators to enable start-up firms to bring new technologies more quickly to markets, and encouragement of networks of firms.

Action are also needed to strengthen the capacities of current and future workers, which requires strong policies on education, vocational training, and on-the-job training. Higher education will need to improve access and increase its focus on science, technology, engineering, and math.

Meeting these challenges requires visionary political leadership with a clear strategic roadmap for building the necessary capacity and fostering dialogue among multiple stakeholders (including civil society, workers and employers, and youth). Appreciating leadership's critical role in promoting socioeconomic transformation, as well as the capacity challenges African countries, regional and continental bodies, and non-state bodies face in strengthening transformative leadership, requires understanding the concept of transformation.

Concept of transformation

Socioeconomic transformation is at the heart of sustainable development. Sustainable development is the result of an interplay between ideas and practice that had evolved over decades. In the 1950s, development was thought to equal growth plus some structural change. In the 1970s, the idea of development was expanded to include growth with redistribution. The 1980s and 1990s were dominated by a reassertion of the neoclassical orthodoxy that

development will follow if countries just “get their prices right” (Ohiorhenuan 2011). A series of major UN conferences during the 1990s highlighted the complex interaction of the many factors that contribute to development beyond economic growth.⁵ This process culminated in 2015 in the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” and the enumeration of the 17 global goals and 169 targets covering a broad range of social and economic development issues, known collectively as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; United Nations 2015).

The global consensus today is that sustainable development means radical improvements in people's lives and that socioeconomic transformation is the essence and driving force of sustainable development. These improvements should be clearly evident in rising incomes, widespread prosperity, longer life expectancy, adequate social safety nets, economic diversification, technological capability, and international competitiveness. The process is driven by self-sustaining and inclusive economic growth as well as by institutional adaptation and productivity growth. It also involves poverty reduction, human development, environmental protection, effective governance, institutional transformation, gender equity, and human rights protection.

The urgency of socioeconomic transformation seems to be clear to African leaders, as demonstrated in their adoption of

Box
2.3 | **Agenda 2063: The Africa we want**

Agenda 2063 delineates the vision of African leaders and sets out a roadmap for Africa's development up to 2063 that is committed to achieving seven aspirations:

- A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.
- An integrated continent, politically united around the ideals of pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's renaissance.
- An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and rule of law.
- A peaceful and secure Africa.
- An Africa with a strong cultural identity and common heritage, values, and ethics.
- An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and care for its children,
- An Africa that is strong, united, resilient, and an influential global player and partner.

Source: AU 2015.

Agenda 2063 at the 50th Anniversary of the African Union in May 2013 (box 2.3). Agenda 2063 sets out Africa's long-term development vision of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena" (AU 2015). Agenda 2063, which established 7 aspirations and 20 goals, was followed by adoption of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–23) in January 2015.

Agenda 2063 and the Ten-Year Implementation Plan recognize the critical role of a bold, visionary, ethical, and responsive leadership in Africa's transformation. They highlight the need for change readiness and mindset shifts in mobilizing for successful implementation of Agenda 2063. They also emphasize the importance of leadership

that recognizes and nurtures talent, creates space for individual expression, and motivates and brings out the best in people.

Although Agenda 2063 preceded the SDGs, there is considerable congruence between the two (UNDP 2017). Like the SDGs, Agenda 2063 covers the three dimensions of sustainability: economic, social, and environmental. The first aspiration of Agenda 2063, realizing a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development, is the overarching frame of reference for promoting the socioeconomic transformation of the continent. Similarly, the goals and targets of Agenda 2063 capture both the structural barriers and the drivers of transformation, as envisaged in the SDGs.

Implementing Agenda 2063 requires capacity in four areas: operational capacity for

organizations; critical, technical, and sector-specific skills; composite capacities; and transformative capacity (ACBF 2016b). Transformative capacity, which includes the ability to initiate, facilitate, and manage change, demands transformative leadership (including visioning), change readiness, ability to shift mindsets, technological predisposition and information and communications technology, commitment to invention and innovation, risk management abilities, optimism and commitment within management and top leadership, shared inspirational vision, and ownership of decision-making (ACBF 2016b: 6).

Leadership and transformation

The social science literature has long recognized that leadership is a key element in solving collective action problems. On the ground in Africa, the pivotal role of leadership is also well recognized. Twenty-five years ago, Nigerian author and Igbo chief Chinua Achebe famously declared that “the trouble with Nigeria” is simply a failure of leadership (Achebe 1983). About a decade ago, former South African President Thabo Mbeki argued powerfully for the need to develop the next generation of leaders for Africa’s transformation (Mbeki 2006). In 2004, the African Leadership Council,⁶ in its Mombasa Declaration on African Leadership, also highlighted the critical importance of leadership for Africa’s transformation (African Leadership Council 2004).

Transformative leadership is the embodiment of a range of leadership qualities or “critical competencies” (Rotberg 2012). These include emotional intelligence (with a capacity for empathy), vision, the ability to mobilize followers, integrity, prudence, ethics, trust, commitment to values, courage, self-mastery, and intellectual honesty. These competencies combine to give transformative leaders the ability to lead appropriately and with legitimacy.

What is leadership?

There is a convergence of opinion in the social science literature (Keohane 2005) and the management literature (Northouse 2016) that leadership is the process whereby an individual or group of leaders influence others to achieve a common goal. Leaders make decisions, assemble resources, deploy incentives, articulate a vision and goals, identify strategies for solving problems, and rally others to follow a course of action that they have determined is desirable.

While leadership has been analyzed in many different contexts, two strands of emphasis stand out: a primary focus on the behavior of leaders (how they act) and a primary focus on the actions of leaders (what they do). From the behavioral perspective, the two approaches that are most relevant to this Report are transactional leadership and transformational leadership. Transactional leaders approach followers with an eye to exchanging one thing for another, whereas transformational leaders are attentive to the

needs and motives of followers and inspire them to accomplish collective goals that transcend their own self-interests (Burns 1978). Transformational leadership is characterized by four behavioral characteristics: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration (Bass 1997).

While the leadership literature speaks of transformational leadership, the focus of this Report is on the actions of leaders that are transformative. There is a nontrivial distinction between transformational and transformative. Transformational means concerned with or pertaining to a major change, and transformational leadership is about the charismatic and affective elements of leadership. Transformative means having the power or capacity to bring about major change, and thus transformative leadership is leadership that brings about radical change (Safire 2008). In a socioeconomic context, leadership is transformative if it engenders the widespread improvements in people's lives described above. Among other things, such leadership inspires people, strengthens their capacities, and fosters strong institutions.

Theory and evidence on the role of leadership in transformation

Leadership plays a crucial role in the evolution of organizations and society. For that reason, interest in a more rigorous understanding of the role of leadership in socioeconomic transformation has been on the

rise in the development community. A 2005 analysis of the question "Do leaders matter?" employed econometric methods to examine whether exogenous transitions in leadership (when a leader died in office) are associated with shifts in a country's growth rates (Jones and Olken 2005). The results indicate that leaders do have significant effects on policy and that leadership matters across a broad range of regime types. The study notes, however, that the effects of individual leaders tend to be strongest both positively and negatively in autocratic settings.

The Commission on Growth and Development, an independent body established in 2006 that brought together 22 policy-makers, academics, and business leaders to examine economic growth and development, concluded that leadership plays a significant role in economic transformation.⁷ The commission's main report analyzed 13 countries that had sustained an average growth rate of at least 7 percent over 25 or more years and sought to explain their success (Commission on Growth and Development 2008). The report highlighted four proximate determinants of high and sustained growth: a fundamental commitment to a market economy and free trade, a policy framework of high macroeconomic policy predictability and a stable macroeconomic environment, a strong future orientation in policy that enables high domestic savings mobilization, and a capable, credible, and committed government that

is able to promote reasonably inclusive economic growth.

The commission emphasized leadership as a critical factor in economic transformation. The successful growth stories it examined were spearheaded over long periods by capable, credible, and committed governments. The countries' political leadership was able to devise and communicate a growth strategy and mobilize and motivate people to make the necessary sacrifices. "Such leadership requires patience, a long planning horizon, and an unwavering focus on the goal of inclusive growth" (Commission on Growth and Development 2008: 3). In several cases, a single-party government provided the strong leadership with long-term policy credibility, whereas in other cases multiparty democracies provided the lead, suggesting that strong political leadership is not necessarily embedded in autocracies.

Ethiopia and Rwanda are often presented as contemporary examples in Africa of transformative leadership. Both countries have had strong visionary leaders⁹ with a clear and reasonably inclusive development strategy, backed by and mobilizing a reasonably competent, though still weak, government bureaucracy. Both countries are working hard to build necessary capacities at central and subnational levels of government. They have also maintained reasonable economic and political stability, although there are still significant socio-political tensions and many concerns about respect for

human rights. In both countries, there have been highly visible positive changes in the material conditions of people's lives.

Ethiopia's remarkable development performance over the past 15 years is widely acknowledged. Economic growth averaged 10.8 percent a year between 2004 and 2015, compared with the Sub-Saharan average of 5.4 percent.⁹ Achievements have also been impressive in social development, especially in the expansion of health and education services. Ethiopia achieved the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for child mortality and safe water availability and has made remarkable progress in gender parity in primary education. High economic growth has helped reduce both rural and urban poverty. The number of people living in extreme poverty declined from 55.3 percent in 2000 to 33.5 percent in 2011. However, because of high population growth, the absolute number of poor people has remained at about 25 million over the past 15 years.

Rwanda has also registered remarkable economic performance over the last 15 years. Between 2001 and 2015, its real GDP growth averaged about 8 percent a year, and the country met most of the MDGs by the end of 2015. The poverty rate dropped from 59 percent in 2001 to 44 percent in 2011 and to 39 percent in 2014, while inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, fell from 0.52 in 2006 to 0.49 in 2011 and to 0.45 in 2014.¹⁰ (The Rwandan story is considered in more depth in the country case study discussions in chapter 4.)

The inference from the development literature that socioeconomic transformation requires capable leadership is also mirrored in the business and management literature. This literature also assigns a critical role to leaders in successful transformations (Kotter 1995; Higgs and Rowland 2005). A pioneering study in 1995 identified eight key actions for successful transformation: establishing a sense of urgency to motivate the constituency, forming a powerful guiding coalition, developing a potent vision of the future, communicating the vision to help the constituency better understand expectations for the change, empowering others to act on the vision, creating and celebrating short-term wins, consolidating improvements and creating more change, and institutionalizing new approaches and embedding them in the organizational culture (Kotter 1995). The study also stressed the importance of recognizing that successful transformation takes time.

Another study summarizes the tasks of the transformative leader as making the case for change by engaging constituents to recognize the business need for change, ensuring that change is based on deep understanding of the issues and supported with a consistent set of tools and processes, building commitment by engaging others in the change process, developing plans and implementing and sustaining the changes, and facilitating and supporting constituents in developing their capabilities (Higgs and Rowland 2005).

Transformative leadership for changing mindsets and reorganizing resource allocation and use

Transformation requires a paradigm shift. It requires “creating a new system and then institutionalizing the new approaches” (Kotter 1995: 60). It involves changes that are large and radical. The role of the leader is pivotal, but society-wide changes require that the citizenry must be fully committed as well. A critical mass of people with a high level of commitment is the real motive force of transformation. Transformation is “primarily not a technical but a political issue,” as it is largely about personal interests and agendas (Gioia and Thomas 1996: 378). Socioeconomic transformation, therefore, requires that people perceive an alignment between their interests and the national agenda.

President Kagame of Rwanda contends that changing mindsets is the starting point for transformation. Socioeconomic transformation involves a “mindset of urgency, ownership, responsibility, and service as well as quite frankly the mindset of moneymaking and long-term investing” (Kagame 2016). Another critical element in transformation is inclusiveness. Because it is citizens who bear most of the risk of transformation, and because it is their daily activities that lead to success, they must be included in the decisions and understand the benefits.

Leading transformation requires two critical processes: changing how people think and reorganizing resource allocation and use. The starting point for changing how

people think is to ensure that there is a clear and simple vision for the future that everyone understands and shares. An example for Africa would be that Africans want a prosperous, stable, and equitable Africa as soon as possible (Kagame 2016). There are four major levers that leaders can deploy to change mindsets: having a compelling story about the future, modeling the message, applying reinforcements as necessary, and strengthening citizens' capacities (Aiken and Keller 2009; see box 2.4).

The second critical process in leading transformation is radically reorganizing how resources are allocated and utilized by defining a small set of concrete and measurable outcomes, with targets to achieve,

resource gaps to bridge, and structural barriers to remove. Such visioning and planning have been widespread in Africa for decades. In general, however, results have been poor, as indicated by the small number of countries that have had consistently stellar development performance over the last six decades. The country cases discussed in chapter 4 suggest that leadership is a weak link in the implementation of policies and programs for socioeconomic transformation in Africa.

Leadership in the developmental state: Lessons of history

The story of developmental states in Asia is one of the best examples of how some

Box
2.4

Framework for mindset change

1. *Develop a compelling story* to convey the logic and thinking behind the change, so that constituents can understand why the change is necessary, tapping as much as possible into shared values. Deliver the story in ways that resonate with your constituency, such as through the use of humor or, in the Africa context, proverbs, drama, rituals, and symbols.
2. *Model what you preach*, showing the constituency that the leader thinks and behaves in the new way. It is more convincing to ask others to make the behavior change when a leader walks the talk.
3. *Apply reinforcement mechanisms*, ensuring that constituents are regularly rewarded when they apply the new mindsets—and that those who do not do so experience the consequences proportionately. Both reward and penalties are more effective when given informally and in nonfinancial forms.
4. *Strengthen constituents' capacity* by building the skills they need to think and behave in the new way and by assessing and closing gaps in their technical and interpersonal skills.

Source: Aiken and Keller 2009.

countries were able to achieve spectacular socioeconomic transformation over one or two generations. Many lessons can be drawn from that experience for Africa today.

Brief history of the developmental state

The notion of the developmental state, which has interested African researchers since the 1980s, has recently gained currency with policy-makers. Structural adjustment programs brought about a substantial shrinking of African state institutions in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, however, particularly as a result of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–09 and its aftermath, African policy-makers have again recognized the imperative of constructive state intervention in the economy. In particular, the crisis prompted increased interest in the idea of the developmental state. The 2011 Economic Report on Africa, which was devoted to the role of the state in economic transformation, focused on how to construct developmental states in Africa (UNECA 2011).

A developmental state may be defined as one that deploys a hegemonic ideology to mobilize society around a core set of socioeconomic transformation objectives and deploys state and non-state resources and capacities to design and implement policies and programs to achieve those objectives. It prioritizes long-term growth and structural change, manages the social tension and conflict that inevitably emerge during the process, and engages in institutional

adaptation and innovation to achieve its goals (Woo-Cummings 1999). The developmental state is effective in mobilizing people around a national agenda over a long period and marshaling societal resources and capacities in a disciplined manner in designing and implementing policies and programs for rapid growth and socioeconomic transformation.

The concept of the developmental state originated in a seminal 1982 study of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry and its role in that country's dramatic growth surge after the Second World War (Johnson 1982). The study contrasts the developmental state with the regulatory or market-rational state (Johnson 1982:19). A regulatory state is concerned with the forms and procedures of economic competition, but not so much with substantive matters. In contrast, the dominant feature of the developmental state is precisely the setting of substantive social and economic goals. In this characterization, a developmental state is defined by its commitment to an ideology of high growth rates, radical structural change, international competitiveness, and a high level of national resource mobilization toward those ends.

The developmental state is grounded in two conceptual elements: a radical change in the structure of the economy and a driving developmental ideology. The organization of state institutions does not automatically serve developmental goals even in a context of stable government, cohesive

bureaucracy, and effective institutions. Achieving developmental goals requires that state institutions and society at large be galvanized by an explicit development-oriented ideology (Vu 2007: 28; Meles 2012: 167).

Japan and the three economies that followed broadly the same strategic path and achieved similar remarkable growth success a generation later (South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) constitute the archetypal developmental state (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999; Chang 2006).¹¹ Since then, there have been many variations on the theme of the developmental state. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which also attained considerable growth success, if not as spectacular as that of Korea and Taiwan, were soon identified as developmental states. The concept has subsequently been extended to include several other Asian countries (notably, China, India, and Vietnam).

The success of the developmental states in East Asia was enabled by their particular political and institutional dynamics. Against the background of the countries' history and geopolitical context as predisposing factors, three political and institutional arrangements facilitated the emergence of the developmental state: visionary leadership, the capacity of the state bureaucracy, and a strong coalition of stakeholders in favor of transformation.

These same arrangements also facilitated the successes of two developmental

state in Africa (see box 2.5). Botswana and Mauritius have long been identified as successful developmental states (Mbabazi and Taylor 2005; Meyns 2010; Sandbrook 2005). These countries have had consistently good economic and social development outcomes for several decades, based on a natural resource economy (Botswana) or the aggressive promotion of exports (Mauritius). They have also maintained a high degree of political stability over several decades since their independence. Two other countries, Ghana and Uganda, have been identified as developmental states during periods in which they had reasonably good performance (Mbabazi and Taylor 2005; Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Ayee 2013). South Africa is considered a legitimate aspirant to developmental state status (Edigheji 2010).

Ethiopia and Rwanda are also increasingly recognized as having embarked on a developmental state trajectory. Ethiopia's former president, Meles Zenawi, insisted that becoming developmental states was the only viable development option for African countries (Meles 2012). Both countries are also democratic, although some critics contest this. They are characterized by strong, visionary leadership; a dominant party system; a competent economic technocracy; a development strategy that is reasonably inclusive; and a sound, broadly pro-capitalist, pro-rural policy framework (Kelsall and Booth 2010). They have managed to establish a degree of consensus among the political elites that enables

Botswana and Mauritius exemplify the feasibility of a democratic developmental state. From being among the poorest countries in the world 50 years ago, both countries are now classified as upper middle-income, with a per capita income of around \$7,000 for Botswana and \$10,000 for Mauritius. Moreover, the process has been reasonably inclusive, although income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, remains high in Botswana at 60.5 compared with 35.8 for Mauritius (World Bank. No date. Country Data for Botswana and Mauritius, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana?view=chart> <https://data.worldbank.org/country/mauritius?view=chart>). Through this remarkable economic performance both countries have also remained politically stable. Both are multiparty democracies, although the political system is much more competitive in Mauritius. These achievements have been attributed to three main factors: development-oriented leadership, competent and relatively autonomous state bureaucracy, and a strong public-private alliance promoting the national development agenda.

Development-oriented leadership

Both countries have built a national consensus around a long-term development vision through democratic means. Under the leadership of its first president, Seretse Khama, Botswana adopted the national principles of “democracy, development, self-reliance, and unity” and the objectives of “sustained development, rapid economic growth, economic independence, and social justice.” These principles and objectives have informed the country’s development plans since then and are still reflected in the country’s Vision 2036 document. In Mauritius, while political parties are distributed across a broad ideological spectrum, they all adhere to an explicit developmental ideology of growth with equity. The consensus-building approach to politics that the first prime minister, Seewoosigur Ramgoolam, adopted at independence has been sustained and nurtured through several changes of government. The essence of these countries’ success is that the leaders took decisions that set up development-promoting institutions or initiated practices that soon morphed into such institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson; 2003; Frankel 2010)

State competence

Both countries have maintained a disciplined and competent bureaucracy. Since the Mauritius Public Service Commission was established in 1953, Mauritius has largely adhered to meritocratic principles in recruitment and promotions. It has maintained

(continued)

The democratic developmental state in Botswana and Mauritius (continued)

a disciplined and competent bureaucracy with high levels of independence and esprit de corps. Partly because of this it has also remained remarkably free of the predatory corruption that is the bane of the civil service in many African countries. The developmentalist ability of Botswana's bureaucracy may be weaker than that of Mauritius, but it has also remained clean, nationalistic, and strongly development-oriented.

Public-private partnership

Even as it adopted state-led development, Botswana has since independence maintained a policy of welcoming private investment. The government's joint venture with the South African mining giant De Beers continues to thrive and provides a degree of assurance that the favorable environment for private investment will be sustained. Diamond mining rather than manufacturing has been the driving force of Botswana's growth, a distinguishing feature of development. Mauritius explicitly adopted the East Asian model of export-led industrialization, providing incentives and an environment conducive to private sector development. The export processing zone model was particularly important in ensuring private capital of policy continuity. Convinced early on that export-led growth based on manufacturing (and later on services) was the most viable development strategy, the government has established and fostered excellent institutional mechanisms to promote regular interaction among labor, business, and government.

Source: Brautigam 1997; Mbabazi and Taylor 2005; Sandbrook 2005; Meyns 2010; World Bank Country Data for Botswana and Mauritius, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana?view=chart> <https://data.worldbank.org/country/mauritius?view=chart>.

policies to be sustained over the long run (Booth 2015).

The wide range of countries that fall under the developmental state rubric makes it clear that it can take a variety of institutional forms, depending on the context. In particular, it is now widely understood that authoritarian governance, which was considered a defining feature in the first generation of developmental states, is neither necessary nor

sufficient. All that is required is that there be effective processes and mechanisms for securing and maintaining consensus on a national agenda and a strategic road map for its implementation. A democratic developmental state is thus a feasible option (Robinson and White 1998; Mkwandire 2001; Edigheji 2010), as the remarkable socioeconomic development of Botswana and Mauritius under democratic systems demonstrates.

Initial conditions for transformation

The historical context of a country was a crucial element in the success of the developmental state, as context tends to shape available windows of opportunity. Japan's extraordinary spurt in national output growth occurred from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. But its success was built on the substantial institutional and political changes that occurred during the Meiji era in the late 19th century. Prior to the Meiji restoration, Western powers were able to force on Japan treaties that limited its control over its foreign trade and even its legal system. Japan's initial transformation in this period was partly the result of a nationalist reaction to foreign domination. Throughout its take-off, Japan remained highly wary of foreign capital and the risk of becoming economically subservient to foreign influence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1975: 11–19).

South Korea and Taiwan were similarly situated in conditions of extraordinary external threats and opportunities. With the partition of Korea, the communist regime in North Korea became a clear threat to South Korea. Similarly, Taiwan saw itself as facing the fire of the great China dragon. Beyond the simple question of an external threat, security considerations gave these countries exceptional geostrategic significance, as a result of which they benefited disproportionately in terms of trade, capital, and technology from first Japan and then the United States (Cumings 1987).

Another important element in the historical antecedents of East Asian development is the colonial experience. For Korea, for instance, it has been suggested that while Japanese colonialism was predatory it was also developmental in achieving a measure of rapid industrial growth (Cumings 1981). It also left a legacy of bureaucratic capacity that formed the management base for subsequent industrial growth in Korea (Kohli 2004). In contrast, some contend that the Dutch left a weaker developmental institutional legacy in Indonesia, thus explaining at least in part why Indonesia did not become the developmental state that Korea did (Vu 2007).¹²

Land reform was one of the most important elements in the initial conditions for development in the East Asian developmental states (World Bank 2006b). In Korea, for instance, land reform was a particularly important foundation for its structural transformation. In three waves from 1946 to 1955, Korea established a land tenure system that limited land ownership to 3 hectares, allowed only people who were actually farming to own farmland, and prohibited farmers from contracting out their land (Kwon and Yi 2008). Korea's land reform produced largely income- and asset-equalizing outcomes. It raised the productivity and incomes of farming families and mitigated the tendency toward inequality that could accompany rapid economic growth (Kwon and Yi 2008).¹³

While these initial conditions were important as foundational elements in the Asian

developmental states, they should not be considered universal requirements. Indeed, the democratic developmental trajectory of both Botswana and Mauritius is the product of their own unique histories, which differ significantly from those of the East Asian states. It has been pointed out, for instance, that the most important initial condition for Mauritius may well be the fact that “everyone who is there came from somewhere else, in modern times” (Frankel 2010: 28).

National mobilization

All the archetypal developmental states demonstrated a genuine commitment to building a strong economy. They enhanced the role of citizens as prime movers and beneficiaries of industrialization, framing transformation as a collective project of national development (Evans 2008). This inherent nationalism was a major factor in successful structural transformation (Amsden 2013). These developmental states explicitly oriented industrial policy toward securing the home market, with governments intervening in the economy to create nationally owned (public and private) firms and supporting an environment that favored the accumulation of national production skills, managerial capabilities, and technological expertise.

Role of the leader and the leadership

The political leadership class

Strong visionary leadership was a major characteristic of the developmental state.

All the East Asian developmental states had powerful leaders who were committed to driving development. These leaders provided clear directions for social and economic change and created a powerful constituency across several domains to fully harness the economic potential of their countries. In South Korea, for instance, General Park had clear strategic objectives and saw his first priority as ending the economic distress of the Korean people, struggling in despair and hunger, and reconstructing a self-sustaining economy (Seunghee 2014: 47).

The pioneer leaders in the developmental states provided a vision of the future and initiated a focused agenda with rigorous plans and programs. The legitimacy of the developmental state derived from the revolutionary authority of people committed to the transformation of their social, political, and economic order—legitimacy derived from the state’s achievements rather than from how it came to power (Johnson 1999: 53). In all cases, however, leadership extended beyond the person of the president.

In Korea, while Park was the motivating force of transformation, the effective exercise of leadership lay in the capability of the bureaucracy and the strong collaboration between the state and the private sector. In Japan too, a dominant political party (the Liberal Democratic Party) together with a strong state bureaucracy provided the leadership vision. The state also had a strong alliance with the private sector.¹⁴ This coalition

was able to look beyond short-term considerations to the long-term welfare of the nation and was dedicated to the vigorous pursuit of this long-term goal.

The technocratic leadership class

A strong core of state institutions ensured the success of the developmental state. In Japan, this role was played by a civil service staffed by the best managerial talent available in the system, which managed all aspects of industrial policy (Johnson 1982). The notion of “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995) conveys the essence of the developmental state bureaucracy that is strong enough to promote economic growth without being captured by special interests.¹⁵ Meritocracy and long-term career prospects were essential characteristics of the state administration in the archetypal developmental state. Civil servants could be fully professional and detached from powerful political or business groups attempting to influence them. At the same time, the bureaucracy was not isolated from the larger society. It remained connected through a matrix of social ties that often provided channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies.

In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in close collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, played the lead role by identifying key industries and marshalling resources (Johnson 1982). Through these entities, the state supported its corporate sector, nudging it in the desired

direction, providing it with fiscal incentives, and nurturing it to higher productivity and global competitiveness.

In Korea, political centralization under General Park was matched by centralization of economic decision-making in the Economic Planning Board. The board was established by bringing together the budget bureau of the Finance Ministry and the statistics bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Bank of Korea was also brought under the board's control. Moreover, the state secured majority ownership in the banks, which enabled it to maintain control over credit. It was thus able to pursue “market-defying” selective industrial policies (Chang 2010).

Korea's main vehicle for delivering economic policy was the five-year plan, four of which were launched during its high-growth period. The Economic Planning Board directed the policy orchestration that produced the country's impressive development results (Seunghee 2014). The board chaired working-level coordination meetings on matters of economic planning and operation, with the vice minister and director-general of each economy-related ministry in attendance. At a higher level, a meeting of economic ministers was chaired by the Economic Planning Board minister, who also served as deputy prime minister. At the apex was the Monthly Economic Trend Report Meeting, the coordinating forum chaired by the president, with key ministers, senior officials, and representatives from businesses and banks in attendance.

The state did not intervene as forcefully in Taiwan as in Japan or Korea. Although the state controlled the banking sector, as in Korea, the lead agency, the Industrial Development Bureau, was essentially a coordinating committee not a coherent ministry or agency. The bureau was tightly constrained by the political power of the Kuomintang (Chang 2010). Despite the differences, however, all three countries had the attribute of a lead bureaucratic agent that was highly competent and successful in leading economic transformation.

The business and civil society leadership class

An alliance between the state and the private sector was another key driver of the developmental state. The public–private partnership that underpinned the Japanese developmental state was symbiotic (Johnson 1982). The state prioritized certain industries and facilitated their growth. There were tensions between the government and the public sector at the outset of industrial policy implementation, but Japan dealt with them through a system of cooperation. In the Japanese developmental state, each side used the other in a mutually beneficial relationship to achieve developmental goals and enterprise viability (Johnson 1982).

In Korea, a strong alliance between government and business was created through a combination of coercion and inducement, contestation and accommodation. For instance, the Park regime persuaded key

businesspeople to make large contributions to the government to avoid prosecution for amassing wealth illegally. The Association of Korean Businessmen, formed with government encouragement, identified a number of key industries for investment with the proviso that appropriate support policies were in place. The “contributions” were also invested in new plant, with the government underwriting foreign loans to ensure the necessary additional capital. In this manner, the government and the private sector recognized the importance of mutual cooperation (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 1990).

Taiwan, with a much weaker private sector than Japan or Korea, had a different kind of public–private cooperation. To ensure control over the development process, the state created a policy network that relied heavily on publicly owned banks, research organizations, universities, and consulting firms (Wade 1990).

The role of the citizenry in transformative leadership

At the early stages of their high growth periods, the East Asian developmental states generally had poor records in public sector efficiency and transparency. In the early 20th century, Japanese workers were considered lazy, unskilled, and half as productive as their US counterparts. Savings habits were poor, and workers did not stay long enough at a job to accumulate skills and experience. South Korea was considered a basket case in the 1950s, with inept and

corrupt officials, heavy dependence on US aid for survival, and poor prospects for investment (Ohno and Ohno 2009, 2012).

The countries overcame these challenges while strengthening capabilities for socioeconomic transformation. The population subscribed to their leaders' vision that projected national pride, extolled material advancement, and promoted the imperative of duty, dedication, pragmatism, innovativeness,¹⁶ and competitiveness (Ohno and Ohno 2009). The countries often deployed militarist approaches to inculcate ethical discipline and effectiveness. For instance, the organizational structure in the heavy and chemical industries in Korea mirrored that of the army, with post-military service employees working under militarist hierarchical command (Kim 2014). Strong measures were also adopted to curtail corruption and nepotism and advance meritocracy. However, as indicated above, while dedication and national discipline are essential, authoritarian rule characterized by human rights violations and political oppression is not.

The social inclusiveness of the transformation program also helped secure the compliance of the citizenry with the national agenda. The developmental state recognized the value of catering to the social needs of the general population through initiatives that aimed at catering for social needs. Promoting social development, while valuable in itself, was also instrumental in easing the social and political tensions that rapid change entails. In Korea, the government

established a system of public health institutions and mobilized it for developmental purposes as well as public health services. It expanded public health facilities in rural areas and improved the health conditions of the poor. Policies encouraged private sector investment in medical facilities while allocating substantial resources to the public provision of healthcare. In addition, the state used incentives to mobilize trained medical personnel to serve in rural areas (UNRISD 2012).

Another feature of the developmental state was its emphasis on building human capital. The developmental states invested heavily in education at all levels, health-care services, and social safety nets. Korea adopted universal primary education as early as the 1950s, and investments in secondary education boosted enrollment past 80 percent by 2000. University enrollment reached over 60 percent in 2004, the highest among OECD countries (Suh et al. 2006).¹⁷ The Korean government established an extensive public vocational training system, commencing in 1967 with the Vocational Training Law. It also subsidized companies to provide training programs that met vocational training standards. By 1986, some 3 percent of the workforce had been trained in vocational institutes, and another 0.5 percent had been trained through internal company-based vocational training programs (Yi 2011).

Political stability

An important inference from the experience of developmental states is the importance

of political stability. The authoritarian bent of the early developmental states is often said to have been necessary to ensure stability during the period of rapid transformation. According to Korea's President Park:

In order to ensure efforts to improve the living conditions of the people in Asia even undemocratic measures may be necessary ... It is also an undeniable fact that the people of Asia today fear starvation and poverty more than the oppressive duties thrust on them by totalitarianism ... In other words, the Asian peoples want to obtain economic equality first and build a more equitable political machinery afterward (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 1990: 15).

Indeed, the example of the other East Asian Tigers—Taiwan and Singapore—seems to support this viewpoint. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew rejected “the notion that all men yearned for democratic freedoms, prizing free speech and the vote over other needs such as economic development. Asian societies, he contended, were different, having evolved separately from the West over the centuries.” Lee also believed that “notions of absolute rights to freedom for individuals would sometimes have to be compromised in order to help maintain public order and security” (Kwang, Fernandez, and Tan 1998: 126).¹⁸

An authoritarian regime is often justified as being better able to take and implement difficult decisions more quickly and to

impose a national developmental ideology on the population for hard work and sacrifice. It can also better ensure technocratic rationality in identifying and implementing strategic initiatives, long-term policy consistency, and increased policy credibility (Johnson 1987, 1999; Deyo 1987; Chang and Shin 2002).

However, there is good evidence that the results of the developmental state can be attained without the authoritarian baggage. Japan's democratic credentials are an example (Chang 2011).¹⁹ Several Western democracies also transformed their countries through policies similar to those of developmental states. And two African states that are developmental in both aspiration and economic performance, Botswana and Mauritius,²⁰ are democracies (Mkandawire 2001).

The core message is that peace and political stability are necessary conditions for transformation. They ensure the confidence in the economy that minimizes investment risks, entrenches trust in both market and state institutions, and assures all stakeholders of predictability in interactions with the government. Some social volatility is inherent in a democracy, but there is no reason to consider this as a disabler of transformation. Other avenues can be explored to smooth out volatility. For example, appropriate political arrangements could be initiated, such as the negotiation of a national unity government in post-independence Mauritius. The national unity government is widely

believed to have established the foundation of the key policies that later made Mauritius famous as a development success (Brautigam 2009). Elements of traditional African culture embedded in such notions as Ubuntu, with its ethic of moral obligation and interpersonal accountability, could also be invoked.

Key leadership lessons from the experience of the developmental states

Building consensus on the desired future

Leaders make decisions, assemble resources and deploy incentives, give voice to vision and articulate goals, identify strategies for solving problems, and mobilize others to follow a course of action that they have determined is desirable (Keohane 2005). In the developmental states, economic policy, particularly industrial policy, was anchored in long-term goals and policy commitment. In a process led by the top leader, the country articulated a long-term national vision. This consensus on the desired future was established through processes involving different degrees of inclusiveness. However, regardless of the degree of inclusiveness in the consensus building process itself, the successful implementation of the program typically involved a high degree of social inclusiveness.

Ensuring policy coordination and coherence

Another important aspect of the leadership role in the transformation of the

developmental state, from Japan to Botswana and Mauritius, was ensuring effective coordination of economic and social policies and processes. The developmental state leadership teams fostered an institutional environment that ensured their ability to design coherent policies, coordinate key stakeholders, and maintain the transformation agenda consistently over the long term. Competent coordination ensured that appropriate interventions were made at each stage and that processes were established and maintained to ensure path correction as needed.

Ensuring policy credibility and commitment

Once the country has adopted a long-term national vision and sketched out the possible routes to achieve it, appropriate government entities are designated or created to draft ambitious but feasible strategies and execute concrete action plans that are revised as circumstances change while remaining true to the long-term vision. This was the essence of the approach in the East Asian developmental states (Ohno and Ohno 2009), and it was also broadly the approach followed in Botswana and Mauritius. The important lessons from the transformation process of these countries are the consistency and flexibility of their leaderships in economic policy, unwavering discipline in economic management, and goal orientation in consistently strengthening human resources and technological capabilities.²¹

Key messages and policy recommendations

Key messages

- Despite strong recent economic performance, Africa still has much unfinished business in transforming its economic structure, overcoming poverty, and capitalizing on the energy and creativity of its massive pool of young people.
- Transformative leadership that brings about radical change is essential for addressing this unfinished business. It is the kind of leadership that engenders widespread improvements in people's lives that are evident in rising incomes, longer life expectancy, adequate social safety networks, and increased access to basic services.
- Historical evidence indicates that transformative leadership is larger than the country's "chief executive officer." A transformative agenda is anchored in visionary leadership, but it is complemented by strong political and economic institutions, including a highly competent government bureaucracy, and a developmental coalition that cuts across sectors. Accordingly, successful transformation also requires the mobilization of leaders from non-state sectors to champion long-term development goals.
- Not only must the top civil service managers be highly skilled, but they must also be supported by strong institutions with effective systems and processes

for policy and program design and implementation.

- Historical evidence suggests that successful transformation has occurred mostly in countries that were politically stable over long periods under strong political leadership that was capable, credible, and committed to national prosperity. Such governments are able to devise and communicate a growth and development strategy and mobilize and motivate people to make the necessary sacrifices.
- In summary, successful transformation requires the building and strengthening of capacities across a broad spectrum of domains. These include the leadership domain itself—the government's capacity to entrench appropriate institutional mechanisms and design and manage reforms for inclusive growth and development.

Policy recommendations

- As transformative leadership consists of a team more than of a single person at the helm, capacity building efforts should engage the top political leadership and top management in the public and private sectors. Africa's history and culture suggest that, in addition, religious leaders and traditional leaders should also be engaged.
- Countries should establish platforms that immerse these top leaders in the essence of transformative leadership. These could take the form of intensive

short-term programs in which they reflect critically on their leadership styles and experiences; learn how to navigate an increasingly complex global, regional, and local environment; rediscover behaviors that build the trust of followers; and renew the meaning of ethics and social responsibility in leadership. The platforms could also sharpen awareness about responsible leadership and the requirements for national stewardship among leaders on the continent.

- Because mindset change is vital to socio-economic transformation, leaders should acquire the competencies needed to facilitate mindset change in the general population. Leaders should have access to programs that convey ways to construct and disseminate the most compelling narrative on why change is necessary. Such programs would deepen leaders' understanding of how to model their vision in words and action and sharpen knowledge of appropriate reinforcement mechanisms. Another important aspect of such leadership capacity would be to understand the technical and interpersonal skills that need to be strengthened among the citizenry.
- There is also a need for capacity development initiatives for leaders on how to be more effective in decision-making and communication. This would include how to lead and facilitate strategic thinking; how to analyze the challenges, critical uncertainties, and global drivers of change in the 21st century; and how to better understand and deploy information and communication technology.
- African countries must invest massively in strengthening competencies in their civil service and bureaucracy. Capabilities, systems, and processes must be strengthened in policy entities responsible for economic planning and finance and social, health, and educational development. That means, in particular, strengthening the capacity of development planning commissions and finance and economy ministries and departments with social policy and planning mandates. Equally important is the capacity of countries' institutions of oversight, restraint, compliance, and accountability, such as ombudspersons and anticorruption and audit departments. Such entities should be capacitated in the design and oversight of long-term transformation programs. These aspects could be addressed through institutionalized workshops and structured courses.
- There is a need for platforms of peer learning for various leadership groups. This could involve periodically convening leaders, opinion makers from key sectors, leading expert practitioners, and young people with demonstrable leadership potential to deconstruct challenges and find solutions. Networks of alumni from these events could discover and engage successor generations of leaders and policy-makers.

- There is a need to build coalitions to lead socioeconomic transformation over the long run. These leadership coalitions must be independent of particular individuals so that they continue to function over the long term. This implies that leadership capacities should be built in multiple domains. Countries should institute social capital building measures that embrace political leaders, traditional leaders, top public sector managers, the media, civil society organizations and trade unions, academic institutions and think tanks, professional standards organizations, business associations, and religious bodies.
- Leadership succession must be nurtured through inclusive capacity building exercises, particularly for young people, who should be exposed to leadership skills early through the education system and specialized programs. More broadly, African countries must invest in training young people in the skills of the future, with an emphasis on science, technology, and innovation.
- There is a need to strengthen the capacities of leadership at the African Union and the regional economic communities through regular strategic visioning and change management review exercises. Systematic training programs for their senior cadres can bolster skills in key areas of leadership capabilities, including visioning, change readiness, ability to bring about mindset shifts, information and communications technology, invention and innovation commitment, risk management, leadership optimism and commitment, and ownership of decision-making.
- As long-term political stability is critical to transformation, there is a need to strengthen national, regional, and continental capacities in conflict analysis and social dialogue, conflict prevention, and conflict mediation and resolution. Countries need to strengthen or establish arrangements to ease tensions as early as possible and prevent local conflicts from escalating. In many African countries, there are chronic social tensions and recurrent conflicts (though not necessarily marked by violence), and elections are often triggers for violent conflicts. Free and fair elections, by strengthening stability, could nurture durable arrangements for inclusive and nonviolent conflict resolution. These include local, regional, or national peace councils that engage protagonists to agree on means and ways of resolving conflicts. By involving representatives of various religious, social, and political groups, such bodies can raise awareness on the use of nonviolent strategies across society. Many African countries already have such mechanisms. Ghana's national peace architecture, particularly its National Peace Council, is widely recognized as a model for developing national capacity to prevent conflict.

Chapter 3

The state and challenges of transformative leadership in Africa

This chapter examines Africa's socio-economic transformation since the 1960s and progress in transformative leadership in Africa. It examines the evolution of transformative leadership from of postcolonial leadership to transformation in contemporary Africa and the mutually complementary relationship between transformative leadership and effective institutions. It considers the dynamics of relations between political leadership and other leaders—bureaucratic, traditional, business, religious, and trade union and other civil society—and the challenges that African political leaders face, including ideological fragmentation, selective or adaptive learning from external ideas, weak and ineffective public sectors and public sector institutions, weak policy and program design and coordination capacities, weak implementation capacities, inadequate domain competence, embedded weaknesses in systems and processes, lack of appropriate data, and leadership networking challenges. Finally, key messages and policy recommendations are highlighted.

Socioeconomic transformation in Africa since the 1960s

This Report emphasizes the intersection of leadership and institutions in Africa's transformation, prioritizing the role of institution-building that transcend individuals over the

search for messianic, visionary, transformative men and women. In underscoring the significance of the leadership dimensions of development, it also highlights the institutional dimensions, particularly efforts to build institutions and leadership teams that can work through them to achieve better development outcomes. It asks: How and when does democratic governance produce leaders who can make a difference in development? Is Africa saddled with poor leaders because of weak institutions or because it lacks strong men and women with bold visions?

Africa's socioeconomic transformation is examined over three periods: independence to the late 1970s, the "crisis" period of 1980–2000, and the "Africa rising" period of the 2000s.

Independence to the late 1970s

Since political independence in the 1950s and 1960s, African countries have been preoccupied with social and economic transformation, punctuated by fierce debates among stakeholders on how to accelerate sustained socioeconomic development. Expectations were strong that postcolonial leaders would deliver on their promise for economic transformation and prosperity for all. As a result, the first decade after independence saw the implementation mainly

of state-led development strategies aimed at rapid industrialization and socioeconomic transformation (Padayachee and Hart 2010).

These efforts yielded some modest gains in economic growth and infrastructure development in the form of new schools, hospitals, roads, railways, and power generation (Lawrence 2010). African economies exported a range of agricultural crops and minerals. Some countries met most of their domestic basic food needs through domestic production. And some countries had emerging industrial sectors, mainly food processing and usually owned by foreign investors or set up as joint ventures between foreign firms and the government. Healthy growth rates and investment were recorded. During the 1960s, 21 of 29 countries with data had an average annual growth rate of more than 5 percent during the 1960s (Mills 2010).

Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah epitomized the state-led development agenda of the postcolonial era, with huge investments in infrastructure and other moves to transform the impoverished and neglected colonial economy. The Nkrumah government constructed schools, teacher training institutes, and colleges and implemented an ambitious industrialization program largely through state-owned enterprises. In 1960, Ghana, the world's leading cocoa producer and home to Africa's most developed middle class, had an economy larger than Indonesia's and a per capita income on a par with South Korea's (Padayachee and Hart 2010).

In short, these state-led policies to restructure the postcolonial economy and invest in socioeconomic development resulted in decent growth rates and socioeconomic well-being in many African countries during the period between independence and the late 1970s (Mills 2010).

The crisis period of 1980–2000

After the mid-1970s, the continent began to experience a period of rapid decline that has been called the “African crisis” or the “African tragedy.” While external factors, including adverse developments in the global economy such as rising oil prices, played a role, domestic factors exacerbated the decline (Leys 1994; Easterly and Levine 1997; Arrighi 2002; Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003). “Bloated, corrupt, and inefficient government bureaucracies increasingly incapable of responding to the day-to-day needs of their respective populations” were in power in many countries (Schraeder 2004: 8), leading to a succession of military coups d'état, civil strife and ethnic violence, and political instability (Owusu 2003). In many countries, the quality of life deteriorated for much of the population, and economic growth rates declined. “The average annual GDP growth rate for low-income Africa declined from 2.7% during 1970–1980 to 0.7% in 1992 and reached a record low of 0.2% in 1983” (World Bank 1986: 7).

The situation was grim. During this period, Africa suffered deadly ethnic conflicts, natural disasters, famine, corrupt and

authoritarian political leadership, and growing aid-dependency (Mills and Herbst 2011). The African tragedy played out through war, economic disintegration, and the spread of disease (Lawrence 2010). Despite advances in medical science elsewhere, in Africa the scourges of HIV/AIDS, drought, and road accidents killed more than 200,000 people in 2007 (Lawrence 2010: 19). Soon there were food shortages, which resulted in severe malnutrition, hunger, and death. In addition to the immense human suffering, these conditions undermined the quality of the labor force, with adverse effects on productivity, costs, and competitiveness (Lawrence 2010: 19).

Responses to the dire situation came from within and from outside Africa in a clash of ideas between Africa and its foreign patrons over the continent's slide into crisis and how to reverse it (Browne and Cummings 1983). The African Union proposed the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa (1980–2000) and the Final Act of Lagos. Externally, the World Bank produced *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* in 1981 (popularly known as the Berg Report).

Temporarily, at least, the outside actors won the debate. The World Bank's structural adjustment program (SAP) became the new development orthodoxy and the main policy-making instrument to address the crisis in African development. SAP emphasized export-led growth, liberalization of

the economy, privatization, and market-led growth ("Washington consensus" policies). SAP generally required countries to devalue their currencies against the US dollar, dismantle import and export restrictions, balance their budgets, and remove price controls and state subsidies. Many African countries embarked on economic reforms in the 1980s along these neoliberal lines, with mixed results. While some countries made progress in their macroeconomic management, others failed to sustain economic growth and poverty reduction.

The austerity measures required to balance budgets resulted in a major turnaround in the financial and economic performance of many African countries, at least during the early years (Ake 1996). For example, when Ghana launched its economic recovery program and reform program under the auspices of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), its economy had been experiencing high inflation and rising public sector debt. Within a decade, growth in real GDP recovered, allowing gains in per capita incomes; inflation declined; and the balance of payments moved from deficit to surplus (Hutchful 2002; Herbst 1993). The country's infrastructure, almost nonexistent at the onset of SAP in 1983, improved appreciably. Implementation of SAP in Ghana "reversed the decline of recent years" (Rothchild 1991: 3).

But despite some overall economic gains following implementation of SAP policies in many African countries over 1980–2000, a

majority of Africans still lacked access to potable water, health care, and education. And some SAP policies worsened conditions for the poor, especially the removal of subsidies on basic social services and the introduction of user fees. SAP policies also exposed fragile African economies to the volatile international market before they were strong enough to withstand the competition. In addition, many African countries had to spend their meager export earnings and other resources on debt service rather than on providing basic services for their people. Debt burdens in many countries became unsustainable, requiring countries to undertake poverty-reduction and other policies in order to become eligible for debt relief under the joint World Bank–IMF Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative, launched in 1996. Of the 42 countries classified as highly indebted poor countries in 2003, 34 were in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNCTAD 2004a).

The failure of SAP and the neoliberal agenda to reduce poverty and advance social development resulted in widespread criticism and opposition in Africa and at the global level. A devastating criticism of SAP was that it lacked country ownership and had been prepared without meaningful country input or involvement (Collier 2000). In response to this criticism, the international development community introduced a “new development architecture” in the form of donor support for poverty reduction strategies (Soederberg 2004). This included attempts to incorporate a new poverty

reduction discourse into the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework and insert ideas of social development into the theory and practice of development. It also included a new emphasis on country ownership of policies and a role for civil society in the design and implementation of poverty reduction policies.

This opening up of space for national participation in the development discourse also coincided with the movement toward a “post–Washington consensus” development framework (Stiglitz 2002). In addition to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative to reduce debt, countries were asked to produce Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, laying out their plans for pursuing the twin goals of sustainable growth and poverty reduction. Alongside this new multi-lateral approach, individual countries also rolled out new bilateral aid programs such as the US Millennium Challenge Account in 2002 aimed at increasing US development assistance by \$5 billion a year within five years. The more than 20 African countries that benefited from the Millennium Challenge Account were selected based on just rule, investments in people, and economic freedom (Mills and Herbst 2011).

The Africa rising period of the 2000s

The post–Washington consensus period, with its new global development architecture emphasizing country ownership, home-grown development strategies, and on poverty reduction and social development,

coincided with the broader global turn toward mainstreaming social development and poverty reduction in international development cooperation. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), agreed in 2000, called for a new partnership between richer and poorer countries to attain agreed-on development goals and targets, with a new focus of the international development agenda on investments in social policy and poverty reduction (UNDP 2003).

In Africa, this global consensus was expressed in 2001 in the continental development blueprint called the New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD). NEPAD sought to attain four primary objectives by building partnerships at country, regional, and global levels: poverty reduction, sustainable growth and development, Africa's greater integration into the world economy, and empowerment of women (Hope 2002; Adesina 2007).

Africa's socioeconomic performance in this period has been mixed. Policies to improve governance led to growing investor confidence and growth in the continent's share of global foreign direct investment. For instance, after lagging behind other developing regions since the 1970s, Africa's GDP growth rates finally exceeded population growth rates after the mid-1990s. Accordingly, investor interest in Africa soared during the 2000s, not just from developed countries but also from emerging market economies, such as Brazil, China, and India. New aid and debt-relief policies of global

financial institutions and bilateral donors also enabled many African countries to improve their sovereign debt rating and access private debt markets. Consequently, Sub-Saharan African economic growth rose from 2.5 percent during 1990–2000 to 4.7 percent during 2000–06 (World Bank 2008).

If the 1970s and 1980s were described as Africa's "lost decade," the first decade of the 21st century could be described as Africa's "decade of progress." This turnaround in Africa's socioeconomic fortunes resulted in 6 African countries placing among the 10 fastest economies worldwide during 2000–10. Recent offshore oil discoveries in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, together with the continent's rich endowment in other natural resources, continue to make Africa a popular investment destination for companies across the globe.

A key dimension of Africa's recent political economy is the continent's growing integration into the global economy, as epitomized by developments in information and communication technology. For instance, liberalization of Africa's telecommunications sector has enabled new connections to be made between individuals, communities, markets, and countries, which have fostered greater integration of Africa with the global economy (Mills and Herbst 2011).

Africa's new socioeconomic standing shows that Africa has jettisoned some of the bad practices of the past few decades and rid itself of many of its self-inflicted internal challenges. The political and governance

reforms implemented since the early 1990s and the introduction of NEPAD and the good governance agenda of the Peer Review Mechanism have enabled many African countries to create an enabling environment for economic growth and prosperity.

Role of institutions, structures, and policies in Africa's development

Much of the focus of the economic and political development literature has been on failure rather than success. In seeking to account for poor performance, the explanatory finger has been pointed at institutions, structures, and policies. In Africa, especially, these have included pervasive neo-patrimonialism, poor policies, weak institutions and bureaucracies, overbearing states, “comprador bourgeoisie” parasitism, ethnic conflict, clientelism, disruptive colonial impositions and the creation of artificial state boundaries, predatory political regimes, and many more (Leftwich 2009). Four “structural traps” have been identified that keep the poorest countries and their people poor: the conflict trap, which locks countries into cycles of political violence (civil wars, coups d'état); the natural resource trap, which leads to the resource curse and Dutch disease; the landlocked trap; and the bad governance trap (Collier 2007).

Useful as these reminders are of the structural and institutional obstacles facing many African countries, few of these explanations shed light on Africa's success stories. While most African countries have had negative development trajectories since

independence, Botswana and Mauritius are notable for their long-term success, thanks to positive development strategies introduced through effective leadership, strong institutions, and sound policies. Botswana should have been a development failure according to the structural trap theory since all those conditions existed in Botswana at independence—it was surrounded by hostile neighbors, it was the sudden beneficiary of immense diamond revenues, it was landlocked, and it had no institutional history of a centralized and effective state or sustained experience of modern governance. So how did Botswana escape the traps? Botswana had good leadership and good institutions, thanks to good postcolonial policy choices (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2003; Beaulier 2003).

Studies have explored the reasons for Botswana's postcolonial development. One study attributes it to three institutional characteristics (Samatar 1999). First is the political and economic unity of the dominant class under the tutelage of a disciplined political leadership that was conscious of the institutional requirements of its policies and programs. The small size of the dominant class, with its narrow and fairly homogeneous economic base and common ideological views, provided the basis for this unity. Second, Botswana's experience reveals the centrality of state intervention to economic transformation, as was the case in East Asia (Beaulier and Subrick 2006). In contradiction of the World Bank and IMF position on

the role of the state in development, Botswana's state agencies dominate major sectors of the economy, including housing, industrial investment, transport, communication, education, livestock, agriculture, and mining. Third, state–society relations in Botswana reflect “embedded autonomy,”²² in the sense that the state is relatively independent and its institutions are insulated from undesirable societal influences, while at the same time state institutions selectively link up with segments of civil society whose active involvement is necessary for socio-economic transformation. Because of its embedded autonomy, the state in Botswana has been able to follow a particular accumulation strategy and to seek alliances with the social groups whose engagement is necessary for the realization of such a program (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009).

Mauritius has also been able to overcome some of its developmental challenges through effective institutions and sound policies and programs. Mauritius is a small, remote island state off the coast of eastern Africa. Its prospects appeared so bleak that it was deemed a strong candidate for failure by Nobel Prize–winning economist James Meade in the 1960s (Meade 1961a). It depended on a single crop (sugar), was prone to terms-of-trade shocks, had high levels of unemployment, and lacked natural resources. Yet Mauritius proved the experts wrong. It encouraged foreign direct investment to spur industries and build strong institutions to support growth (Meisenhelder

1997), enabling it to become a well-diversified middle-income economy that earns revenue from tourism, finance, textiles, and advanced technology—as well as sugar. Whether measured by per capita income, human development indicators, or governance indicators, Mauritius is among the top countries in Africa. The prudent policies such as proactive fiscal policy, monetary policy as an anchor for economic growth, forging consensus, effective response to economic shocks, the nexus between public and private sectors strong institutional framework, favorable regulatory environment, and low level of corruption which Mauritius adopted fueled its transformation (Zafar 2011).

Evolution of transformative leadership in Africa

The good performance of nations that strive to realize a development vision and attain identified goals is linked, to a large extent, to transformative leadership. This is because transformative leadership translates the needs and aspirations of citizens into prudent public policy design and implementation, as well as good public service delivery (Ayee 2017; Dartey-Baah 2014). The importance of transformative leadership is underscored in the Mombasa Declaration Code of African Leadership (African Leadership Council 2004: 1):

Good leaders globally guide governments of nation-states to perform effectively for their citizens. They deliver high

security for the state and the person; a functioning rule of law; education; health; and a framework conducive to economic growth. They ensure effective arteries of commerce and enshrine personal and human freedoms. They empower civil society and protect the environmental commons. Crucially, good leaders also provide their citizens with a sense of belonging to a national enterprise of which everyone can be proud. They knit rather than unravel their nations and seek to be remembered for how they have bettered the real lives of the governed rather than the fortunes of the few.

The Mombasa Declaration concedes that “leadership, especially in Africa, is difficult. There are many challenges, particularly of political culture, poverty, illiteracy, and disunity.” It also promises not to repeat the “terrible and unfortunate examples and mistakes of Idi Amin, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, and Mobutu Sese Seko” or to create the conditions under which such bad leadership may arise or be sustained (p. 2).

A solid body of evidence associates Africa’s underdevelopment with poor political leadership, resulting in persistent instability, violence, ethnic conflict, hunger, disease, poverty, and lack of transparency and accountability (Mazrui 1970, 1971, 2001; Mbah 2013; Afegbua and Adejuwon 2012; Mills 2011; Mills 2010; Heleta 2007). Multiple studies hold African leaders accountable for many of the continent’s economic, political,

and social woes. They see Africa’s poverty not as a result of lack of capital, access to world markets, technical experts, and an unfair global economic system; rather, they see it as the fault of African leaders who made poor choices and chose to keep their country in abject poverty (Mills 2011, 2010). The World Bank’s 1989 study *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* concluded that “underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is crisis of governance” (World Bank 1989: 6–7). Another study put it even more bluntly: the “fundamental cause of African underdevelopment and conflicts lies in the vicious leadership in the continent from 1960s” (Mbah 2013: 142). This belief has also informed many of the development programs on the continent. Governance reforms adopted in the 1990s thus focused on getting the institutions and leadership right (Kauzya and Balogun 2005).

The paradox of leadership in Africa is that, with a few exceptions, African leaders admit that the major reason for Africa’s social, political, and economic crisis is poor leadership. Yet the leaders that assumed power in postcolonial Africa did very little to address the shortcomings of leadership. Little wonder, then, that Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria, recently lamented that African leaders have failed the continent.²³ Kofi Annan, former secretary general of the United Nations from Ghana, was frank in advising African leaders to stop blaming colonial powers and colonialism for

Africa's ineffective leadership, political and economic woes, and underdevelopment.²⁴

Notwithstanding this bleak picture of leadership (especially political leadership) in Africa, there have been (and are) cases of transformative leadership in Africa. At the individual leader level, Africa has traditionally been a cradle of great leadership, which continues to serve as a source of inspiration. Many African leaders are well known around the world—including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Patrice Lumumba of the then Republic of Congo, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, Steve Biko of South Africa, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, to name a few. In addition, Africa has produced international leaders such as Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, who served as secretary generals of the United Nations, and others who have served as executive secretaries of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and as presidents of the African Development Bank.

And a few African leaders have exhibited transformative leadership. The Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership²⁵ has been awarded to six African leaders: Nelson Mandela of South Africa (2007), Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (2007), Festus Moghae of Botswana (2008), Petro Pires of Cape Verde (2011), Hifikepune Pohamba of Namibia (2014), and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia (2017). These former presidents all had strong democratic

credentials and emerged from democratic institutions or tried to build strong institutions of accountability and participation. The Mo Ibrahim Prize has the potential to change perceptions of African leadership by showcasing exceptional role models from the continent. The significance of the prize lies not only in the award-winners it recognizes but also in the quality of leadership that it fosters.²⁶

But transformative leadership requires more than great individual heads of state, and Africa has had transformative leaders in other positions as well. At the bureaucratic leadership level, ministries of finance in African countries have often been led by capable individuals who skillfully dealt with structural adjustment and poverty reduction strategies. They spearheaded the design and implementation of budgets and revenue mobilization and management plans. Consider the accomplishment of the South African Revenue Service, which met its revenue targets and created an environment that encouraged citizens to comply with tax laws, in part by expediting the processing of returns (SARS 2017 Kariuki and Kiragu 2011). For instance, it processed 99.9 percent of returns electronically; 92.4 percent were assessed within 3 seconds and 93.28 percent of refunds were paid within 72 hours.²⁷ Despite challenging economic conditions, the revenue service collected 1.14 trillion rand in 2016/17, 6.9 percent higher than in 2015/16. The tax to GDP ratio of 26.1 percent speaks to its remarkable resilience.

Similarly, business, traditional, religious, trade union, and civil society leaders have also contributed to socioeconomic development despite the tensions that can color their relationships with the political leadership. Political leadership can be antagonistic to leaders in other domains if they express opposing viewpoints, are not seen as supportive enough of government policies, or appear to be competing with political leadership in serving citizens. Nonetheless, despite these tensions, these leadership groups have been able to work together in some spheres to advance socioeconomic transformation in Africa.

The postcolonial state and its implications for political leadership and African transformation

Understanding leadership in Africa after the end of colonial rule requires distinguishing between constraints that must be taken as given (unjust world economic order, balkanization of the continent, pervasive role of multinational companies, reliance on foreign aid and divergencies in political history, culture, size and resources) and those that are amenable to change (some of the legacies of colonialism such as dearth of leadership at all levels, centralization, authoritarianism, and undiversified economy and agriculture) through the transformative vision, direction, and political and managerial competence of the leadership (Ayee 2006). African leaders have generally inherited from the colonial period their country's integration into the global

economy and internal social fragmentation, as well as political systems that are highly personalized and leadership-dependent. The African state suffers from its colonial legacy of implanted colonial institutions, weak historical legitimacy, and arbitrary borders (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Clapham 1996). These conditions are central to understanding the use of authority in Africa (Ayee 2001).

Thus, the postcolonial African state has certain characteristics that affect the performance of political leadership (Ndulu 2001; Doornbos 1990):

- Highly centralized systems of governance.
- Excessive state control, coupled with limited capacity to govern and implement policies and programs.
- Arbitrary policy-making and abuse of executive power.
- Erosion of the boundaries between the state and civil society.
- Weak state and civil society institutions.
- Few countervailing forces to offset the authority of the executive branch.
- Bureaucracies that are not accountable to the citizenry.
- Widespread corruption.
- Unenforced laws and flawed legal systems.
- Limited participation in governance by the general citizenry.
- Preferential access to power and resources based on religious, ethnic, or geographical considerations.

Earlier studies of Africa's growth tragedy focused largely on geographic and climate

factors, commodity dependence and decreasing (and volatile) terms of trade, macro- and microeconomic policies, and ethnic fractionalization. Less attention was given to the role of political structures and institutions as “the greatest impediment to development” (Ake 1996: 1).

For the most part, the postcolonial state was consigned to an instrumental role, characterized by informal power relationships and mired in the pathologies of neopatrimonialism—accumulation, extraction, and control—that resulted in weak institutions, patronage, nepotism, corruption, and the plundering of state resources. Lacking the historical continuity of institutions, the postcolonial state’s fundamental deficit was the absence of legitimacy, which posed an essential challenge for transformative leadership (Herbst 2000).

Democratization, political transition, and implications for transformative leadership

Since the “third wave of democracy” starting in 1989, political transitions have featured prominently on the agenda of African countries. With authoritarian rule decried by both citizens and the international community, most African countries returned to constitutional rule.

The third wave of democratization in Africa ushered in a period of promise and enthusiasm. But that third wave also produced a number of unconsolidated regimes that identified themselves as democratic but

whose disrespect for political rights and civil liberties belie that designation. Moreover, the number of unconsolidated regimes in Africa rose after 2006, in what some have called the “democratic recession” (Diamond 2015). Among the 25 democratic breakdowns since 2000, 13 resulted from abuse of power by elected rulers and 4 of those took the form of electoral fraud or non-democratic changes in the electoral practices.

Thus, what the elections actually yielded in terms of democratic dividends has been mixed. The gains include putting in place the constitutional, legal, and institutional framework for democracy and decentralization and holding elections despite their sometimes contentious nature, as in Kenya. The deficits include increased exclusion as a result of presidential systems of government that promotes a winner-takes-all system, neopatrimonialism, electoral violence and fraud, recentralization of power, and weak transparency and accountability that often result in corruption. There is no doubt that the promise and then the retreat of democratization have implications for transformative leadership, especially given the intractable nature of one-party rule in countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, which hide behind the fiction of democratic elections. This drift from democratization has undermined the emergence of responsible and accountable leaders in some of the countries, such as Burundi, Egypt, Libya, Niger, Togo, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.

The benefits of democratization

Despite considerable skepticism about the prospects for widespread democratization and democratic consolidation (Lindberg 2005), that pessimistic view may be unwarranted. Although, many democratic reforms were blocked or overturned by old or new elites, several young democracies have survived in Africa and have strengthened the protection of political rights and civil liberties (Bratton and van der Walle 1997; Villalón and Von Döepp 2005).

Democracy does not automatically solve all economic problems, especially in weak-capacity states. However, democracies perform better than dictatorship in such contexts. Africa's most impressive economic success stories have been democratic Botswana and Mauritius. These countries started out poor and with bleak prospects for development after independence. But smart political and economic decision-making helped them grow fast over a sustained period (Leith 2005; Meade 1961b). Moreover, democratization has helped other African countries boost economic growth and promote more accountable forms of government. Ghana, for example, has become more prosperous since its political liberalization. And despite still being poor, countries such as Benin and Rwanda also experienced increased economic growth after democratization. In contrast, few economies have performed as badly as many African dictatorships have. Prominent examples are Nigeria under

various rulers, Togo under Eyadema, Zaire under Mobutu, Uganda under Idi Amin, and Ethiopia under Haile-Selassie and Mengistu. These regimes differed widely in ideological base, colonial history, and natural resource endowments, but they were all ruled by authoritarian regimes presiding over states with weak institutions. A prominent exception among dictatorships was South Africa under apartheid. It differed crucially from most other African dictatorships on one important measure, however: it had a well-functioning bureaucratic apparatus and effective state institutions (Padayachee and Hart 2010).

Despite an uneven record, on balance there have been positive developments in political transitions in Africa, with progress evident in both political transitions and transformative leadership. As former US President Barack Obama noted in 2009, "Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions." For the most part, institutions are still weak, and the process of consolidating them depends to a great extent on the will of the people who lead these countries.

Thus, Africa needs both strong institutions and transformative leaders who will not play on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities (ethnic, regional, and religious divisions) of newly democratic African societies but will instead work to build strong and enduring institutions and improve living standards. The continent needs leaders who make choices that reinforce national cohesion

and the consolidation of their countries' still fragile institutions (Hounkpe 2014; Rotberg 2014)

Identifying good leaders

Clearly, the question of knowing how to identify, select, and retain good leaders in young African democracies is fundamental, as it has been for all democracies since ancient Greece. Every democracy has, with varying degrees of success, developed its own mechanisms and institutions, shaped by its era and history, to reduce the risk of choosing the wrong leaders. African countries, too, have put in place measures to reduce the risks of choosing the wrong leaders.

One mechanism is to identify young people with leadership potential and prepare them through training programs. To this end, institutes, academies, and scholarships (such as Amani Institute, African Leadership Academy, and Ibrahim Leadership Fellowship) have been created to identify, prepare, connect, and advance the careers of potential future leaders. This method has some shortcomings in identifying future political leaders, however. It is intended to train future leaders across multiple spheres, not only politics, which could reduce the numbers that end up in the political sphere (Hounkpe 2014). In addition, leadership training is recent, and more time is needed before it can produce a critical mass of leaders who can help bring about change.

A second mechanism is to confer performance awards on leaders at the end of their tenure, to incentivize exemplary performance while in office. Generally, these awards are bestowed in recognition of a contribution in a particular area, such as peace-building. The most well-known prize focusing on leadership in Africa is the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. The prize recognizes and financially rewards African leaders who have contributed to developing their country and who have themselves behaved as exceptional role models for the continent. As an a posteriori mechanism, performance awards do not help in selecting good leaders but rather in incentivizing good performance among existing leaders (Rotberg 2013; Wiatr 1988).

The effectiveness of awards could be increased if two conditions were changed. First, it must be made more difficult for leaders to enrich themselves while in power by removing immunity against illicit activities engaged in while in office. When leaders can profit dishonestly from their power in office, the financial incentives of the Ibrahim Prize have little appeal. Second, former leaders need the promise of a secure retirement, without the threat of abuses of power against them. This fear may be one of the underlying reasons why African leaders are reluctant to leave power (Rotberg 2013).

In addition to these mechanisms, there are others laid down in the constitution and electoral code of each country—the laws, regulations, and institutions in place to

support accountability, transparency, and good governance. While these different tools are used with varying degrees of success in African democracies, there is one that could be better used. This is the eligibility criteria stipulated by all electoral legislation for the initial screening of candidates. The heads of state in some countries, including Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Uganda, have bypassed or altered by questionable means the term limits written into their constitution and laws to allow them to stay in power in perpetuity.

Ghana has put in place stringent rules to filter out unqualified or unscrupulous leaders. In addition to term limits, its 1992 Constitution (article 94) stipulates that no one may run in legislative elections (and therefore in presidential elections) if a board of inquiry has established that the person is incompetent, incapable, or unworthy of holding public office; has acquired public property by fraudulent means; or has been found guilty of misuse of power. Other countries in Africa could consider establishing similar eligibility criteria.

Types of political leadership in contemporary Africa

Leaders differ in how they wield their authority to achieve their goals and in the dynamics of relations between them and bureaucratic, business, traditional, religious, labor union, and civil society leadership. Among the many factors that shape the adoption of a particular leadership strategy or style are

the personality and goals of the incumbent, the institutional framework of leadership, the political mechanisms by which power is won and retained, the means of mass communication available, and the broader political culture (Ayee 2006; 2007).

In Africa, leaders have exhibited several leadership styles that appear to be common in developing countries.²⁸ For instance, in Nigeria, General Murtala Mohammed adopted a disciplinarian style of leadership in the mid -1970s because of the chaos that plagued Nigerian society after the end of civil war. In contrast, General Yakubu Gowon, who led the federal government during the civil war from May 1967–January 1970, and General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who tried to create a transition to redemocratization in 1998–99, sought to reconcile widely divergent viewpoints. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela, who became president in 1994 after the transition from minority white rule to black majority rule, exhibited the reconciliatory, patriarchal, and transformative leadership style that South Africa seemed to need at the time (Ayee 2006).

Despite differences such as these in leadership style, most African leaders have generally practiced a transactional style of leadership, which involves the exchange of goods and benefits between ruler and followers within a framework of self-interest. Instead of relying on formal institutions, which were largely ineffective, most African leaders followed the pragmatic course of adopting some form of personal rule without formal

legitimacy. Personal rule is characterized by factional politics and clientelism, corruption, purges and rehabilitations, and succession maneuvers (Jackson and Rosberg 1998).

The roots of this style of leadership can be traced to the immediate postcolonial period, when newly independent African countries inherited from colonial rule undemocratic governments and bureaucracies that emphasized hierarchy, compliance, and discipline without addressing public accountability, responsiveness, and participation (Ndulu 2001). The new African ruling parties that emerged inherited this colonial machinery of state, blurring any differences between the two. As a consequence, the African governments that emerged were undemocratic, overcentralized, and authoritarian. Predictably, the political monopolies that emerged as a result of such transactional leadership led to corruption, nepotism, and other abuses of power.

Repressive single or no-party systems emerged, with power concentrated in individual leaders. Dissent, for which there had always been a secure and honored place in traditional African society, came to be viewed with hostility and labeled as treasonous. Multiparty systems were little better and generally led to ethnic-based factions and intransigent opposition parties that made some countries ungovernable, including Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Military rule was often seen as a way to neutralize ethnic-based rivalry in countries such

as Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.

Political leaders with the most precarious hold on power had the strongest incentive to enrich themselves while in office, whereas more confident leaders may have calculated that it was safe to defer personal financial gains until after they leave office (Goldsmith 2001). To maintain what was often an insecure grip on power, many leaders constructed strong bases of social support through the discretionary distribution of patronage and the development of clientelist ties to key individuals and groups that became the main form of political exchange (Olsen 1993; Gordon 2001). The most egregious example may have been Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo, who clung to power for 32 years before being driven into exile in 1997. During his tenure, Mobutu erased the line between public and private property, accumulating a vast personal fortune and bankrupting his country. The transactional style of leadership in Africa persisted into the post-Cold War era, driving some countries into crisis or collapse. The structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and early 1990s helped to crystalize popular dissent, which eventually led to the toppling of many corrupt and unpopular regimes.

Dynamics of relationships between political leadership and other leaders

Institutions matter for stable and secure states, economic growth, political democracy, and inclusive social development

(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Rodrik 2007). Policy-makers and donors have long urged the adoption of “appropriate” political, economic, and social institutions to promote economic growth, accountability, and responsiveness through good economic governance and political democracy (DfID 2007). Yet attempts at transferring institutions and encouraging particular forms of institutional evolution have not been very successful. Institutional and governance reforms have had a patchy record (Levy 2004; Robinson 2007), which has weakened institutions and affected the relationship between political leadership and other forms of leadership.

Bureaucratic leadership

Countries cannot make meaningful progress in developmental governance capacity without a professional, meritocratic, and effective public service capable of delivering value-for-money, as the Asian developmental states have shown.²⁹ The public sector delivers services, produces goods, and transfers resources to citizens, organizations, or other levels of government (Aye 2015; Bangura and Larbi 2006). In doing so, it performs four important functions to fulfill the government’s broad economic and social objectives: formulating economic and social policies, designing and implementing public programs, raising revenue, and managing accountability. Thus, the role of bureaucratic leadership is important to effective government.

At independence, most African countries inherited a reasonably effective and efficient public sector that was staffed by competent bureaucrats who implemented policies and programs to improve the quality of life of the citizenry. These bureaucrats were recruited on the basis of merit and competence and were reasonably insulated from politics. However, after independence, political leaders began to replace the colonial bureaucrats in a process of Africanization (Aye 2008). New appointments were, however, not generally based on merit but rather on connections to political leadership, so that most of the new bureaucrats were incapable of delivering services effectively. Salaries and allowances were meager, however, so many of the most qualified bureaucrats left for abroad or sought refuge in the private sector. An already weak public sector was further weakened, to the point that even the state’s basic functions such as tax collection could not be properly performed (Owusu and Ohemeng 2012).

Furthermore, the relationship between the political leaderships and the bureaucracy soured. Political leadership blamed the bureaucracy for sabotaging their economic development efforts. Political leadership also commonly took credit for successful programs designed and implemented by the bureaucratic leadership. This tension between political and bureaucratic leadership persists to some degree today (Aye 2012b).

The poor performance of the public sector led to the adoption of several reforms

pushed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s based on the principles of new public management. These included decentralization of authority from the center to local governments to improve governance (subsidiarity), privatization of state enterprises, and the creation of executive agencies, especially in tax collection and administration.

To improve service delivery, some African countries cut back the number of public sector employees, conducted user surveys on satisfaction with service delivery, and evaluated programs. Performance management agreements were drawn up between senior bureaucrats and their ministers in Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania. While these agreements improved the performance of senior bureaucrats, they did not lead to improvements in the quality of service delivery. Consequently, political leadership continued to criticize the performance of bureaucratic leadership, complaining of too much red tape, lack of urgency, sabotage, and overly secure tenure (Owusu and Ohemeng 2012).

Accusations of corruption among the bureaucratic leadership in some African countries led to the promulgation of codes of conduct and ethics and whistle-blower legislation. The Charter for the Public Service in Africa, adopted at the third Pan-African Conference of Public Service in Africa in 2001, is a key document in establishing norms and values (meritocracy,

professionalism, and neutrality) and assessing the adequacy and performance of the public sector across Africa. The Commonwealth Secretariat, under the auspices of its Governance and Institutional Development Division, has assisted all African commonwealth member countries to achieve the objectives of the charter through the platform of the Commonwealth Forum for African Heads of Public Service that meets every July to coincide with the African Public Service Day (Ayee 2012c).

Chapter 2 of the charter points out that one of the strongest ways of improving the performance of the public sector is to promote developmental states in Africa (see chapter 2 of this Report). A developmental state “puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal” (Bagchi 2000: 308). Its policies are characterized by strong state intervention, including extensive regulation and planning (Johnson 1982). Some of the principles for creating a developmental public sector are flexible and competent public service, strong government–business–civil society relationships, meritocratic and career-building public service, sound human resources management system, and high ethical standards (Ayee 2013; Owusu and Ohemeng 2012).

In a democratic developmental state, bureaucratic competence consists of four critical capacities: regulatory, technical, extractive (tax collection), and administrative

(Brautigam 2002). These capacities, while evident in the public sector in some countries, including Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa, are not strong in most countries. Public sector capacity building institutions are needed in Africa, to provide training, capacity development, and human resources development and to inculcate a commitment to public service in administrators and managers (Awortwi 2010).

Traditional leadership

Traditional leadership is closely bound to the society and culture of African countries. It played a key role during the colonial and postcolonial period, particularly in Anglophone countries, and still has influence today. In countries including Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Nigeria, South Africa, and Eswatini, the role of traditional leadership is enshrined in the constitution. In Eswatini, the king still “rules and reigns”; he is the head of state and selects the prime minister. Some countries have created a National House of Chiefs, a consultative body with jurisdiction over issues relating to traditional leadership (Ayee 2013). In some countries, succession of traditional leadership is being codified as succession has been instrumental in fomenting disputes and conflicts.

Traditional leadership is still highly respected because it serves as custodian of community land, traditions, and cultural practices. In some countries, including Botswana, Lesotho, Nigeria, South Africa, and Eswatini, nothing can be done at the local

level without the approval or involvement of traditional leadership, which is part of the local governance system. In Eswatini, for instance, traditional leaders have reserved seats in local administrations (*tinkhundla*), which since 1979 have been used as a mechanism for holding elections for the legislature (Ayee 1989). Similarly, in Lesotho, the 1997 Local Government Act, which created community councils, rural councils, and urban councils, set aside some positions for local chiefs (Quinlan and Wallis 2003).

While traditional leaders lost nearly all of their government, judicial, and land revenue management roles under colonialism, in most African countries, they still have certain functions in local and urban governance (Arhin 1985; Arhin 2001):

- Embodiment of deep cultural values and institutions related to ancestor and land veneration, taboos, and festivals.
- Representation of the community and community identification.
- Symbolic leadership and patronage of development, youth, and hometown associations.
- Control and management of dynastic lands.
- Creation of dynasties of wealth and influence.

Traditional leaders have the capacity to be transformative in national affairs when they participate effectively in national reconciliation processes, lead the quest for the social and educational development of their people, serve as mediators or arbiters

in conflict resolution, and link national leadership to their people (Odotei and Awedoba 2006). While many traditional leaders have become embroiled in disputes and conflicts or have been co-opted by the government, some traditional leaders are at the forefront of development in their local areas. They have built education facilities, promoted gender equality, helped make traditional customs and practices more relevant, codified succession, led campaigns to reduce HIV/AIDs, and resolved disputes among politicians. Examples include the Ooni of Ife (Nigeria), Alafin of Oyo (Nigeria), Asantehene of Ashanti (Ghana), and Okyenhene of Akyem Abuakwa (Ghana).

Most African political leaders have had to find ways to cooperate with traditional leaderships, despite popular agitation in some countries for their abolition (Odotei and Awedoba 2006; Awolowo 1960). They recognize that denying recognition to traditional leadership will not make it disappear:

Traditional authorities do not exist as a consequence of their recognition and appointment by governments of sovereign states. On the contrary, they are recognized and appointed to traditional offices, in accordance with customary laws, because those offices are legitimated by the beliefs of the people, who expect them to exist in practice (Sklar 1999: 169).

A consensus is emerging on how traditional and modern leaderships can co-exist.

For instance, the Kabaka of Buganda, Mutebi II, who was installed in 1993 in Uganda, noted that “African leaders who enjoy national-legal political legitimacy based on being elected in a fair manner, must supplement this with traditional legitimacy, which traditional leaders like kings possess” (Mutebi 1996). He viewed traditional leadership as part of “an effective civil society which countervails and enriches the State” (Mutebi 1996). He was, however, quick to add that “If the traditional leader is largely dependent on the State for his survival, he will find it hard to take a neutral position when the State is prompting him to side with it even when he is convinced that the State is wrong” (Mutebi 1996).

Business leadership

At independence, indigenous corporate leadership had not yet developed because there were very few African-owned companies; the corporate sector was dominated by foreign entrepreneurs and multinational companies. In the early post-independence period, the development of indigenous corporate leadership was stunted as political leadership pursued mostly statist policies. In addition, the indigenous private sector and its corporate leadership were viewed with suspicion or ambivalence by political leaders, who considered them rivals. This has sometimes led to frosty relationships between political and business leaderships in the post-independence era, particularly, during the structural adjustment program period of the 1980s and 1990s.

More recently, however, African countries have recognized the importance of the private sector as the premier engine of growth, and governments are trying to involve the private sector in development. In some countries, including Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, the private sector is organized along sectoral lines. This ensures specialization and the development of leadership along sectoral lines, for instance, in commerce, mining, industries, transport and communication. This organization also helps in the development process as the leaders are able to leverage their strengths in their sectors which make them stronger to lead in their areas of expertise and competence for the development of their sectors. In addition, some countries have involved the private sector in national policy dialogues on socioeconomic development.

The World Bank and African Development Bank have implemented initiatives aimed at encouraging dialogue between political leadership and business leadership. For instance, in May and June 2017, the World Bank, in collaboration with the African Center for Economic Transformation (a pan-African economic think tank), organized conferences in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Sierra Leone for public and private sector leaders to share insights and solutions on unemployment, income inequality, energy security, infrastructure, job creation, and poverty reduction.

Governments are also revising policies and removing policy inconsistencies to

increase private investment and to encouraging more private sector engagement. They are reforming macro- and microeconomic policies that have created obstacles to private sector participation in development. President Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana remarked that the public and private sectors “need to cooperate more and cooperate smartly to mobilize more financing for each other’s success.”³⁰ Furthermore, former President John Kufuor of Ghana urged African leaders to build a strong public sector that can stimulate private sector activity to advance the continent’s socioeconomic development.³¹

Other obstacles are also impeding private sector development. While Africa has made progress in the last 10 years toward gender equality in corporate leadership, “only 5% of CEOs in the private sector in Africa are women, compared to 4% globally. Organizations with a greater share of women on their boards tend to have higher operating margins, return on equity, and total return to shareholders” (Omarjee 2016:1). In addition, the emergence of strong corporate leadership in Africa is being held back by:

- Lack of political commitment and a crisis of legitimacy, due largely to the concentration of political and economic power and wealth in the hands of a small, entrenched political and economic elite, breeds mistrust and discourages people from starting new enterprises.
- Physical infrastructure and transport and communication facilities are either lacking or outdated.

- People are not meaningfully involved in formulating and implementing development plans. Consequently, they do not have a stake in the creation of wealth. This has, in turn, bred a culture of dependence, with everybody fighting for a piece of the shrinking national wealth pie instead of generating more wealth.
- There are very few listed companies. The vast majority of companies are small or family-owned private companies (many in the informal sector); state-owned corporations, co-operatives, and co-operative societies; and community-based organizations.
- History and politics have combined to create a privileged few firms that resist efforts to promote good corporate governance, resulting in weak regulatory and supervisory systems.

Numerous studies have explored the role and influence of the private sector in Africa. In well-publicized reports on illicit financial flows from Africa, the African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity show that \$1.2–\$1.3 trillion left Africa illegally between 1980 and 2009 (AfDB and GFI 2013a; b), with the bulk of that money amassed through tax evasion. These studies show that the role of the extractive industry in Africa remains controversial, and its leadership practices have often created tension and suspicion between political and corporate sector leaderships (Eckert and Rweyongoza 2015; Dartey-Baah 2014).

Religious leadership

There are multiple faith-based organizations (FBOs) in Africa. Some of them have continent-wide representation, such as the African Council of Religious Leaders, Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar, All Africa Council of Churches, Organization of African Instituted Churches, Hindu Council of Africa, Council of Anglican Provinces of Africa, Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'i, Association of the Evangelicals of Africa, Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, Arigatou International, and Union of Muslim Councils of Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. The role of FBOs is important because their leaders provide spiritual and moral leadership and basic services such as schools and water to African local communities.

The role of religious leaders has been expanding, reflecting the dynamic nature of society in Africa. Even though most countries have secular constitutions, religion and religious leaders play an influential role in Africa. When religious leaders speak out, their voices are heard. They have designed and delivered services in education, health, water, and other poverty reduction programs. In addition, religious leaders have been loudly critical of dictatorships in African countries. In South Africa, for instance, religious leaders including Archbishop Desmond Tutu were instrumental in ending apartheid. Religious leaders have also made important contributions in preventing

genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Outspoken religious leaders have incurred the wrath of some political leaders on the continent. For instance, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda castigated religious leader for condemning the 2017 decision by parliament to amend the constitution by extending the term of elected officers of government and the presidential term limits from five to seven years: “Instead of working for the independence of Africa, they [religious leaders] are always in cahoots with foreigners—encouraging the latter to meddle in our affairs.... This is assuming they do not have evil intentions, which would be worse.”³²

Religious leaders in Africa should invest in more innovative strategies to address the developmental challenges facing their congregations and the continent more broadly. Between June 30 and July 2, 2014, more than 200 religious leaders gathered in Kampala, Uganda, for the Africa Faith Leaders Summit to deliberate on the theme Enhancing Faith Communities’ Engagement on the post 2015 Development Agenda in the Context of the Rising Africa. Some of the commitments made include promising to do more to promote peace and reconciliation in countries and communities facing violence; promoting interfaith dialogue and cooperation to end religious radicalization; ensuring that marginalized and disadvantaged groups, including women, children, youth, people with disabilities, and people

living with HIV/AIDS, are included in finding solutions to Africa’s development challenges; and highlighting and expanding the resourcefulness of Africa rather than its poverty and misery.

Trade union and other civil society leadership

The leadership of trade unions and other civil society organizations has contributed to Africa’s socioeconomic development, despite multiple obstacles. Since precolonial times, organizing and mobilizing people have been central to advancing the interests of Africans. Trade unions across large parts of the continent marshaled popular forces in the anticolonial liberalization struggle. Following independence, however, trade unions were transformed into transmission belts for the policies of the ruling parties. In exchange for giving up fundamental freedoms, they received secured status and jobs for their members and privileges for their leaders. The debt crisis in the 1980s and the ensuing economic liberalization led to rude awakening, with massive job losses in the formal economy and a strong decline in union membership (Schillinger 2005; Minter 2014). Making matters worse, at the same time that many governments weakened trade unions they also introduced labor law reforms that disadvantaged workers.

On the positive side, however, growing political liberalization has created political space for breaking up the close and dependent trade union relationships with government and provided avenues for the

emergence of new, independent trade unions. In many African countries, trade unions played a major role in the late 1980s and early 1990s in mobilizing mass protests and strikes that led to the overthrow of authoritarian regimes and ushered in democratic transitions (Kraus 2007). In other countries, strikes and protests organized by trade unions were critical in gradually creating political space in which other social and political groups could mount protests and form political coalitions. These crystallized in political liberalization and democratization.

Unions continue, with varying degrees of success, to protect the economic and social rights of workers and to be a political force to be reckoned with in many countries. The African trade union movement has emerged as an important countervailing force to autocratic governments and anti-worker legislation. In addition, it has secured short- to medium-term direct benefits for workers and for pushing the frontiers of politics and policy in the direction of social transformation for the benefit of the people as a whole (Minter 2014). Unions are one of the few societal organizations in Africa with a sizable constituency, countrywide structures, and the potential for mobilizing members on social or political matters (Schillinger 2005), enabling them to play a leading role in public and political life in ways that are crucial to the vitality of democracy. They have organized labor protests and strikes, insisting that workers, whose living standards and organizing rights suffered under the democratic

regimes they were crucial in creating (Kraus 2007), also participate in the benefits of new market-oriented policies (Minter 2014).

Despite these strengths, trade unions and their leadership in Africa are viewed by some academics and citizens as weak due to internal problems. Some trade union leaders have been accused of being partisan and co-opted by governments. In addition, they are seen as too ready to strike and to shun hard work.

Other civil society leadership has also made significant contributions to democratic governance in Africa (Mercer 2002; Obadare 2005). Civil society organizations have improved the environment for meaningful policy engagement (Makumbe 1998). In some parts of Africa, civil society organizations have become an integral part of development policy frameworks and processes that were formerly the exclusive domain of the state. Civil society organizations' policy influence has been especially pronounced in donor-initiated macro-level policy processes, such as the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Amoako 2008).

Civil society activities have expanded from purely service delivery initiatives to active public policy advocacy work as a result of global initiatives such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Accra Agenda for Action, which encouraged and defined the interface among government, donors, and

civil society organizations. They have amplified the voice of the public and its demands for accountability in government decision-making. Believing that effective checks on government would prevent the re-emergence of authoritarian rule, civil society organizations built grassroots capacity to scrutinize the exercise of power by local office holders and monitored the performance of individual government bodies, as well as the executive and legislative branches (Heinrich 2005).

Civil society leadership in Africa is making significant contributions in human development, especially in the delivery of health and education services and in empowering citizens. Africa's civil societies have become increasingly innovative in supporting the continent's transformation of public services, such as health care and education (Kamstra and Knippenberg 2013). Civil society leadership is also working actively to secure transparent, peaceful, free, and fair elections in a number of West African countries and has extended democracy-building activities to direct engagement with political parties, especially during elections (Gershman 2004).

Nonetheless, civil society leadership in Africa remains at the periphery of policy-making. There has been a lack of consistency in the level of direct involvement in the policy process, and few organizations have made significant differences to policy outcomes. Most worryingly, consensus between governments and civil society

organizations remains elusive even on such basic issues as fiscal prudence, the insulation of key aspects of economic policy from direct political pressure, and the institution of central banks and other independent agencies of restraint (Meja 2011).

Restoration of trust in leadership through public financial and economic management reforms

Public financial management reforms could help to restore the trust of citizens in their political leadership. Countries including Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda have passed financial management and procurement legislation and have become more sensitized to the appropriate use of financial resources. Fiscal revenues and other domestic sources of finance have been used more judiciously in the service of structural transformation rather than to buy political allegiance or sell patronage (Padayachee and Hart 2010).

Some countries rich in natural resources, such as Ghana and South Africa, have signed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to provide greater transparency and accountability. Some have designed new ways of investing revenues from natural resources for the future. For instance, Ghana has set up a Heritage Fund with the intention of saving oil revenues for future generations. The fund is overseen by the multistakeholder Public Interest and Accountability Committee that promotes compliance with the country's

oil revenue management laws. In addition, public investments have been reoriented in some countries to follow an economic growth logic rather than a political rationale. As well, trade and pricing distortions have been corrected to discourage rent-seeking and self-enrichment.

Opportunities have emerged for more effective public financial management systems in Africa as a result of democratization and new demands for transparency and accountability. Efforts have also been made to improve aid effectiveness by aligning aid with national implementation and accountability. This new emphasis has been reinforced by the African Union Commission's (2015) *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*, which highlights democratization and aid effectiveness and the development of capacity at all levels to achieve political and socio-economic development. African countries should leverage this opportunity to develop their public financial management to achieve these ends.

Despite some progress, capacity deficits impede the work of institutions of public financial management, because of both inadequate incentive structures and a lack of technical capacity. This reinforces the point that public financial management systems do not function in isolation. Technical aspects of financial management—individual, institutional, and organizational—cannot be separated from their managerial and even wider cultural context. At times, the legal framework, the institutional incentives and

the human policies in place can all have an impact on whether capacity development efforts succeed" (OECD 2006: 67).

Leadership capacity challenges in Africa

Africa faces several challenges in transformative leadership development. Foremost is that political leadership across African countries does not have a uniformly deep understanding of the substantive issues of development and transformation. While leaders at the highest levels typically have a strong understanding of the structures and dynamics of governance needed for socio-economic transformation and of the major internal and external factors that shape countries' development prospects, that is not always true at lower levels.

Ideological fragmentation

Africa suffers from ideological fragmentation and continuing tension between endogenous wisdom and experience and the knowledge inherited from the continent's colonial past. This fragmentation has resulted in great ideological divergence and detachment from cultural roots, despite African leaders' commitment to economic integration and strong political collaboration (Lewis 1998). This tension is compounded by the impact of religions (in particular Christianity, Islam, and animism) on the ideological values of development. These different forms of fragmentation have brought great ideological divergence to development

and transformation perspectives. Additionally, the countries' different colonial experiences continue to shape relations among African leaders.

As a continent colonized by many different western powers, Africa has been exposed to multiple ideologies imposed from outside, such as capitalism, Marxism, socialism, imperialism, neocolonialism, ethnicity, feminism, democracy, neoliberalism, apartheid, sectarianism, and chauvinism. Apartheid, for example, fragmented South Africa into racial and ethnic groups and established an authoritarian racial hierarchy that permeates all aspects of societal life and that concentrated political, economic and military power in the hands of the Afrikaner-controlled state (Herbst 2000). The ideological fragmentation has been exacerbated by globalization through hitherto unavailable information on the internet on several ideas and philosophies and by new threats of terrorism and religious extremism, which pose serious risks to lives and property (Herbst 2000).

The ideological divergences among African leaders were particularly pronounced during the Cold War period, revolving around liberal and Marxist ideologies. The decline of communism reduced the extent of this fragmentation but did not eradicate it. While the old Cold War ideological divergences among African leaders have eased, they still cast a shadow on a continental vision of Africa's future, highlighted most starkly in questions about democracy

and the nature of civilian or military regimes (Lewis 1998).

This ideological fragmentation is reinforced by differences in the role of culture in countries' development. Countries with an English-speaking, French-speaking, or Portuguese-speaking heritage distinguish themselves along this line in their national cultures. These cultural roots are much deeper in English-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries than in French-speaking countries. The French policy of assimilation taught their subjects that by adopting the French language and culture, they could eventually become French. As a consequence, the actions of leaders in Africa are only tenuously connected to the local values that should guide them. This lack of a value system also reflects the artificial nature of African states, whose inhabitants have an origin and a history with attachments to other political regions that are sometimes confrontational (such as Chad and Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia). This results in major ethnic conflicts at the border, thus undermining efforts to create local values as the fundamental basis for sustainable development (Dia 1996; Lewis 1998).

In view of the ideological fragmentation and the artificial creation of states that severed traditional connections across the continent, and arising from economic and political crises, African societies are experiencing major chasms. In these chasms, new networks—economic, political, ethnic,

women, youth—are steadily emerging and enlarging their scope.

Selective or adaptive learning from external ideas and institutional forms

African governments have been exposed to many external ideas and institutional forms of governance and economic development, either as colonial legacies or borrowed from abroad. They include the system of governance (presidential, parliamentary, quasi-presidential); economic policies and programs such as structural adjustment programs imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions; and ideologies such as capitalism, socialism, neoliberalism, and globalization. While some of these external ideas and institutional forms have had led to positive achievements, those that have been imposed on Africa—often as conditionalities of assistance programs—have lacked national ownership and sustainability and have been ill-adapted to the African environment (Herbst 2000).

As a result of the external ideas and institutional forms of governance and economic development to which African countries have been exposed, political development on the continent has often been influenced by flaws in political leadership, which became institutionalized over time as part of the political culture of the African system. Though these same weaknesses are also found in systems outside of Africa, their vast dimensions in Africa and the impact they have had on the socioeconomic and political

evolution of the continent have been especially pernicious. These leadership flaws fall into three basic categories: unconstitutional leadership (expressed as the pursuit of personal interest and preservation of power at all costs); unaccountable political leadership (patronage, neopatrimonialism, corruption, and embezzlement of state resources); and weak multicultural political systems (exclusion and ethnicization, which laid the foundation for political tribalism that encouraged clientelism and neopatrimonial politics) (Ale-mazung 2011; Dartey-Baah 2014).

The challenge to African leaders is thus to develop the capacity to strike a balance between the values of African societies and governance arrangements that African countries must embrace and not to see them as mutually exclusive.

Weak and ineffective public sectors and public sector institutions

Weak public institutions have hampered development in Africa. The public sector in African countries is weak, and its performance is unsatisfactory largely because of conditions that are rooted in colonialism, political conflict, and the underdevelopment of the private sector and non-state sector. Public institutions have often been unable to fully provide the legitimate rules and organizational capacity that are required to promote structural transformation.

Many public institutions in Africa continue to grapple with challenges relating to shortages of personnel with the requisite skills,

weak capacity to formulate and implement policies, unmotivated staff due to uncompetitive conditions of service, and slow diffusion of technology for improving productivity and competitiveness (ACBF 2017a, b; AfDB 2005; UNECA 2005). These challenges result in inefficient procedures and weak intergovernmental relations, leading to policy inconsistencies and weak interactions between public institutions and the private sector.

Long-term, systemic approaches are needed to build the capacity of the public sector to achieve its stated goals of reducing poverty, accelerating economic growth, and providing better services. It is with this goal in mind that the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) was established in 1991 by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). ACBF supports capacity building initiatives in Africa by investing in capacity building institutions for state and non-state actors; providing technical assistance for capacity building projects and programs to formulate, implement, and monitor policies at national and regional levels; and enhancing knowledge and learning and conducting research on emerging development and capacity building issues on the continent.

Weak policy coordination capacity

Efforts to promote coordination across government entities seek to facilitate policy synergy and to use resources efficiently to achieve objectives shared by multiple

departments. Efforts to coordinate such activities in Africa are hampered by incompatibility in policy goals and operations across specialized entities and weak policy implementation.

Furthermore, there is no coherent and coordinated African strategy for reaping the maximum benefits from international partnerships. “The key obstacle to Africa’s partnerships is the lack of a coherent strategy towards partners ... As a result, the growing number of agencies operating in Africa and the multiplicity of coordinating, steering, working committees and groups throughout the African Union system, are increasingly posing serious challenges to the ability of the AU to carry out its overarching international role to ensure effective partnerships for Africa’s development” (Nnadozie 2017: 1). This fragmented approach to international partnerships has also provided “leeway for some partners to impose programs and priorities on the AU that do not come properly structured to systematically address Africa’s challenges” (Nnadozie 2017: 1).

These coordination challenges prompted the convening of the African Partnership Coordination Platform in December 2017 under the auspices of the ACBF. The platform’s objectives are to make interactions work for the benefit of Africa, ensure that cooperation with partners leads to economic diversification and sustainable development, and solicit Africa’s partners to support the continent’s integration into the global economy, as laid out in Agenda 2063.

Weak implementation capacity

African countries have designed reasonably good policies and programs and have signed on to broader development strategies, including the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Millennium Development Goals/Sustainable Development Goals, and Agenda 2063. However, implementation has been weak. As a former South African finance minister explained (Manuel 2007):

South Africa needs to focus on its implementation capacity and resist just talking about good policies and instead put them into effect. There is currently no shortage of money in the system but we do have a shortage of implementation capacity. We need quality leadership in our institutions because we are still the gateway to Africa demonstrated by the fact that the headquarters of many multinationals are here.

Inadequate domain competence

Some scholars have argued that the culture of African countries is responsible for the weak leadership practices on the continent (Leonard 1987; Jackson 2004; Bolden and Kirk 2009). Some assert that the differences between organizational behavior in Africa and in the West are a result of fundamental differences in leadership thinking rather than merely of managerial failures (Leonard 1987). They see Africa following a sovereign–subject approach to leadership,

characterized by restrictions on the ability of followers to be creative and act independently (Kuada 1994). In this view, loyal subordinates are expected to protect the image of the boss by transferring blame to themselves or others and by concealing errors, allowing the emergence of dictatorial, rent-seeking political leaders. Others see weak systems and institutions in Africa as the source of the problem and thus believe that only strong personalities can turn things around. Human beings create systems—not the other way around—so if human beings are not strong, they cannot create strong institutions.

Others argue that there is nothing basically wrong with the African character or political system and that the trouble with Africa is simply the failure of leadership. A lack of domain competence—the knowledge, skills, abilities, and personal attributes required to perform successfully in a particular area of work—among leaders is impeding socioeconomic development and democratization (Adamolekun 2011). As most leaders have lacked effective capacity to manage public affairs, a scramble ensued to grab state resources for self-serving ends. Political leadership in Africa has been parochial rather than committed to national causes, and public resources were sought to further personal projects or enrichment.

The crisis of governance led to Africa's underdevelopment (World Bank 1989). Low or negative per capita GDP growth in some Sub-Saharan African countries reflected

a transference of power through military coups and invasions rather than through elections (table 3.1; Barka and Ncube 2012). A turnaround in leadership capacity began to emerge in the late 1990s, however. Two World Bank vice-presidents for Sub-Saharan Africa attributed a significant improvement in Africa’s growth prospects to the advent of a new generation of leaders, a “new model [of] no-nonsense, accountable pragmatism ... [The] new generation of African leaders [is] committed, qualified, and nonideological” and has replaced their “once largely statist and corrupt” predecessors (Madavo and Sarbib 1997: 112–113).

Weaknesses in systems and processes

Weaknesses in systems and processes as diverse as procurement, elections, and recruitment resulted in corruption, electoral disputes, and politicization of the appointment of public servants. In some cases, both ineffective institutions and a disregard for constitutional and legal frameworks have led to governance failure and lack of trust in public institutions. The weaknesses in systems and processes are also exacerbated by weak enforcement capacity, thus perpetuating rent-seeking activities. Weaknesses are especially evident where institutional checks and balances are inadequate. Executive dominance also works against the emergence of strong institutions. Checking executive power is thus essential for entrenching good governance (UNECA 2009).

Table 3.1 How African leaders left office, 1960–2012

Decade	Coups d'état	Elections
1960–1969	27	0
1970–1979	30	0
1980–1989	22	1
1990–2000	22	14
2000–2012	12	Over 50

Sources: Goldsmith 2001; Barka and Ncube 2012.

Lack of appropriate data

To make data-driven and evidence-based decisions, African governments and their development partners need reliable data on basic development indicators. To be useful in determining whether programs are effective or whether resources are being allocated to address the most urgent development issues, such data must be accurate, timely, disaggregated, and widely available. This is not the case in many African countries. There is also a lack of an entrenched culture of data use. This situation severely impedes economic planning:

The economic value of a development plan depends to a great extent on the quality and reliability of the statistical data on which it is based. When these data are weak, unreliable, or simply non-existent, as in many poor countries, the accuracy and internal consistency of economy-wide quantitative plans are greatly diminished (Todaro 2000: 637–638).

Nigeria “became” the largest economy in Africa in 2014 when the method of calculating GDP changed, to include rebasing every three or five years. Previously, Nigeria had not done so for decades. This suggests that, for years, decisions in Africa’s largest economy were based on data that were not credible, accurate, or timely. The story is similar in many countries in Africa. In 2015 in Central African countries, 65 percent of indicators needed to assess progress toward achievement of the Millennium Development Goals were estimated, derived from statistical models, or measured prior to 2010.³³

Leadership networking challenges

Networking among leaderships—political, bureaucratic, business, religious, traditional, labor, and civil society—is not well developed, largely because leadership mentoring and capacity development are not institutionalized. Accordingly, there is little sharing of best practices and experiences (Jallow 2014).

This is changing, however. Programs are being organized by some institutions to bring together groups of young leaders to benefit from the ideas and insights of past leaders. An example is Boston University’s African Presidential Archives and Research Center (APARC), which includes a President-in-Residence program, roundtables, public papers, and private conversations. Its African Presidential Roundtable is a gathering of former African heads of state, policy-makers, and public sector leaders.³⁴

Discussants come together annually to deliberate issues of growth and development. Currently, APARC works with students and staff of the universities in 15 democratic countries in Africa.³⁵

The African Leadership Network (ALN), founded in 2010, brings together Africa’s most influential leaders from business, government, civil society, and the arts for three days each year to engage in networking and leadership development. Participants leave having forged powerful new relationships, enhanced trust, and a deeper understanding of Africa and the trends shaping its future. The ALN’s mission is to build relationships and promote pan-African collaboration that will drive Africa’s prosperity. The ALN also has a strong focus on entrepreneurship through the Africa Awards for Entrepreneurship, an annual award ceremony honoring Africa’s top entrepreneurs.³⁶ While the ALN’s aspirations are high, it does not lend itself to a comprehensive discussion of leadership issues because of the limited number of leaders convened and the short duration of the event.

Constitutional and legal framework gaps

African democracies need leaders who can consolidate still weak and fragile institutions, not rulers who devote their energies to their own gain by further weakening their countries. To advance this goal, constitutional and legal frameworks need to enable and promote the selection of political representatives with the wisdom to discern the public good and

the virtue to pursue it. This calls for amending such frameworks to increase the likelihood of selecting effective leaders for Africa.

Capacity development opportunities

Along with capacity challenges, there are capacity development opportunities arising from the renewed interest in transformative leadership within and outside Africa. The belief is now widespread that there cannot be socioeconomic transformation and development in Africa without transformative leadership.

Capacity development initiatives of development partners

There has been a global renaissance in recognizing the importance of transformative leadership, led by many of Africa's development partners. Transformative leadership initiatives have been developed both in Africa and globally. While it is too soon to gauge the impact of these initiatives on producing transformative leadership, which takes time to develop, these stirrings of interest offer promise for developing a culture of transformative leadership in Africa. Prizes are now awarded to recognize individuals who demonstrate transformative leadership, while academic and other leadership programs have been developed. Autobiographies and biographies of past leaders have gained popular acclaim, serving as a source of inspiration for current and future leaders and documenting best practices and transformational leadership norms and qualities.

Capacity development initiatives of the African Capacity Building Foundation

The mandate of the ACBF is to promote and enhance capacity development in Africa. Thus the theme of ACBF's Strategy 2017–2021 is "Skilled People and Strong Institutions Transforming Africa." The ACBF believes that the capacity of institutions and leaders, especially political institutions and leaders, should be developed simultaneously because of a symbiotic relationship between them. And developing the capacity of political leaders is an important first step in reducing tensions in the relations between political leaders and other leadership. As the African Union's specialized agency on capacity development, ACBF will focus on coordinating leadership capacity building programs to enable operationalizing the recommendations of this Report.

Capacity development initiatives within African countries

The constitutional, legal, and institutional frameworks for transformative leadership exists in all African countries, though some of them need to be amended and restructured. In addition, African countries have acceded to several global and continental initiatives on transformative leadership, including the Sustainable Development Goals, Agenda 2063, and the Mombasa Declaration 2004 Code of African Leadership. Several public sector reforms point to the commitment and support from leadership to enable them succeed. There is thus ample will to achieve transformative leadership.

The key policy issue is that African countries must take advantage of the opportunities to roll out a viable and coordinated strategy that will ensure that the ethos of transformative leadership is internalized at all levels in their countries. This entails commitment and understanding from all forms of leadership and support from citizens.

Capacity development within civil society

One of the missing links in Africa's leadership is a consistent place for civil society engagement in leadership development. There are already several civil society organizations with reasonably effective leaders, but they have not been engaged in the transformative leadership agenda in Africa. One reason is the history of tension between political leadership and civil society leadership, including labor leadership. Harmonious state–society relations are vital to democratic governance and socioeconomic development. There is therefore a need for political leadership to reach out to the leadership of civil society in constructive engagement and dialogue.

Key messages and policy recommendations

Key messages

Despite the challenges facing leadership at all levels in Africa, some progress has been made. Transformative leadership is one of the most critical factors for Africa's success. Africa needs to invest wisely in its future by

developing leaders with the capacity to face challenges and take Africa and her people to the next level of socioeconomic development and by building competent institutions to complement the work of leaders. The experiences of Botswana and Mauritius are instructive in this regard, as discussed throughout the Report.

The following are some of the key messages on the state and challenges of transformative leadership in Africa:

- While dysfunctional leadership is often in evidence in Africa, the continent has an abundance of responsible leaders at all levels of society who need to gain power and influence so as to spur transformation.
- Transformative leadership and effective institutions are mutually reinforcing and complementary, while weak institutions undermine transformative leadership.
- Political leadership has generally been criticized as the key obstacle to Africa's socioeconomic development and democratic governance. While acknowledging that bad leadership is the major reason for Africa's social, political, and economic crises, the leaders that emerged in postcolonial Africa have done little to address the underlying causes of poor leadership.
- To understand the emergence of leadership types and styles in Africa, it is important to understand that African leaders have inherited various ideologies and structures from the colonial era that led to social and ideological

fragmentation, as well as political systems that are highly personalized and leadership dependent.

- Some of the challenges facing political leadership include ideological fragmentation, naive adoption of external ideas and institutional forms, weak policy and program design capacity, weak policy coordination and implementation capacities, inadequate domain competence, inadequate working systems and processes, lack of appropriate data, and inadequate leadership networking to share best practices and experience.
- Little attention has been given to the contributions of non-political leaderships, including bureaucratic, traditional, and corporate, to the slow progress of African transformation. The relations between political leadership and other types of leadership are influenced by the interactions between their respective interests. In addition, there are capacity imbalances between political leadership and other forms of leadership, which are generally more experienced and qualified. This sometimes leads to tension and animosity.
- Even though Africa has made reasonable progress in political, bureaucratic, traditional, and corporate leadership, much remains to be done to advance progress toward political and socio-economic transformation.
- Faulty policies and culture, corruption, and lack of resources and mentoring

have slowed the development of transformative leadership.

Policy recommendations

This section presents policy recommendations for advancing transformative leadership in Africa through capacity development for leadership, institutions, citizens, and disadvantaged groups.

Capacity development for political leadership

Political leadership sets the tone and models desirable behavior for other leadership groups in African countries in designing and implementing policy and managing resources for national development. The quality of political leadership has improved considerably, especially at the top (presidents, vice-presidents, ministers), but there is room for more improvement, especially among members of the legislature and local level administrators. The current practice of organizing retreats and orientation programs for political leaders before they take office is generally ad hoc and inadequate. Political parties, which operate as election machines and are not development oriented, lack institutionalized forms of leadership development—in most cases, it is the availability of resources that is the determining factor for assuming leadership positions within the parties. As a result, a majority of politicians assume leadership positions without adequate preparation.

To address deficits in political leadership, political parties should be encouraged to institutionalize leadership preparation by schooling leaders in the rudiments of politics, governance, legislation, economic policy, and international relations. Attending such development programs should be a criterion for assuming leadership positions within parties. This practice should also begin to transform parties from election machines to development-oriented, long-term strategists on how to achieve socio-economic transformation and development. A few political parties in Africa have set up schools for party leadership development. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana set up the Ideological Institute for this purpose in 1961. In August 2017, the opposition National Democratic Congress launched the Ghana Institute of Social Democracy to train and prepare party members and others in politics, governance, and social democracy.

In addition to institutionalizing leadership development, there is a need to strengthen the constitutions, laws, and regulations that are meant to guarantee accountability, transparency, and good governance among leaders in the newly emerging democracies in the continent. In particular, there should be an initial screening of candidates running for elected positions, especially for head of the state and parliament. While fundamental electoral regulations often stipulate character requirements for candidates, these legal measures are vague. For example, Benin's electoral code states that no one

may run for president who is "not of good morality and great probity" (Benin Electoral Code art. 336). The constitution of Niger (Art. 47) requires candidates for higher offices to "have ... good morals." Côte d'Ivoire requires candidates to file "a tax clearance certificate" before running for office. Other documents limit candidates to those "enjoying ... civil and political rights" (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger). But none of these terms is defined in a way that would enable voters and bodies in charge of deciding on eligibility to judge a candidate's character. In practice, these measures are barely relevant. Most new African democracies require only elected officials, not candidates, to declare their assets, providing no help in guiding voters or candidate eligibility boards.

Requiring candidates to disclose their assets and their professional histories can give some indication of the type of leaders they will be. The stages and requirements of the electoral process should also be reviewed, to ensure that adequate information is available on the qualities of the candidates—their honesty, leadership, and skills.

Capacity development for other forms of leadership

Bureaucratic, corporate, traditional, religious, trade union, and civil society leadership are, in general, better prepared than political leadership. Training for these positions is largely formal or, in the case of traditional leadership, relies on mentorship and observance of traditional values, customs,

and practices. While corporate leadership is shaped by requirements to adhere to performance management contracts and dedicated budgets for capacity building, other areas of leadership are not. Governments could set up budgetary allocations for capacity development in these other areas of leadership, to ensure more uniformity in capacity development interventions and to send the signal that capacity development is vital.

Capacity development for institutions

Effective institutions are a sine qua non for transformative leadership. However, institutions in Africa are generally weak and ineffective. Adequate resources (finance and human resources) and merit-based appointments and promotions are needed to develop the capacity of public sector institutions. Developing strong and effective institutions requires leadership that upholds the principles of democracy and good governance. US President Obama, in his July 2015 address at the African Union, noted: "There's a lot that I'd like to do to keep America moving. But the law is the law, and no person is above the law, not even the president." This message applies equally to Africa and its need for strong institutions. President Obama also noted that the first president of the United States, George Washington (1789–97), refused to run for a third term in 1798—during the nascent years of the republic—despite popular acclaim and instead stepped down to uphold

the principles of democracy and ensure a peaceful transition. South Africa's Nelson Mandela did the same (Songwe 2015).

Capacity development for disadvantaged groups

Disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, and people living with disability have largely been under-represented in leadership, with the exception of Rwanda and South Africa where women, for instance, are well represented in the legislature and ministerial positions. In some cases, the under-representation is due to the influence of traditional values and customary practices. In some countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, women complain that they are excluded from leadership positions and access to resources because of gender discrimination. In some African countries, including Benin, Ghana, and Rwanda, civil society organizations have stepped in to support women by preparing them for leadership positions. But more needs to be done.

Governments should ensure that women and men have equal opportunities during election campaigns, by providing public funding, giving equal access to state media, setting campaign spending limits, and ensuring that campaign finances and expenditures are disclosed. In addition:

- Political parties should allocate a percentage of public non-campaign-related funding to activities promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women, including training and research.

- International actors should provide resources for training women to run for office.

The youth policies and programs of political parties must become more relevant to the needs of the youth and their country. Unemployment and under-education are high among African youth. Even though all political parties have a youth wing, they have not been able to prepare or motivate youth for leadership positions. Civil society organizations could lobby political parties to groom youth for leadership positions and to support them with capacity building when they come to power.

All African countries have laws to support people living with disability, but they are only weakly enforced, largely because of lack of commitment and prioritization. In some countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, South African, and Tanzania, organizations are rewarded for being welcoming to people with disabilities. For instance, Ghana allocates money to local government units that are disability-friendly under its the district development facility, a donor-funded support mechanism for decentralization. Such incentives can promote the cause of disadvantaged groups in leadership positions.

More needs to be done to help people with disabilities participate in the transformation agenda:

- Civil society organizations and non-state associations should step up their advocacy, lobbying government to recognize the rights of people with disabilities and

to enforce anti-discrimination laws. In Ghana and Zimbabwe, Disabled People's International and the National Council of Persons with Disabilities have heightened their advocacy and persuaded the government to give more attention to the needs of people with disabilities.

- Greater political will and support are needed from governments and politicians. In 2006, Ghana passed the National Disability Act and established the National Council of Persons with Disabilities, and in 2009 the government incorporated disability issues into the country's national budget, promising a free education to all children with disabilities. In some countries, disability issues are a cross-ministerial responsibility. For instance, in Namibia, all government ministries have been instructed to integrate disability issues into their work.

Capacity development for citizens

While all African countries have institutions for civic education, resource constraints and weak support have put education for citizenship on the back burner. Some politicians even fear that a well-educated citizenry, able to analyze issues, could endanger their election chances. A dedicated budget for public education in African countries, along with clear commitment by political leadership, could begin to turn the situation around and improve citizen's understanding of policy issues.

Chapter 4

Lessons on capacity development for transformative leadership from country case studies

This chapter draws on country case studies to review capacity development for transformative leadership in Africa. It analyzes institutions, systems, and processes for leadership capacity development and evaluates the impact of leadership development strategies on socioeconomic performance. It highlights good practices and major challenges in transformative leadership development, and concludes with a summary of key messages and policy recommendations.

The analysis draws on 10 country case studies commissioned by the Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF): Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa. These countries represent a range of economic sizes, subregions, and states of governance. The economies range in size from Nigeria with a GDP of \$415 billion and Egypt with \$347 billion, to Rwanda with \$8 billion and Liberia with \$2 billion (IMF 2017). All but two countries score above 50 percent on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (table 4.1). Ghana, Namibia, and South Africa are among the top 10 performers on the index, and Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda are among the top 10 improvers on the index since 2011.

Country strategies and approaches to transformative leadership

Most African countries embed frameworks for transformative leadership development and capacity building in national development strategies, long-term visions, and three- to five-year plans. Global and continental development goals and frameworks have shaped these national development strategies. Côte d'Ivoire's strategies state this explicitly:

The 2016–2020 PND [Plan de développement national] has made provision for, and incorporated, the sub-regional, regional, African and international initiatives that help shape Côte d'Ivoire's strategic and economic policy choices. Those initiatives have to do with: (i) the “post-2015” development agenda; (ii) the 2063 Agenda; (iii) the Common African Position (CAP) on the post-2015 development agenda; (iv) the African Union Plan of Action; (v) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Vision 2020; and (vi) the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) regional economic program. (IMF 2016: 6)

Typical national development strategy objectives include poverty eradication,

Table 4.1 | Characteristics of case study countries and score and rank on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance

Country	Rank by size of economy among African countries (nominal GDP)	Governance index score (%)	Governance index rank	Change in governance index score since 2011
Côte d'Ivoire	15	48.3	35	+8.5
Egypt	2	51.3	24	+0.5
Ghana	14	67.3	7	-0.4
Kenya	9	58.8	14	+4.3
Liberia	44	50.7	26	+0.9
Mozambique	23	52.3	21	-2.2
Namibia	29	70.4	5	+2.0
Nigeria	1	44.9	39	+0.9
Rwanda	33	60.7	11	+2.9
South Africa	3	73.0	4	+0.9

Source: IMF 2017; Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2015.

employment creation, inclusive and equitable development, improved international competitiveness, environmentally sustainable development, accelerated growth and structural transformation, and strengthened development leadership capabilities. For instance, the main objectives of South Africa’s national development plan are to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. Kenya’s Vision 2030 aims to transform the country into a newly industrialized middle-income country that provides a high quality of life in a clean and secure environment to all its citizens.

National development strategies also incorporate explicit or implicit leadership capacity building elements (table 4.2). These

appear in such initiatives as cultivating mindset change; building a capable and developmental state; strengthening key capabilities of people and the state; restructuring the knowledge and innovation system; developing the skills of public servants (including in leadership); improving government effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and compliance with rules and procedures; and promoting a sound work ethic, pursuit of excellence, respect for time, attention to detail, and a sense of urgency.

Leadership in political, bureaucratic, business, traditional, religious, and civil society contexts all support African transformation. Leadership in the public sector is the most widely highlighted in the national

Table 4.2 National development strategies and leadership capabilities in the case study countries

Country	National development strategies	Main goals	Leadership-related capacity building elements	Source
Côte d'Ivoire	Plan National de Développement 2016–2020	Emergence of Côte d'Ivoire by 2020 with a solid industrial base; poverty reduction and inclusive and equitable growth; improved competitiveness	Improve government effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and compliance with rules and procedures; strengthen participation in the development process by the citizenry, civil society, and the private sector	IMF Country Report No. 16/388 Dec. 2016 Côte d'Ivoire Economic Development Documents—National Development Plan, 2016–20 http://www.gcpnd.gouv.ci
Egypt	Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt Vision 2030	A competitive, balanced and diversified economy; dependent on innovation and knowledge; based on justice, social integrity, and participation; characterized by a balanced and diversified ecological collaboration system	Ensure efficient, effective, and transparent public administration; improve public management, planning and monitoring systems, and human resource management; fight corruption; restructure knowledge and innovation system	http://www.cabinet.gov.eg/English/GovernmentStrategy/Pages/Egypt%E2%80%99sVision2030.aspx
Ghana	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda II	A just, free, equitable and prosperous society; an industrialized, inclusive, and resilient economy	Build effective and efficient institutions; modernize public sector; promote science, technology, and innovation; cultivate attitudinal change, including work ethic, pursuit of excellence, respect for time, attention to detail, sense of urgency	http://www.ndpc.gov.gh/downloads/2/

Table 4.2 National development strategies and leadership capabilities in the case study countries (continued)

Country	National development strategies	Main goals	Leadership-related capacity building elements	Source
Kenya	Kenya Vision 2030	Transform Kenya into a newly industrialized, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment	Promote science, technology, and innovation; build efficient, motivated, and well-trained public service; establish Kenya School of Government to provide research and training for transformative leadership	http://www.vision2030.go.ke/
Liberia	The National Vision: Liberia Rising 2030	Achieving middle-income status by 2030	Promote accountable, transparent, and merit-based public sector; strengthen public financial management; strengthen strategic networks and coalitions of civil society organizations to promote enhanced transparency	http://governancecommissionlr.org/doc_download/ATT%20document-%20April%2015.%202013.pdf?a4705305cd27e04fb1f66830e7e0ef9d=NZE%3D
Mozambique	National Development Strategy (2015–2035)	A safe, prosperous, and competitive country, based on a framework of equitable income redistribution and social cohesion	Create specialized centers of research and development; improve public institutions and interinstitutional coordination	http://unohrills.org/custom-content/uploads/2014/10/Mozambique-Report.pdf
Namibia	Fifth National Development Plan (2017/18–2021/22)	Inclusive, sustainable, and equitable economic growth; promotion of industrialization	Invest in quality technical skills; build capable and healthy human resources; become the most transparent and accountable nation in Africa	http://www.npc.gov.na/?wpfb_dl=293

Table 4.2 National development strategies and leadership capabilities in the case study countries (continued)

Country	National development strategies	Main goals	Leadership-related capacity building elements	Source
Nigeria	Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (2017–2020)	Sustained inclusive growth and structural economic transformation; investment in people; and building a competitive economy	Build a knowledge-based economy; prioritize jobs for youth; develop the skills of public servants (including in leadership; institutionalize performance management practices)	http://nationalplanning.gov.ng/images/pub/ERGP%20document%20bas%20printed.pdf
Rwanda	Rwanda Vision 2020 (Revised 2012)	Transform Rwanda into middle-income country by 2020	Invest in good governance and a capable state, human resource development, and a knowledge-based economy	http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/Vision_2020_.pdf
South Africa	Our Future—Make It Work: National Development Plan 2030	Eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030	Strengthen development, democracy, and accountability; strengthen key capabilities of people and the state; build a capable and developmental state; encourage strong leadership throughout society	https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf

Source: Country case studies.

development strategies of case study countries, as implied by the priority assigned to improving public management (all countries) and “building a capable state” (Liberia, Rwanda, South Africa). Kenya demonstrated the importance it assigns to transformative leadership by converting the Kenya Institute of Public Administration to a more comprehensive Kenya School of Government. Political leadership is considered explicitly as a priority in several national development strategies, including those of Ghana, Rwanda, and South Africa.

Although business leadership is another priority concern in many countries—recognizing the crucial role of the private sector in African transformation—the state continues to take the lead. In general, leadership capacity building remains a work in progress, although there have been some significant areas of success.

Rwanda provides a good example of how specific strategic directions highlighted in its long-term Vision 2020 are embodied in the design and implementation of a medium-term policy and development framework, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS; figure 4.1). The current medium-term plan is the second one (EDPRS-2), and within its framework the government is committed to developing the appropriate skills and competencies to enable the citizenry, especially youth, to become more productive and effective in supporting the country’s development targets. An important capacity development element

is inherent in the EDPRS-2 approach of fully engaging communities and searching for home-grown solutions. The EDPRS-2 has four thematic areas, each with a number of pillars and planned actions. The pillars and planned actions provide the context for the development and implementation of the sector strategic plans.

Figure 4.1 depicts how Rwanda translates its Vision 2020 into the Mid-Term Plan, sector strategic plans, and decentralized systems of implementation and accountability. Rwanda has embarked on phase 2 of its decentralization process in which districts, the third level of government administration, design and implement district development plans based on sector strategic plans, all the while taking into account specific local context.


Types of leadership development programs and institutions

Three broad types of leadership capacity development mechanisms may be identified: specialized leadership training institutions, mentorship, and peer learning.

Specialized leadership capacity building institutions

Specialized leadership capacity building institutions constitute arguably the largest proportion of leadership development approaches in Africa. They include centers of excellence in leadership and management development, such as the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration,

Figure 4.1 | Rwanda's national planning framework



the Kenya School of Government, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, and the Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management. These centers typically provide leadership training through combinations of formal lectures, seminars and informal leader-to-leader interactions, and experiential learning that encourage leaders to learn by reflecting on their experiences.

The continent also has a large number of conventional higher education institutions that confer professional master's diplomas in public administration or business administration in addition to traditional academic degrees. Among the most well-known in the sample countries are five that are cited

in the 2018 Times Higher Education World University Rankings: the University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa), the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the University of Legon (Ghana), the University of Ibadan (Nigeria), and the University of Nairobi (Kenya).³⁷

Mentorship

Mentorship is a leadership development approach in which leaders provide guidance to others with leadership potential. Mentorship can be formal, within a corporate employee system, or implicit in an organization's structure and dynamics. Mentorship is inherent in the succession dynamics of traditional

leadership in many parts of Africa. In some areas of Ghana, for instance, new traditional leaders are required to withdraw from society for 1–3 months to be schooled in the customs, values, and practices of the society (see Ghana country study). Mentorship is also inherent in the structure of some political parties across the continent. Most current political leaders have undergone long periods of leadership apprenticeship throughout their careers. Among the case study countries, the current heads of state of Egypt, Nigeria, and Rwanda had armed forces leadership backgrounds before venturing into politics.³⁸ The heads of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Namibia had long leadership stints in the private sector. The recently appointed president of South Africa had a long period of engagement as a trade union leader during the country's anti-apartheid struggle and, after the democratic transition, in the private sector as a successful businessman. All of these leaders had also held other political leadership positions before assuming their countries' highest offices.

Peer learning mechanisms

Peer-learning mechanisms include regular retreats for political office holders, often together with the top echelons of the civil service, to explore strategic issues. Larger events, such as seminars, workshops, and conferences, are also convened, to facilitate mutual learning among senior-level staff. Peer review mechanisms are growing

in importance in Africa, particularly since the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism in 2003.³⁹

Political leadership capacity development

The development of political leadership capacity does not in principle require formal education, and some African countries do not establish educational requirements for contesting for higher office. Many, however, require a minimum level of education, usually secondary school qualification.⁴⁰ Regardless of constitutional requirements, the majority of people in political leadership cadres in Africa today, especially those at the most senior levels, have had some formal education. Moreover, as indicated above, most high-level political leaders have typically had long periods of leadership tutelage in other spheres.

Formal mechanisms

In addition to these basic foundations, there are several formal mechanisms for nurturing and strengthening political leadership capacity in Africa.

For instance, Namibia's SWAPO Party (formerly the South West Africa People's Organization) established a specialized political leadership institution in 2016, the SWAPO Party School. The school aims to build discipline as well as inculcate skills to keep up with 21st century challenges. Party cadres are inducted and oriented at the school in preparation for assuming

Box
4.1 | **Nigeria: National Institute of Legislative Studies**

After more than 30 years of military rule that began in 1966 and was interrupted by a brief period of democracy in 1979–83, Nigeria returned to full democratic rule in 1999. Due to the long period of authoritarian rule, systems and processes for managing democracy needed to be reconstituted. ACBF provided support to the Nigerian National Assembly in establishing the Policy Analysis and Research Project. With two ACBF grants of \$2 million in 2002 and in 2007, the project's goal was to strengthen the capacity of the National Assembly to discharge its constitutional duties of legislation, representation, and executive oversight. Building on this foundation, the National Institute of Legislative Studies was established in 2011 by the National Assembly, again with some support from ACBF.

The institute's purpose is to serve both the federal legislature and state houses of assembly. Its mandate is to provide periodic training in democratic principles and practices, and advocacy on democratic governance and legislative practice and procedures and to facilitate interaction between democratic institutions and civil society. It conducts regular induction courses for legislators after each general election, and it facilitates periodic specialized training, at home and abroad, for legislators, legislative aides and staff, and committee clerks at the federal and state levels.

Source: ACBF and Nigeria country study.

future and higher challenging national roles. Headed by former Deputy Prime Minister Markus Hausiku, the school offers two-year certificate courses and three-year diploma courses. While it is too early to tell what impact the school will have on Namibian political leadership, setting up such a school is a move in the right direction.

An interesting custom-designed mechanism for developing political leadership capacity is Nigeria's National Institute of Legislative Studies, set up in 2011 with ACBF support, which trains legislators and legislative staff. This was particularly important

because, after several decades of military rule, Nigeria needed to reconstitute or refresh systems and processes for managing democracy (box 4.1). This may be an excellent model for countries such as South Sudan that are setting up new democratic systems.

Another noteworthy leadership capacity strengthening initiative is Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS). It is the country's apex leadership development institution, and its client group is the highest echelons of leadership in the country across all domains: political,

public sector, private sector, and civil society. NIPSS was conceived of as a high-level center for reflection, research, learning, and dialogue, with the primary objective of serving as the nation's foremost policy think tank and developing a crop of top-class leaders of high intellectual capacity that will anchor the design and implementation of innovative and dynamic policy initiatives and strategies critical for national development. It aims to be a model institution for inculcating the highest national ideals in its graduates. NIPSS conducts courses for top-level leaders in different domains; conducts research into major socioeconomic, technological, and security issues; and conducts seminars and workshops for leaders and potential leaders in the state and non-state sectors.

Mentorship is in widespread use for political leadership capacity building across the continent, although it is not as well-documented as formal training mechanisms. Political mentorship is inherent in the structure of political parties, especially those that originated in the continent's liberation movements, which served as a training ground for political leaders. For instance, a mentorship mechanism was integral to the structures of the SWAPO Party of Namibia and the African National Congress in South Africa. Leadership succession was built into the party structures in the form of youth leagues, women's councils, and elder councils. The interaction among these cohorts ensured continued articulation between legacy and innovation and served as an early

vetting system for quality of leadership (Namibia case study).

Peer learning mechanisms are also growing in importance as a leadership capacity development mechanism. The leading example is the African Peer Review Mechanism. Established in 2003 by the African Union, it was designed as a platform for African leaders to share experiences, reflect on best practices, identify deficiencies, and assess capacity building needs to foster transformative social and economic policies. African countries use the African Peer Review Mechanism to self-monitor all aspects of their governance and socioeconomic development.⁴¹ The Nigeria Governor's Forum and State Peer Review Mechanism are an innovative extension of this peer learning approach that could be usefully adapted to other national contexts (box 4.2).

Women's leadership capacity

African countries are beginning to focus more intently on strengthening the capacities of women at all levels of leadership. Some African countries have been at the forefront of the global and continental development goal of increasing women's representation in national leadership positions. Rwanda is recognized as the global leader, with women holding nearly 64 percent of seats in the national parliament. Of the sample countries, Namibia and South Africa also report high rates of female representation (about 42 percent) in national parliaments. However, a majority of countries still have

Box
4.2 | **Nigeria's State Peer Review Mechanism**

The Nigeria's Governors' Forum was established in 1999 as a nonpartisan mechanism for collaboration among the country's 36 state governors on improving public policy, promoting good governance, and sharing good practice. As a basis for peer learning, the Governors' Forum designed the innovative State Peer Review Mechanism. Modeled on the African Peer Review Mechanism, it is the first of its kind at a subnational level in Africa. Through periodic reviews of progress on state development policies, plans, and programs, leaders of Nigeria's states share experiences and reinforce commendable and innovative practices. By participating in the peer reviews, state governors learn from each other about innovative practices that they could adapt in their states.

Source: Nigeria country study.

much work to do in meeting the Agenda 2063 target of achieving gender parity in decision-making positions at all levels (table 4.3).

There are several programs to strengthen the leadership capacity of women and girls on the continent. Côte d'Ivoire launched the Compendium of Female Expertise program in 2011 to enhance Ivorian women's expertise at all education levels and to strengthen female leadership by:

- Enhancing the visibility, involvement, and leadership of women in the management of public and private affairs at all levels.
- Providing useful and timely information for the president and other decision-makers on the recruitment, appointment, and representation of high-skilled women.
- Identifying sectors where women are under-represented, and taking corrective measures in favor of equity and social life.

- Promoting dynamic solidarity networks among women.

A presidential initiative, the program has not yet been mainstreamed into the government framework, but it has already demonstrated its value and is well on its way to being integrated (Côte d'Ivoire country study).

Youth leadership capacity

The imperative of building tomorrow's leadership today is now widely recognized across the continent as a priority issue. As indicated in chapter 2, former South African President Thabo Mbeki signaled 10 years ago the imperative of investing in nurturing a new generation of leaders for the continent. He stressed the need for a deliberate, calculated, well-researched effort (Mbeki 2006).

The Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for Girls in South Africa is a good example of building leadership capacities for a group

Table 4.3 Proportion of women in national parliaments in case study countries, 2016

Country	Share of women (%)
Rwanda	63.8
South Africa	42.0
Namibia	41.4
Mozambique	39.6
Kenya	19.7
Egypt	14.9
Ghana	10.9
Liberia	11.0
Côte d'Ivoire	9.2
Nigeria	5.6

Source: AU et al. 2017.

of young people that is often doubly disadvantaged: by poverty and by gender. The academy provides free education to high-potential young women from poor households and supports them through tertiary education (box 4.3).

Over the past 20 years, a large number of leadership programs have been initiated in Africa and elsewhere to strengthen the capacity of young people and nurture the next generation of African leaders (a partial list is in table 4.4). There are significant differences in approach and focus, but the programs all place a priority on building the capacity of tomorrow's leaders. A few examples illustrate this point.

The African Leadership Institute is unique among leadership capacity building initiatives in that its focus is on strengthening visionary

and strategic leadership across the continent. Its flagship Archbishop Tutu Leadership Fellowship program offers a multifaceted learning experience for mid-career (ages 25–39), high-potential individuals across the continent. The fellowship is awarded annually to 20–25 carefully chosen candidates (box 4.4).

Another example of a youth-focused leadership capacity development is the Egyptian government's Presidential Leadership Program, which aims to build skills and develop the leadership abilities of Egyptian youth. The program uses several learning methods including guest speakers, community service activities, and field visits. Targeting potential leaders, the program covers themes in business, public administration, and political science (box 4.5).

Public sector leadership capacity development

Building capacity for leadership in the public sector begins with formal education. A university degree, and in some cases a post-graduate degree, is a requirement for entry into the management cadre of the civil service of African countries. Countries also have an array of specialized institutions and mechanisms to nurture leadership in the public sector.

Public sector management training institutes

Almost all African countries have top-notch public sector management training institutions.⁴² One of the earliest training

Box

4.3

The Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for Girls—South Africa

The Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for Girls—South Africa is a girls-only boarding school that opened in January 2007 to provide education and leadership opportunities for academically gifted girls from impoverished backgrounds in South Africa who exhibit leadership qualities for making a difference in the world. The school aims to develop a new generation of dynamic female leaders who will lead a positive and enduring transformation of their communities and the country.

Its curriculum is designed for girls in grades 8 to 12 who have demonstrated academic talent and leadership potential. The academy is guided by the spirit of *ubuntu*, which stresses the ideals of humanity, compassion, and service to others. Ms. Winfrey also set up the Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy Foundation to support graduates through higher education.

The foundation provides gap funding to cover any tertiary education tuition fees that are not provided by the South African National Student Financial Aid Scheme or other scholarship sources. A monthly allowance is provided to help students with living expenses. Additional funding covers medical aid, transportation, and mentoring. The foundation has supported the admission of students to colleges and universities in South Africa and in the United States. In addition to covering a variety of expenses related to studying in college, the foundation pairs each student with a mentor who provides guidance and support through her college life. This comprehensive advice and support system takes the girls from high school graduation through college and prepares them for the world of work.

Source: <https://www.owl.a.co.za/>. Retrieved 10/11/17.

institutions is the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, created in 1962 by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a subsidiary body of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. It works closely with the ministries of finance, economic development and planning, and several line ministries of African countries to provide specialized courses for their mid-career and senior officials. In addition to its core training and

capacity development mandate, the institute conducts associated policy research on economic management and development planning.

Ghana has established the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, which has received substantial financial and technical support from ACBF over the years; the Civil Service Training Centre; the Management Development and Productivity Institute; and the Institute of

Table 4.4 | Selected youth-focused African leadership development initiatives in Africa and abroad

Initiative/ institution	Year founded	Focus
African sponsor		
Archbishop Tutu Leadership Program of the African Leadership Institute (AFLI)	2003	Seeks to build the capacity and capability of high potential mid-career level (ages 25–39) emerging leaders by equipping them with the skills and self-awareness to lead effectively. Competitive selection process.
African Leadership Initiative (ALI)/ Aspen Global Leadership Network	2003	Seeks to develop the next generation of values-based African leaders, who will not only impart knowledge and share opinions, but also guide their country with integrity.
Africa 2.0	2010	A pan-African civil society advocacy organization made up of emerging and established African leaders who share a collective vision for Africa and a commitment to sustainable solutions that will drive forward the transformation of the continent. Volunteer-based.
African Leadership Network (ALN)	2010	Fee based networking platform. A community of the most dynamic and influential leaders working to create change in Africa. The community aims to advance Africa's prosperity by strengthening relationships among leaders to encourage collaboration
Youth Program and Youth Dialogue of the Mandela Institute of Development Studies	2014	The Youth Program is designed to strengthen the quality of youth engagement in electoral and political governance processes in Africa. The Youth Dialogue is an annual gathering of young African leaders who have demonstrated a commitment to the development of Africa, practical involvement in elections and governance, and the ability to mobilize other youth toward achieving a set goal.
Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI)	2010	A platform to groom change agents to address and solve African challenges. The institute also plays a significant role in priming tomorrow's leaders, with numerous students taking initiatives that implement what they learn.
Young Women's Leadership Project	2010	Aims to strengthen young women's leadership in sexual and reproductive health rights. Involves several African universities in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Strengthens young women's leadership capacity and advocacy skills and contributes to the pool of young female leaders in the region.
AU Youth Volunteer Corps	2010	A continental youth empowerment program that recruits and deploys young African professionals to serve as AU Youth Volunteers for a period of one year in an AU member state other than the one they are from. With support from the Ford Foundation and other partners, the African Union Commission (AUC) recruits, trains, and deploys up to 100 young Africans to serve in their respective professional capacities within the AUC, United Nations, AU member state ministries, and civil society organizations.

Table 4.4 | Selected youth-focused African leadership development initiatives in Africa and abroad (continued)

Initiative/ institution	Year founded	Focus
Building Bridges	2014	A fellowship program that involves Ford Foundation grantee leaders and youth participants from the region. It brings together established and emerging public leaders, policy-makers and experts from across Africa on key policy issues.
International sponsor		
Aspen New Voices Fellowship	2013	A media skills, communication, and leadership program designed for standout development professionals from the developing world. Designed to bring more expert voices from the developing world into the global development discussion.
Fortune Women's Mentoring Program	2006	In a competitive selection process, connects talented, women leaders ages 25–43 from all over the world with senior women leaders in government, business, academia, civil society, and the media in the United States.
Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI)/ Washington Mandela Fellowship	2014	Empowers young people ages 25–35 through academic coursework, leadership training, and networking. Competitive selection process.
Young Global Leaders with the World Economic Forum	2004	A community of enterprising, socially minded men and women under the age of 40 who operate as a force for good to overcome barriers in the way of progress. Made up of leaders from all walks of life and from every stakeholder group in society.
Eisenhower Fellowship Africa Program	2016	Identifies, empowers, and connects innovative leaders ages 32–45 through a transformative fellowship experience and lifelong engagement in a global network of dynamic change agents committed to creating a more peaceful, prosperous, and just world.
Yale Greenberg World Fellows	2015	Cultivates and empowers a network of globally engaged leaders committed to making the world a better place.
CSC Leaders	2011	Assembles exceptional senior leaders from across the Commonwealth to tackle challenges, build global relationships, and develop the cultural intelligence needed by the leaders of tomorrow.
MasterCard Leadership Program	2006	Helps economically disadvantaged young people in Africa find opportunities to move themselves, their families, and their communities out of poverty to a better life. Seeks to advance youth learning and promote financial inclusion to catalyze prosperity in developing countries, with a specific focus on Africa.

(continued)

Table 4.4 | Selected youth-focused African leadership development initiatives in Africa and abroad (continued)

Initiative/ institution	Year founded	Focus
Youth Action Net	1990	US-based but with regional and global components that include Africa. Aims to strengthen and scale up the impact of youth-led social ventures around the world through its local and global initiatives. Provides training, mentoring, funding, advocacy, and networking opportunities to social entrepreneurs, ages 18–29, who have pioneered solutions to urgent global challenges.

Source: Office of the CEO, African Leadership Institute, and author's compilation.

Box 4.4 | The African Leadership Institute

The African Leadership Institute (AFLI) was formed as a UK charity in 2003 and, subsequently, as a non-profit organization in South Africa in 2006. AFLI promotes effective leadership in Africa by identifying exceptional individuals who have demonstrated strong leadership capabilities and equipping them with the skills to fill top leadership positions on the continent.

Its flagship program is the Archbishop Tutu Leadership Program, which is predicated on the globally respected leadership values of its namesake and patron, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. In partnership with Said Business School, Oxford University, AFLI offers world-class learning in leadership designed specifically for Africa's emerging leaders. The goal is to build a critical mass of visionary, strategic, self-aware, and ethical leaders across the continent that become catalysts for African transformation. The program provides a foundation for a lifelong bond of understanding and fellowship among a peer group driven by the imperative of Africa's transformation.

The underlying principle of AFLI is that the big differences in Africa are going to be made by its top leaders in government, business, and civil society. Without excellence in leadership at the top echelons of society, all the other good efforts at lower and grass-roots levels will have less than maximum impact. It is top leaders' expertise, values, and networking that will make the difference in Africa, and AFLI's goal is to help establish this network of top future leaders as drivers of Africa's success.

Source: Author's notes (AFLI Board member), and Dr. Jackie Chimhanzi (AFLI CEO), September 9, 2017.

Box
4.5 | **Egypt's Presidential Leadership Program**

Egypt's Presidential Leadership Program (PLP) is a government program that aims to build the skills and develop the leadership abilities of Egyptian youth in business, public administration and political science. This cadre of enlightened and capable young leaders is expected to be a force for reform and change for a brighter Egypt.

This group of smart and business-minded individuals will be exposed to a balanced curriculum that revolves around people and communication skills and experiential learning. PLP seeks Egyptian college graduates ages 20–30 with analytical skills, learning agility, innovative mindset, effective communication skills, and persistence.

The program began accepting applications in November 2015. More than 50,000 applicants were winnowed to a shortlist of about 5,000 and then to about 3,000 who passed language skills tests in Arabic and English. All accepted candidates joined an eight-month training course that ended in November 2016. In 2017, PLP announced a new call for applicants. It also announced the intention to launch a special leadership development program for M.A. and PhD degree holders in 2017.

Although hiring PLP graduates in governmental positions has not been announced as a direct goal of the program, the Egyptian Central Agency for Organization and Administration declared in April 2017 that PLP graduates will occupy several key jobs, including as ministers' assistants.

Source: Egypt country study.

Local Government Studies, among others. These institutions provide career development training for the public service and assist public servants in meeting the learning needs of their organizations. The Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, a long-established management training institution, has a history of serving Ghanaian managers and managers from other African countries.

The Kenya School of Government is a national flagship institute aimed at providing research and training for transformative leadership. It has several leadership and

management programs for senior managers in government, including some that focus on building the competences of middle managers to prepare them for senior managerial roles. Its Strategic Leadership Development Program (SLDP) for senior officers in public service and private sector organizations teaches them how to make a successful transition from manager to leader. The newly developed National Leadership Development Program, a successor to SLDP, is designed for cabinet secretaries, principal secretaries, SLDP alumni, governors and their deputies, chief executive committee

members, and chief officers and directors in national and county governments. These programs address policy challenges facing top leaders in the public service. A particularly significant program of the Kenya School of Government is its Women's Executive Leadership program for high-potential women seeking new levels of success as team leaders and organization visionaries.

Egypt's Leadership Development Center, a direct outcome of the country's Civil Service Leadership Law of 1991, was established to strengthen the capacity of Egyptian public officials. It implements training programs for leadership positions, convenes conferences and seminars to study and discuss problems in administrative development, and conducts training programs for public officials. It also provides technical assistance and training to

other organization so that they can better implement training programs locally

Côte d'Ivoire set up the National Capacity Building Secretariat in July 1999 to manage implementation of the National Capacity Building Program. The secretariat is charged with formulating and coordinating government actions to improve the performance of the public sector, private sector, and civil society within the framework of Côte d'Ivoire's development process.

Rwanda likely has the most consistent approach to building capacity at several levels. Following the genocide of 1994, the Rwandan government instituted and has steadfastly implemented a program to build leadership capacities in pursuit of socioeconomic transformation. The trajectory of this institutional process is summarized in box 4.6.

Box
4.6

Rwanda: Evolution of capacity building for socioeconomic transformation

In 2005, Rwanda established the Human Resource and Institutional Capacity Development Agency to coordinate implementation of Rwanda's Multi-Sector Capacity Building Program, which was the country's strategic response to the capacity deficits in implementing its Vision 2020. In 2009, the government established the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat as a successor agency to coordinate capacity-building initiatives in the public sector. In 2013, Rwanda established the National Capacity Building Secretariat to guide, facilitate, and coordinate capacity building interventions in the public and private sectors and civil society. In 2016, the secretariat was superseded by the Capacity Development and Employment Services Board, whose mandate is to coordinate and oversee capacity development and advise on how to match human resources with employment opportunities. ACBF, among other donors, has supported Rwanda's capacity development efforts at various stages since 2005.

Source: ACBF; <https://www.acbf-pact.org/what-we-do/how-we-do-it/grants/projects-regions/eastern-southern-africa/rwanda/multi-sector-capacity>; Rwanda, Capacity Development and Employment Services Board. <http://cesb.gov.rw/about-cesb/cesb-background/>.

Namibia took a great leap forward in realizing its Vision 2030 (launched in 2004) when it accelerated its efforts at leadership capacity in the public sector by establishing the Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) in 2010. NIPAM's mandate includes providing administration and management training; instilling habits of efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in public sector staff; conducting operational research; and serving as a think tank for the public sector. Its curriculum includes courses aimed at strengthening transformative leadership competencies (box 4.7). In its first five years of operation, NIPAM trained almost 2,000

people in transformative leadership skills (table 4.5).

Public sector leadership development in Nigeria is provided in centers of excellence that cover a wide range of leadership issues at senior levels. These include the Centre for Management Development, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, and the Public Service Institute of Nigeria. Each of these institutions has specific mandates, with leadership training and development as the connecting link (table 4.6⁴³).

Performance contracts

Across the continent, performance contracts are increasingly being used to

Box
4.7

Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management

The Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) was established in 2010 as part of a broader effort to address the country's shortage of skilled people for general management positions; for leadership positions in management, finance, and project management; and for the unique challenges of delivering services to the country's underdeveloped areas. Its mandate is to "transform the public sector of Namibia into an efficient, effective and accountable system through capacity development, consulting and research, operational excellence, capacity development evaluation and strategic partnerships." NIPAM's training and capacity development programs include executive, senior management, and middle management development programs. The executive development program, in particular, emphasizes two concepts critical to transformative leadership: leadership and change management, and ethics and governance. For the Senior Management Development Program, NIPAM has entered into a three-year agreement with the School of Public Leadership at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa. One module of this program focuses on leadership development and institutional capacity building. The Middle Management Program has a module on transformation and self-leadership.

Source: Namibia country study.

Table 4.5 | The Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management’s transformative leadership programs, 2010–15

Course/program	Number of participants			
	2010/12	2012/14	2014/15	2010–15
Innovation, Leadership, and Change Management	34			34
Strategic Thinking and Management	42			42
Leadership for School Principals		35		35
Executive Management Program		37		37
Corporate Governance		40	51	91
Fraud Prevention and Ethics		33	20	53
Senior Management Program	52	143	79	274
Middle Management Program	114	497	458	1,069
Transformational Leadership and Change Management (Ministry of Urban and Rural Development)			27	27
Leadership and Change Management (Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing, and Rural Development)			22	22
Total				1,684

Source: Namibia country study.

promote public sector leadership accountability. Rwanda has had one of the most effective performance contracts systems, known as “Imihigo,” since 2006. Each public sector institution signs a performance contract every year, and its supervising body outlines the main results and targets it expects to achieve over the year. There are also joint performance contracts to encourage private sector and other non-state institutions to work with public sector institutions to achieve national and strategic goals in the national development framework. These performance contracts are jointly evaluated

annually by the responsible entities and an independent body to ensure objectivity and transparency. The performance contract is part of Rwanda’s decentralization process (box 4.8). The current phase emphasizes strengthening reforms and improving service delivery at the sector level as well as enhancing local economic development and accountability. Rwanda’s Institute of Policy Analysis and Research has been contracted by the Office of the President to conduct an independent review of the public sector’s performance over the past few years. The institute was established in 2005

Table 4.6 | Selected Nigerian public sector institutions and their strategies for leadership development

Institution	Mandate	Leadership development strategies	Target leadership group/clientele
Centre for Management Development	Regulates standards and develops competencies for public and private sector management and economic administration	Specialized training programs/workshops, short and long-term courses and accreditation and registration of management trainers and training institutions	Serves primarily as a training center for economic planners, policy analysts, and budget and project officers at the federal, state, and local government levels
Administrative Staff College of Nigeria	Provides higher-level management training	Specialized training programs/workshops, short and long-term courses (including postgraduate diploma in various aspects of leadership and management)	Senior executives in the public and private sectors of the economy
Public Service Institute of Nigeria	Builds strategic capacity in the public service and continuously modernizes management practices and enhances the leadership competence of public servants; strengthens organizational capacities of public service institutions	Transformational training, research and consulting on governance, management, and leadership development	Public servants

Source: Nigeria country study; institutions' websites.

and became fully functional in 2008 with the support of ACBF, which continues to support it.

Private sector leadership capacity development

In several countries, the private sector is very active in advancing the socioeconomic transformation agenda. For example, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, founded in

2003, has evolved from an institution for establishing the private sector as an engine for economic growth and economic transformation to its current phase of strengthening and institutionalizing public-private dialogue, launching the National Business Agenda (2008–12), and driving the economic pillar of Kenya's Vision 2030. It aims to steer the country toward an improved ranking on the Ease of Doing Business

Box 4.8 | Rwanda's decentralization policy

Rwanda's decentralization policy has five objectives:

1. To enable local people's participation in all aspects of decision-making that concern them by transferring authority and resources from the central government to local government and lower levels.
2. To strengthen accountability and transparency by making local leaders directly accountable to the communities that they serve.
3. To enhance the sensitivity of public administration to the local environment by placing all aspects of management of service provision at the point at which services are provided and enabling local leadership to take into consideration the local environment and needs.
4. To develop sustainable economic planning and management capacity at local levels to drive social, political, and economic development programs.
5. To enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, monitoring, and delivery of services by shifting the burden from central government to lower levels.

The decentralization program had three phases. The first phase (2001–05) provided the basic policy and legal framework. The first local elections were held in 2001, and since then all local leaders have been elected under terms of the 2003 Constitution. The second phase (2006–10) covered major territorial reforms, including the consolidation of districts and the establishment of district governments as key units for service delivery and the assignment of a greater role to sectors in service delivery. The third phase (2011–15) envisaged further deepening of decentralization by extending the range of decentralized services to local government and addressing outstanding issues in capacity building and fiscal and financial autonomy of local levels.

The decentralization program has produced profound and rapid institutional changes with the consolidation of districts and has made them financially and legally independent and responsible for coordinating service delivery, although there are still some outstanding challenges.

Source: Adapted from Thomas (2008) and World Bank (2015).

Index, the Global Competitiveness Index, and the Bribe Payers Index. In addition, the alliance partners with the government and other stakeholders to improve Kenya's Human Development Index ranking and to

raise GDP growth to 5–7 percent by 2018 and 7–10 percent by 2024.

The processes for developing leadership capacity in the private sector are similar to those in the public sector, although there is

more emphasis on higher business management degrees such as MBAs. There is also more emphasis on professional certifications in such areas as accounting, finance, human resources, insurance, banking, and management information systems. Qualifications are acquired through universities and other tertiary education institutions, as well as through professional bodies. In addition, the corporate sector systematically works on developing the leadership capacities of their staff through induction and orientation programs, on-the-job training, and seminars and workshops. Many companies also offer internships to enable young people to gain important experience.

The organized private sector also has in place platforms to strengthen top-level corporate leadership capacity and enhance the economy for business development. A good example is the Nigerian Institute of Directors. Modeled after the UK Institute of Directors, it seeks to advance leadership capacity at the highest corporate levels. The institute's objectives include the following:

- Provide practical and effective solutions for meeting the development needs of organizations.
 - Improve the professional competence of its members as company directors and business leaders.
 - Provide an active forum and effective voice for its members in public affairs.
 - Charter its members as directors and formulate and monitor the ethics of directors as professionals.
- Enlighten and educate its members about their legal, moral, and general rights and responsibilities to their companies and organizations and to society.
 - Advance the competence and knowledge of its members.⁴⁴

The business sector in Africa has also actively supported national capacity development efforts, including leadership capacity. South Africa has the most advanced private sector on the continent. The private sector has a large number of social investment initiatives that promote leadership development (table 4.7). Most of these initiatives are concerned with addressing the leadership capacity deficits not just of the private sector but also at a broader level.

In consultation with the government of Côte d'Ivoire, the General Confederation of Ivorian Companies (CGECI), through the Young Entrepreneurs Commission, initiated a competition for young entrepreneurs, known as the CGECI Academy Business Plan Competition, to nurture national business and industry champions. The competition seeks to stimulate and create a framework for developing innovative young entrepreneurs (box 4.9). It has reached more than 1,500 young people across the country, about 20 percent of them women, and this increased visibility is encouraging even greater participation.

Civil society sector leadership

The processes for developing and strengthening leadership capacity in civil society are

Table 4.7 Corporate initiatives for leadership development in South Africa

Entity	Description	Web site
Business Leadership South Africa	A catalyst for South Africa’s inclusive growth, transformation, and development of a strong society	www.blsa.org.za
SAB Foundation	Founded to benefit historically disadvantaged individuals and communities, primarily through entrepreneurial development in South Africa	www.sab.co.za/the-sab-story/sab-foundation/
Ford Foundation	Promotes inclusion of people in the political, economic, and social institutions that shape their lives	www.fordfoundation.org/regions/southern-africa/
Old Mutual Foundation	Contributes to transformation in South Africa through effective socioeconomic development initiatives	//dogreatthings.co.za/foundation/about-us/
Cipla Foundation	Advances healthcare for the public and corporate sectors	http://www.cipla.co m/en/csr.html
Ackerman Pick n Pay Foundation	Aims to make a measurable contribution to sustainable development by supporting projects that address food insecurity in a sustainable way and create opportunities for income generation	www.picknpay.co.za/foundation
Allan Gray Orbis Foundation	Invests in a long-term legacy of greatness through inspiring and developing individuals who will become high- impact responsible entrepreneurs capable of shaping and transforming the future of the Southern African	http://www.allangrayorbis.org/about-us/

Source: South Africa country study.

similar to those in the public and private sectors. Some formal education is considered a useful foundation across all types of civil society organizations. Moreover, some countries offer higher education courses in areas of civil society concern such as labor studies or not-for-profit organization management. In many areas of civil society, however, such as trade unions, leadership capacity is developed on the job and through peer learning.

Civil society organizations across the continent play an important role in promoting national leadership capacity building initiatives. Nigeria, for instance, has one of the most widely known civil society leadership strengthening initiatives in Africa, the Africa Leadership Forum. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo founded it in 1988 after he stepped down as military head of state. The main objective of the forum is to improve the

Box
4.9**Nurturing the next generation of entrepreneurs in Côte d'Ivoire**

The General Confederation of Ivoirian Companies (CGECI) conducts a competition of young entrepreneurs, known as the CGECI Academy Business Plan Competition, which provides a platform for the development of innovative entrepreneurs ages 18–40. Candidates must have a business plan already drawn up or must have set up a company that is less than three years old. The competition identifies people with high potential and provides them with financial and technical support to develop that potential.

An international auditing firm certifies the selection and evaluation process. A large number of applicants (between 400 and 700 in the last three years) is filtered down to 30 finalists, who attend a one-day training session on how to present their projects. They are then invited to defend their projects before a panel. The six best projects are awarded prizes and receive technical and financial support from CGECI and sponsor companies. The winners also have access to the CGECI business accelerator, which offers entrepreneurs an array of practical tools, networking, and knowledge sharing. Finalists also have access to mentorship from established companies.

Source: Côte d'Ivoire country study.

quality of leadership in Africa and to help train the next generation of leaders on the continent. The forum provided the first Africa-wide mechanism for leaders from various sectors to meet and exchange experiences with a view to improving their performance. The Africa Leadership Forum spearheaded development of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation, which has become a standing program of the African Union since 2000. Three of Nigeria's not-for-profit leadership development initiatives aimed at improving leadership capacity are described in table 4.8.

South Africa probably has the largest number of leadership initiatives in Africa sponsored by the civil society that are making an impact on leadership capacity at

various levels. Some of these are described in table 4.9.

Traditional leadership

The social status and leadership role of traditional rulers varies considerably across Africa. Traditional rulership systems range from the relatively acephalous (leaderless) systems of the Karamajong (Uganda), the Talensi (Ghana), and Igbo (Nigeria) to the centralized systems of the Asante (Ghana), Yoruba (Nigeria), and Zulu (South Africa). Historically, traditional rulers have played significant and diverse roles in African societies, typically combining the roles of the executive, legislature, judiciary, and military. Since independence, however, traditional leaderships have evolved in different ways

Table 4.8 | Selected civil society institutions in Nigeria and their strategies for leadership development

Institution	Mandate	Leadership development strategies	Target leadership/clientele
Africa Leadership Forum	Improve the capacity and competence of African leaders to confront development challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides a platform for leadership reflection, dialogue, and experience sharing Organizes leadership capacity building programs Organizes conferences and workshops on major issues facing the continent 	High-level leadership in all domains across the continent and high potential young leaders and leaders at various levels
Ken Nnamani Centre for Leadership and Development (KNC)	Promote excellence in public leadership; promote prosperity, democratic governance, and political stability in Nigeria and the African continent by nurturing creative, innovative, transformative, and moral leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offers three categories of initiatives: Emerging Leaders Program, Executive Leaders Program, Diaspora Resources and Skills Network Workshops and seminars Research Specialized training in transformative leadership Mentoring, fellowships, and internships 	Promising young Nigerians and other Africans
African Centre for Leadership, Strategy and Development	Promote strategic leadership and sustainable development in Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leadership School Leadership Institute Executive Leadership Course Customized Leadership Training Program 	Chief executive officers and heads of organizations Mid-level managers Others

Source: Nigeria country study.

Table 4.9 | Selected civil society initiatives in South Africa

Institution	Mandate
Nelson Mandela Foundation	Convenes dialogues and creates platforms for engagement around critical issues to promote social justice
Institute for Transformational Leadership	Empowers emerging leaders to facilitate sustainable transformation toward healthy, reconciled communities based on biblical principles

(continued)

Table 4.9 | Selected civil society initiatives in South Africa (continued)

Institution	Mandate
African Leadership Foundation	Supports transformative change in Africa by developing and connecting the continent's next generation of leaders
Matthew Goniwe School of Leadership and Governance	Researches, develops, and delivers cutting-edge capacity building programs in school management, leadership, governance, and teacher development for schools in the province
Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute	Serves as a platform to groom change agents who can solve Africa's challenges and issues. Primes tomorrow's leaders
MAD (Make a Difference) Leadership Foundation	Develops selected scholars into leaders in their chosen fields. Provides academically talented scholars with exceptional leadership development opportunities through education
Helen Suzman Foundation	Promotes liberal constitutional democracy through broadening public debate and research
FW de Klerk Foundation	Promotes the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the rule of law Promotes cordial intercommunity relations and national unity Supports charities that care for children with disabilities and disadvantaged children
Shuttleworth Foundation	Promotes a vision for a better future centered on open principles Aims to build an open knowledge society with limitless possibilities Funds people to re-imagine the world and the way we live in it
Africa Leadership Academy	Seeks to transform Africa by developing a powerful network of over 6,000 leaders who will work together to address Africa's greatest challenges, achieve extraordinary social impact, and accelerate the continent's growth trajectory
Frederik van Zyl Slabbert Leadership Institute	Aims to improve students' leadership skills so that more of Stellenbosch University graduates are capable of contributing as well-equipped leaders to the well-being of South African society
RAITH Foundation	Seeks effective and lasting solutions to the systemic injustice and unfairness still prevailing in South Africa
Afrika Leadership Development Institute	Creating developmental leadership capacity in local government and communities and influencing other thought leaders who are shaping the leadership development discourse and practices in the region
Imkamva Youth	Equips learners from disadvantaged communities with the knowledge, skills, networks and resources to access tertiary education and employment opportunities
Tiso Foundation	Provides education programs and opportunities to South Africans

Source: South Africa country study.

across the continent. In some countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa, traditional rulers retain important roles in socioeconomic transformation. In South Africa, for instance, the role of traditional leaders is embedded in the Constitution, and it includes the officially recognized Council for Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) established in 1987, an important extra-parliamentary voice of traditional leaders.

In other countries, the role of traditional leaders has been significantly downgraded, as in Mozambique, where the government abolished the formal power of traditional leaders in 1975. These rulers were re-assigned some legitimacy in 2000 when the government provided for their re-inclusion in the performance of a long list of state administrative tasks and re-named “chiefs” (*régulos*) as “community authorities.” In their new roles, they are expected to function as both community representatives and state assistants, and the scale tips toward the state-assistance role (Buur and Kyed 2006). In many countries, traditional leaders are consigned to subsidiary roles for incumbent governments, facilitating the governments’ access to the grass-roots communities and supporting their political ambitions to stay in power.

In the contemporary context of socioeconomic transformation, traditional leadership can be both a positive and a negative force. In Ghana, for instance, research indicates that some traditional institutions

have not kept pace with other political and social institutions in the transformation process. This has often put traditional leadership institutions under pressure to change. On the one hand, some aspects of African culture may constrain transformative leadership in the modern world. On the other hand, other aspects of African culture may be excellent catalysts for transformation. It is important, therefore, to re-examine traditions and to contest assumptions that have remained unexamined for centuries and to empirically interrogate the impact of dominant African cultural attributes on leadership and organizational performance on the continent (Kuada 2010: 21).

To some extent, the capacity requirements for traditional leadership are now much the same as the requirements for leadership in the public or private sector. Some formal education is increasingly becoming important. It is unusual today for an important traditional ruler to have little education. A significant emerging trend is the installation of professionals, such as medical doctors, lawyers, bankers, or professors, as chiefs.

In some countries, like Ghana and Nigeria, the top traditional rulers had been leaders in other fields before assuming traditional chieftaincy roles. For instance, the current Asantehene (traditional ruler of the Asanti Kingdom in Ghana), Osei Tutu II, obtained a Diploma in Management and Public Administration at the University of North London, and on his return to Ghana in 1989

Box
4.10**Credentials of selected leading Nigerian traditional rulers**

Emir of Kano, Muhammadu Sanusi II, has a Master of Science degree in economics from Ahmadu Bello University and a degree in Islamic Law from the International University of Africa, Khartoum, Sudan. He was a leading banker and former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Among other recognitions, *Time* magazine listed Sanusi in its *Time's 100 List of Most Influential People of 2011*.

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. <http://www.cbn.gov.ng/AboutCBN/allgovernors.asp>. Retrieved 10/11/17.

Asagba of Asaba, Prof. Joseph Chike Edozien, graduated from University College Dublin with medical degrees. He has been professor and dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Ibadan, professor of nutrition at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and professor and head of the Department of Nutrition of the School of Public Health of the University of North Carolina.

Source: Celebrating a royal icon. Asaba.com. <http://asaba.com/his-royal-majesty-asagba-of-asaba-turns-90/>. Retrieved 10-11-17.

Oba of Benin, Ewuare II, has a degree in economics from the University of Wales and a Master of Public Administration degree from Rutgers University. He has been Nigeria's ambassador to Angola, Sweden, and Italy.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ewuare_II. Retrieved 10/11/17.

Oba of Lagos, Rilwan Akiolu, graduated in law from the University of Lagos. He served for many years in the Nigeria police force, reaching the rank of assistant inspector-general.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rilwan_Akiolu. Retrieved 10/11/17.

The **Sultan of Sokoto**, Sa'adu Abubakar, attended the Nigerian Defence Academy and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Armored Corps. He rose to become commanding officer of the 241 Recce Battalion, Kaduna, and of the 231 Tank Battalion in Sierra Leone. He was defense attaché to the Nigerian High Commission in Pakistan. He retired in 2006 as a brigadier general.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%27adu_Abubakar. Retrieved 10/11/17.

he set up his own mining equipment business.⁴⁵ In Nigeria, the Sultan of Sokoto is the religious leader of Nigeria's Muslim community and president-general of the National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs.

His leadership role derives from the Sokoto Caliphate, which unified large parts of West Africa under Islamic law in the early 19th century. He retired from the Nigerian Army with the rank of brigadier general to take up

his current position. See box 4.10 for brief backgrounds on some leading traditional leaders in Nigeria.

Despite the strong education background of traditional leaders and their rigorous preparation for office, the need for leadership capacity building remains, as in all other leadership cadres. This preparation is especially important because of the explicit and implicit overlap in the functions and duties of elected representatives and those of traditional leaders. Additional training of traditional leaders on such issues as land administration, conflict management, negotiation, and records and documentation management would significantly enhance their effectiveness in handling the multitude of development challenges facing their communities. Such training should be regular and continuous to be effective over the long term.

In Ghana, for instance, a 2010 research project by the University of Professional Studies, Accra, drew attention to the fact that many traditional leaders charged with managing land had little or no knowledge of land administration or records and documentation management. In consequence, the university established the Otumfuo Centre for Traditional Leadership in 2015, with the motto of “traditional leadership and seamless governance,” to enhance the capacity of traditional leaders to lead and to manage their resources effectively and sustainably.

Traditional leaders could play a larger role in building leadership capacity on the

continent. They could serve as teachers on a wide range of issues, from traditional leadership approaches to the challenges of modern economic development. For instance, the Asantehene of the Asanti Kingdom in Ghana presented the keynote address at the Fourth African Development Forum in October 2004 on the subject of “Traditional Systems of Governance and the Modern State.” The Kgosi Leruo Molotlegi of the Bafokeng Community in South Africa also delivered a speech at that event, on “Traditional Leadership for a Progressing Africa.”⁴⁶ Similarly, in October 5, 2011, the Sultan of Sokoto was the featured speaker at a seminar convened by the Harvard Divinity School on “The Role of Traditional Nigerian Leaders in Governance.”⁴⁷ The Emir of Kano is well known for his regular lectures and speeches in Nigeria and abroad on the fundamental developmental challenges of Nigeria and Africa.⁴⁸ Traditional leaders thus play an important role as mentors and thought leaders on issues of socioeconomic transformation.

Country achievements in transformative leadership

This section highlights some key achievements in nurturing transformative leadership in the case study countries during the first two decades of the 21st century. Achievements can be considered at several levels: in the institutional framework for transformation, visioning and strategy formulation, and technical issues.

The first level, that of strengthening the overall institutional framework for transformation, includes constitutional changes aimed at institutionalizing the values and ethics of transformative leadership. Kenya, for instance, introduced a new Constitution in 2010 that aims to be a foundation for efficiency, integrity, and accountability in governance (box 4.11).

Similarly, as part of the process of strengthening capacities to realize Ghana's long-term vision, the country recently established a National Public Sector Reform Strategy 2017–27, which identifies key areas of reform:

- *Cross-cutting reforms*, which include transparency, accountability and

Box
4.11 | **Kenya has institutionalized leadership values in public service**

In 2010, Kenya promulgated a new Constitution that introduced a devolved system of governance. The Constitution emphasizes service delivery focused on client satisfaction, including timeliness, knowledge and competence, courtesy, quality, and ease of access. The devolution was followed by public sector reforms driven by the principles of efficiency, human rights, good governance, integrity, transparency, accountability, and sustainable development.

Chapter 6 of the Constitution lays out the code of leadership and values expected of all elected and appointed public office holders. State office holders must be people of integrity, willing to be held accountable by those who have entrusted them with public office. It is now mandatory for senior managers employed in the public sector to be cleared by the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission for integrity. One provision of the new Constitution is that all public officers must declare their wealth.

Kenya also has supportive legislation to ensure the integrity of public officials. It has the Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003, the Government Financial Management Act of 2004, the Fiscal Management Act of 2009, the Ethics and Anti-corruption Act of 2011, the Public Service Commission Act of 2012, the Public Finance Management Act of 2012, the Leadership and Integrity Act of 2012, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act of 2015, and the Public Service (Values and Principles) Act of 2015. In addition, Kenya has ratified international treaties and conventions that show a commitment to integrity and anti-corruption.

Every state ministry, department, and agency is now required to have a framework to promote national values and principles of governance and to institute a code of conduct and ethics to enhance professionalism in service delivery and eradicate corrupt practices. Implementation is being monitored through performance contracts.

Source: Kenya country study.

oversight, service delivery improvements, human resources management, institutional development, records management, conditions of work, financial sector, information and communication technology, and gender mainstreaming.

- *Specific reforms*, which cover agencies, local government, civil service, state enterprises, and central management agencies.
- *Sectoral reforms*, which include land, trade, education, agriculture, health, energy, tourism, and the legal system (Ghana country study).

A second level relates to strengthening the capacity for visioning and strategy formulation, which is the domain of top leadership in any sector. The main challenges are how to create the appropriate vision and outline the strategy, how to cultivate and connect with a range of stakeholders, how to be a good (corporate or national) player within the region and globally, and how to create new meaning and mindsets among the leadership and constituents. These are competencies that leaders need to internalize to be effective in leading transformations. Some achievements have been registered here too. African countries have successfully put in place some noteworthy institutions. In Nigeria, for instance, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, which was established almost 40 years ago, has trained several of the country's top leaders (box 4.12).

A third level to consider is the technical dimension, which is concerned mainly

with operational issues. In the public sector, mastery of these issues is vital to a capable state. Technical issues include how to cultivate networks and collaboration, how to make smart decisions, how to develop and implement a change agenda, and how to influence and persuade team members to deliver. Here, too, a number of significant achievements have been registered. The Kenyan School of Government, the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, and the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (the latter two supported by ACBF) are now recognized globally as leaders in this field in Africa (see boxes 4.13 and 4.14).

Socioeconomic impact of transformative leadership

While it is not simple methodologically to establish a causal link between transformative leadership and overall socioeconomic progress, a strong association between the two over time can be compelling, especially when multiple achievements are visible along the way.

Rwanda stands out among the sample countries for demonstrating the strongest association between leadership actions and socioeconomic progress. According to the World Bank's most recent economic update, Rwanda is in its third decade of uninterrupted economic growth and social progress, founded on the country's strong commitment to good management of national resources and the principles of

Box
4.12**Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies**

Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) is the top strategy and policy institution in the country, targeting the highest echelons of leadership across all domains: political, public sector, private sector, and civil society. Established by the federal government of Nigeria in 1979, it was conceived as a high-level center for reflection, research, learning, and dialogue to serve as the nation's foremost policy think tank and develop a core of leaders with high intellectual capacity. These leaders are expected to anchor the design and implementation of innovative and dynamic policy initiatives and strategies critical for national development. NIPSS brings together top academics, seasoned policy-makers, senior military and national security personnel, and a broad spectrum of distinguished Nigerians from all walks of life. It aims to inculcate the highest national ideals and achieve the best results from a rational deployment of resources.

During its first 37 years, NIPSS has graduated about 2,000 senior government, armed forces, and private sector executives from its Senior Executives Course. Its alumni include former head of state Ibrahim Babangida and Nigeria's anti-corruption guru Nuhu Ribadu. Most of the directors-general in Nigeria's federal and state civil service structures, some state governors, and several important traditional rulers are also alumni of NIPSS.

Source: National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, <http://www.nipsskuru.gov.ng/index.php>. Retrieved 10/11/17.

a market economy (Gaye et al. 2017). Since 2000, economic growth has averaged almost 8 percent a year, and GDP per capita growth has averaged 5.6 percent. Its GNI per capita has grown from \$200 in 2000 to \$700 in 2016.⁴⁹ The poverty rate fell from 59 percent in 2000 to 39 percent in 2013/14. Extreme poverty fell from 40 percent to 16 percent over the same period. As a consequence, Rwanda moved from the 7th poorest country in the world in 2000 to 20th in 2015. Structural transformation has been the main driver of growth, although labor

has moved from subsistence agriculture mainly to the services sector rather than to manufacturing. The major challenge for the long term is to improve productivity in agriculture and create an enabling environment for manufacturing employment growth.

Rwanda's remarkable achievements have often been attributed to its visionary leadership, inclusiveness, and effective governance of national resources (box 4.15). Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of leadership in Rwanda has been the ability to maintain the three key principles of policy

The Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration

The Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) was established in 1961 as a joint Ghana Government–United Nations Special Fund project. Initially called the Institute of Public Administration, it was established to train public servants to plan and administer national, regional, and local services. In 2001, GIMPA became largely self-financing.

In 50 years, GIMPA has been transformed into a comprehensive tertiary education institution offering programs in leadership, management, public and business administration, and technology for the public and private sectors. Its clients range from politicians to senior bureaucrats to mid-level personnel from the public and private sectors. GIMPA is a top institute in Africa, recognized on the continent and around the world. It offers high-quality master's and executive master's degree programs in business administration, public administration, development management, governance, and leadership.

GIMPA also offers public servants postgraduate professional qualifications through two main categories of courses run annually. The first, for in-service professionals, emphasizes key competencies in economic planning, research, budgeting, procurement and finance, human resources, marketing and public relations, organization theory and practice, administrative skills, administrative law, civil service rules and regulations, and comparative administrative systems. The second category includes tailor-made courses designed to address specific agency needs. More recent offerings, prompted by Ghana's reform efforts, include training in strategic planning, performance measurement, contracting, and privatization procedures.

Currently, GIMPA runs a one-year master's level Public Sector Management Training Program to meet capacity needs (capacity building, retention, utilization, and regeneration) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Funded by ACBF, the program is designed to equip participants from English-speaking West African countries with skills to handle critical development challenges. In addition to project work, the candidates' core curriculum is in four modules: general principles and policy perspectives, strategic management, public sector resource management, and global and regional organizations and issues.

Source: GIMPA, <http://newsite.gimpa.edu.gh/AboutUs/history.html>. Retrieved 13/11/17. Ghana country study; ACBF.

Box
4.14**The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis**

The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) is an autonomous public institute established in 1997, with ACBF as a major partner, to study macroeconomic management and medium to long-term planning. Under the oversight of the Ministry of State for Planning, National Development, and Vision 2030, KIPPRA has played a critical role in promoting evidence-based policy-making in Kenya and providing platforms for building consensus on key development priorities reflected in Kenya Vision 2030.

Some of its major outcomes include the KIPPRA–Treasury Macro Model, which supports the Ministry of Finance in the preparation of the budget; the Budget Outlook Paper, which runs policy simulations to inform national development plans; and the Kenya Economic Report on the performance of the economy, which is prepared and presented to Parliament each year. KIPPRA also led the preparation of the concept paper for Kenya Vision 2030. Other KIPPRA contributions include policy dialogue for the establishment of the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, and the creation of a Nairobi Metropolitan Ministry. KIPPRA is also building tomorrow’s leaders through a Young Professionals Program that takes in 10–12 bright young people each year to enhance their skills and competencies in public policy analysis and research.

There is widespread demand for KIPPRA’s policy research across government ministries and agencies and national and international policy institutions such as the African Peer Review Mechanism. Over 2013–17, KIPPRA’s research outputs included five Kenya Economic Reports, 454 research reports, 221 media articles, 52 journal publications, and 145 client reports.

KIPPRA is recognized internationally for its support of evidence-based policy-making. It obtained ISO certification for quality standards and services in 2010 and has been recognized as one of the top think tanks in Africa by the Global Think Tanks Program of the University of Pennsylvania.

Source: LenCD 2011; Abagi 2017.

effectiveness: commitment, coordination, and cooperation.⁵⁰ Since the 1994 genocide, the government has been steadfast in implementing transformative policies and programs. Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in Rwanda’s decentralization

program, which has been implemented in a consistent and disciplined manner for nearly two decades and has served as a major instrument for mobilizing resources for economic development. It has also catalyzed people’s energies at all levels, shifted their

Transformative leadership and socioeconomic development in Rwanda

1. *Visionary and strategic leadership.* Rwanda's leadership has been effective not only in the design of development programs but also in their implementation and accountability. The governance system that supports development decentralization has enhanced the effectiveness of sectoral institutional arrangements and service delivery. However, some institutions still require additional capacity and competency enhancement to respond effectively to emerging challenges in the transformation journey.
2. *Inclusive socioeconomic development model.* The inclusive development model adopted by the current leadership in Rwanda embodies the Sustainable Development Goal of "leave no one behind." Complementing the inclusive economic growth policies, the Rwandan government has also initiated several social protection programs. These programs provide direct support to vulnerable people and help them develop themselves through job creation, education, health, gender promotion, and access to finance and land for productive purposes. The reduction of the Gini coefficient of inequality from 0.507 in 2001 to 0.447 in 2014 suggests an improvement in the equity of wealth distribution among Rwandans.
3. *Good governance of scarce resources.* Rwanda is a landlocked country and is endowed with limited natural resources, but it has shown remarkable aptitude in managing available financial, human, and environmental resources. The country has established mechanisms for natural resources management such as the Rwanda Natural Resource Management Authority and other specialized entities to ensure proper use and management of resources (forests, water, energy, land). Additionally, Rwanda has made a quantum leap in the quality of public finance management, accountability, and anti-corruption through establishment of the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the Office of the Auditor General, the Office of Ombudsman, the Parliamentarian Accountability Committee, and the empowerment of internal audit and tender committees in government institutions.

Source: Rwanda country study.

attitudes and mindsets, and sharpened their desire for self-development (Thomas 2008).

Rwanda also provides a good example of transformative leadership achievements at the sectoral level, as evidenced by the

success of its Community-Based Health Insurance scheme, introduced in 1999. Following the 1994 genocide, public health services were provided free of charge with donor support. As donor support lessened,

user fees were re-introduced in public and mission health facilities in 1996. The result was a reduction in health service utilization and a loss of financial security for a majority of people. To address these challenges, the government piloted the Community-Based Health Insurance scheme in 1999 and scaled it up nationwide in 2005. In just over 10 years, Rwanda expanded health insurance coverage from less than 7 percent of the target population in 2003, to 81 percent in 2016. The insurance scheme is recognized internationally as a model in advancing universal health coverage (box 4.16).⁵¹ A major factor in its success has been strong and consistent government political and operational leadership from the highest levels to local levels. This includes having an integrated approach and cooperation across national government departments and

between national and local governments under the leadership of the presidency.⁵²

Challenges in capacity development for transformative leadership

The case study countries reveal a number of challenges in transformative leadership and development. First, the understanding of substantive issues of development and transformation is not uniformly deep among the political leadership across all countries. While there is generally a good understanding at the highest political leadership levels of the structures and dynamics of governance, of what socioeconomic transformation involves, and of the major internal and external factors that shape countries' development prospects, this is not generally the case at lower levels. Several case studies

Box 4.16 Community-Based Health Insurance in Rwanda

Rwanda introduced the Community-Based Health Insurance program in 1999 as a response to the widespread inability of most people to access health services and facilities. The initiative started in 3 of the 30 districts of Rwanda and scaled up to the other districts within about six years. In less than 20 years, it has become the leading service model in the country and the region. To sustain this initiative, Rwanda introduced a national policy on community health insurance and standardized services across the country. A policy of zero premiums for the poor was also put in place in 2006. Membership in the scheme increased from 7 percent in 2003 to more than 80 percent currently. The country's leadership at the central and local government has played a major role in encouraging and facilitating this initiative, developing the relevant policies, and regulations and monitoring its implementation.

Source: Rwanda country study.

point out that many political parties have no formalized way of training their future leaders. As a result, many people enter public office unprepared and make mistakes that could have been avoided had they received political leadership education.

The transformative leadership narratives in the country studies suggest that the more successful transformative leaders have a robust understanding of four functional areas: visioning and developing strategies, directing strategy implementation, soliciting and advancing stakeholder participation, and leading the messaging and information sharing on the vision. Significant capacity development efforts are often required to enhance understanding of the substantive and procedural issues involved in these activities.

Second, most of the institutions and processes for developing transformative

leadership are still fledglings. While leadership capacity building is implicit in national development strategies, there are very few comprehensive national leadership capacity development policies or strategies. The main exceptions among the country case studies are Côte d'Ivoire and Rwanda. Rwanda, in particular, has embarked on the systematic development of national capacities at all levels over the past 20 years. Yet it, too, still faces plenty of capacity challenges (box 4.17).

In most countries, leadership development initiatives have been hampered by a lack of technical, financial, and human resources. Most of these initiatives have struggled to find the resources needed to carry out their objectives. The country studies point out that most capacity building institutions themselves need capacity

Box
4.17 | **Capacity challenges in Rwanda**

Though Rwanda has made progress in capacity development, the country still faces challenges in the financial capacity and skills needed to implement certain programs, as well as deficiencies in the functionality of certain development forums at the district level, such as the Joint Action Development Forum. The country's budget covers only about 82 percent of expenses, and some programs or sectors rely partly on external funding from development partners. In the area of technical expertise, Rwanda relies on outsourcing in some areas, especially for some specific skills in engineering, industrial development, technology investment, and the capacity to handle complex projects in energy, construction, and mining. However, Rwanda's regional integration into the East African Community and other regional bodies has opened other windows of collaboration and easy access to additional skills.

Source: Rwanda country study.

upgrading in staff, technology, and infrastructure. The establishment of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies in Nigeria, for instance, is a response to the multiple challenges of parliamentary leadership quality, but it remains very resource constrained.

A third major challenge for transformative leadership in Africa is having the right mindset for transformation, among both leaders and the citizenry. As indicated in chapter 2, the proper mindset recognizes the urgency of the transformation challenge, takes responsibility for one's future, believes in service to one's country, and prioritizes long-term investing. The country case studies highlight corruption among leadership as a major problem. Irresponsible leadership behavior includes executive, legislative, and judicial lawlessness; abuse of ethnic relations through nepotism and tribalism; and sectarian manipulation of religion (Sanusi 2012). The absence of a transformative mindset in the leaders and their inability to lead by example frustrate the transformation journey. It is for this reason that Côte d'Ivoire's President Alassane Ouattara speaks of the "New Ivorian." Similarly, Rwandan President Paul Kagame reminded his audience at the opening of the 13th National Dialogue Council on 21st December, 2015, that Rwandans have chosen to stay together, be accountable, and think big (Rwanda country study).

Most of the country case studies highlight corruption as a particularly damaging

manifestation of poor leadership mindsets. For instance, the fight against corruption is a major policy priority in the Economic Growth and Recovery Plan launched by Nigeria's new administration in 2015. In many countries, the citizenry view leaders as enriching themselves at the people's expense. In the words of President Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana at his inauguration:

Those of us in public service should acknowledge that corruption is one of the biggest concerns to the people of Ghana. It is the one subject on which a surprising number of people are willing to tolerate a waiver of due process. This is because, unfortunately, public officials are in danger of losing the confidence of the people in the fight against corruption. There is a perception that all public officials are part of a great scam to defraud the public and that they protect each other. It is in everybody's interest that the fight against corruption is transparent and has the support of the public (Republic of Ghana 2017: 14–15).

Unethical leadership behavior, corruption, and impunity are countered by the general public with indiscipline and a lack of civic-mindedness in the form of an apathetic attitude to work. In many cases, civil servants do not show up for work punctually or attend to government business with a sense of urgency.

Key messages and policy recommendations

Key messages

- Three broad types of leadership development mechanisms in Africa are specialized leadership training institutions, mentorship, and peer learning. Of the three types, specialized leadership training institutions account for the bulk of countries' leadership development efforts. All the case study countries have initiated public sector capacity development initiatives ranging from targeted efforts to comprehensive public sector reform programs. Although some senior executive programs draw participants from all domains—public, private, civil society, and traditional—not many programs are specifically designed to strengthen leadership in other than the political domain.⁵³
- There are a large number of initiatives across the continent for building the leadership capacity of young people. The sponsors of such programs are mostly private sector or civil society entities, although a few are sponsored by the state.
- The lead role in managing transformation belongs firmly with political leadership and the public sector. At the same time, the private sector is the main engine of economic transformation, and traditional and civil society leaderships also have important roles. Accordingly,

the capacity requirements for transformative leadership have to be considered in terms of both areas of commonality and areas of differentiation.

- A mindset of transformation is a critical missing link in Africa's transformation journey. The continent needs a critical mass of leaders that can model ethical leadership styles and lead in exercising strong governance practices grounded in transparency and accountability to the people.
- A mindset for transformation also appears weak among the general population, partly because their leaders do not typically act as good role models
- In most countries, initiatives to develop leadership capacity are hampered by a lack of technical, financial, and human resources. Most initiatives struggle to find the resources they need to fully carry out their objectives.

Recommendations

- Transformative leadership needs bold, visionary, ethical, and responsive leadership that understands change readiness and the imperative of creating the right mindset. It requires pooling expertise to design and sustain implementation of the agenda and promoting a disciplined approach to implementation. It is recommended that countries commit sufficient resources to ensure that the state and non-state institutions that lead in designing and implementing the transformation

roadmap have the necessary capacity. Relevant state institutions include ministries of economy and finance and central banks at the policy coordination level and social ministries at the sectoral level. These institutions constitute the core of the capable state.

- As the country studies show, the transformation process has also been supported by other policy and strategic institutions that are not within the state bureaucracy, such as Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), and the Institute for Policy Analysis and Research in Rwanda. Countries should ensure that these entities have the institutional and human capacities needed to stay on the cutting edge of emerging policy and strategic issues.
- Countries could put in place differentiated initiatives to internalize transformative leadership values in each domain: political parties, state institutions, private sector leadership, traditional rulers, and civil society institutions. For instance, initiatives for private sector leadership capacity development could focus on acting with integrity and corporate social responsibility; making markets serve development; and integrating a culture of value creation into corporate governance, operations, and profit calculation across the value chain. Similarly, political leaders could sharpen their competencies in such matters as strategic thinking, team leading, negotiations and communication, stakeholder engagement, coordination and facilitation, relationship management, and smart decision-making.
- Countries could consider designating at least one strategy and policy institution as a level 1 center of excellence. This is analogous to the approach used in health care of differentiating trauma center levels according to the kinds of resources they deploy and the level of demand for their services. The level 1 center of excellence would provide the largest range of transformative leadership development services at the highest quality. It would be capable of providing full training in every aspect of leadership. The level 1 center could also serve as a referral resource for other countries in the region. Elements of a level 1 center of excellence could include:
 - Leadership development programs for national chief executives.
 - Programs for heads of civil service.
 - Programs for traditional rulers and civil society and religious leaders.
 - Leadership development for chief executives in the private sector.
 - Multidisciplinary programs.
 - Organization of teaching and research efforts to support other centers of leadership development in the country or the region.

- The case studies identified several initiatives aimed at young people, but there does not appear to be a critical mass of such initiatives across the continent. Nurturing leadership succession through inclusive capacity building exercises for young people is vital. Countries could establish youth leadership development platforms to nurture a critical mass of transformation-minded young people who should also be highly skilled in science, technology, and innovation systems.
- The country stories reinforce the importance of having the right mindset for transformation. That requires leaders to have a clear vision and message and to embody this message in their own lives. Countries could establish high-level institutional facilities to help leaders understand the imperative of leading by example and to learn the critical skills in changing mindsets, such as creating and projecting the right message and facilitating awareness-building forums. Leaders should learn how to construct and disseminate compelling narratives on why change is necessary. They should sharpen their ability to convey the message in ways that resonate with the citizenry, drawing on elements of African history and culture.
- The country case studies also suggest that there is insufficient investment on the continent in building followership awareness. Countries could invest in public information and awareness-building campaigns to secure buy-in from the citizenry for the transformative vision.

Summary, key messages and capacity development policy recommendations

This chapter summarizes the findings of this Report and makes capacity development recommendations not only to deal with the challenges facing transformative leadership in Africa but also to develop effective institutions and to promote a culture of transformative leadership that is sustainable and enduring.

Summary of findings

This Report has examined the capacity dimensions of transformative leadership and how to address them to achieve Africa's socioeconomic development with specific reference to Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This section presents a summary of the findings around capacity dimensions.

Findings on capacity dimensions

- The results on the African Capacity Index (ACI) of 2019 are generally satisfactory, driven largely by a strong policy environment. The ACI ranges from 70.8 for Mauritius to 24.0 for Guinea-Bissau. There are no countries at the very low or very high extremes of capacity. Most countries are in the medium capacity bracket (67.4 percent, 31 countries), 21.7 percent (10 countries) are in the high bracket, and 10.9 percent (5 countries) are in the low bracket.
- By indicator cluster, the pattern of the ACI has not changed much since 2011. The policy environment for capacity development cluster remains the strongest and the capacity development outcomes cluster the weakest. Since 2014, the development results at country level cluster has caught up somewhat to the processes for implementation cluster.
- More than 93 percent of countries are ranked high or very high on the policy environment for capacity development cluster, as countries are putting in place policies and strategies for development, such as national development plans and vision strategies.
- Capacity development outcomes are difficult to achieve because few countries allocate adequate resources to capacity building, and a majority of countries (66 percent) have not complied with the 2003 Maputo Declaration that recommends allocating at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture.
- Of the 10 case study countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa), 3 (Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda) are in the high capacity bracket on the ACI while the remaining 7 are in the medium capacity bracket.

- Some progress has been made toward transformative leadership in Africa. Even though it is difficult to directly establish the connection between transformative leadership and socioeconomic development, there is some evidence that long-term socioeconomic performance can be attributed to transformative leadership, as is illustrated by Rwanda.
- The framework for transformative leadership is being improved through constitutional changes aimed at institutionalizing the values and ethics of transformative leadership. The constitutions of Ghana and Kenya, for example, have provisions on human rights, transparency, accountability, and code of conduct for public officials.
- Effective institutions also matter—ineffective institutions can undermine even the most transformative leadership. Accordingly, transformative development requires both developing the leadership capacity of individuals to effect change at all levels and creating strong institutions that endure beyond individual leaders' tenure in office.
- Most countries have established institutions to train transformative leaders. The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in Nigeria, for example, focuses on capacity building for top leadership. Many countries have similar institutions. Furthermore, most countries have also established institutions to train public servants to run a capable state, such as the Kenya School of Government, the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, and the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis.
- While significant progress has been made in Africa's capacity development for transformative leadership over the past 25 years, capacity deficits remain at all levels. Notably, dysfunctional leadership has been all too common. Nonetheless, Africa has an abundance of capable and responsible leaders at all levels and across all dimensions of society. These leaders need to become more prominent in guiding national transformation. Capacity development initiatives can help to create a leap forward in transformative leadership.
- African countries understand that the syndrome of poor political leadership must not be allowed to persist. Some past and current African leaders have taken on the challenge and established the African Leadership Council, promulgated a Code of African Leadership, and issued the Mombasa Declaration aimed at promoting exceptional leadership.
- The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is playing a major role in supporting capacity building for transformative leadership. For instance, in its Strategy 2017–21, ACBF identified "institutional weaknesses and inadequate leadership and human capacity" as the key challenges impeding achievement of

the AU Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. The ACBF strategy also identified the need for “change and transformative capacity,” of which transformative leadership is a major aspect.

Findings from the case studies

In addition, the evidence from the 10 case study countries reveals common patterns and divergences. In all the countries, transformative leadership in the political domain is recognized as a critical factor in development, and improvements in legal and institutional frameworks are being put in place to address challenges. There is some antipathy on the part of political leadership toward other types of leaderships—bureaucratic, religious, traditional, and civil society. And there are capacity weaknesses in leadership at all levels, indicating the need to develop competencies in core leadership areas such as visioning and developing strategies, managing implementation, cultivating stakeholder participation, and networking to reduce tension among levels of leadership.

Perhaps a crucial common factor that characterizes the case study countries is the lack of a dedicated budget for leadership development at all levels. This is partly because democratic politics is geared to an electoral cycle with short time horizons, which places a high premium on visible, quick-fix actions (new roads, clinics) rather than longer term and gradual capacity development initiatives. This makes any meaningful and sustained capacity development

for transformative leadership especially difficult.

Furthermore, while leadership capacity building is implicit in the various national development strategies, there are few comprehensive national leadership capacity development policies or strategies. Additionally, most of the institutions and processes for developing transformative leadership are in the formative stage, struggling to find their feet because of inadequate financial and human resources.

The problem of corruption also emerged in the country case studies. Corruption has debilitating effects on development. Steps taken so far, including the introduction of legal and institutional frameworks, seem to have achieved little success in curbing corruption.

Another area of convergence concerns the lack among political parties of formalized ways of training future leaders for office. Consequently, many frontline party members enter public office unprepared and prone to making mistakes that could have been avoided through political leadership training. The good news, however, is that there are several initiatives across the continent that aim to build the leadership capacity of young people. These initiatives are mostly sponsored by the private sector or civil society entities, although a few are sponsored by the state.

There are three-broad types of leadership development mechanisms that promote the agenda of transformative leadership in

the case study countries: specialized leadership training institutions, mentorship, and peer learning. For the public sector, for instance, specialized leadership training institutions have been set up, and they have short and long-term demand-driven programs for members of senior and mid-level cadres from all the sectors. At the same time, however, inadequate technical, financial, and human resources have often hampered leadership development initiatives. Most of these initiatives have struggled to find the resources they need to fully carry out their functions. The country studies reveal that the institutions charged with responsibility for capacity building are themselves in need of capacity building in several areas.

Some of the divergences in the country case studies reflect countries' different stages in creating transformative leadership, especially in capacity development, development of constitutional and legal institutional frameworks, and awareness building among the citizenry through well-coordinated public education programs.

In addition, the depth of understanding of substantive issues of development and transformation within the political leadership differs across countries. For instance, while there is generally adequate understanding at the highest leadership levels of the structures and dynamics of governance, what socioeconomic transformation involves, and the major internal and external factors that shape countries'

development prospects, this is not generally the case at the lower levels of political leadership.

Key messages and policy recommendations of the Report

This section highlights the key message and policy recommendations based on the findings.

Key messages

Some salient messages emerge from the findings in the Report:

- There has been tremendous concern about transformative leadership in Africa among political leaders, non-state actors, citizens, and development partners because of clear evidence of a scarcity of transformative leadership and of under-performance in sustainable socioeconomic development.
- Even though transformative leadership is not a panacea for Africa's slow development, achieving it would be an important step in the right direction, as recognized in the SDGs, Agenda 2030, and the 2004 Mombasa Declaration and Code of African Leadership that are emphasized in this Report.
- Achieving transformative leadership is a Herculean task, requiring substantial resources (funding and people) and the commitment of political, bureaucratic, business, religious, traditional, and civil society leadership. Despite the crucial role of transformative leadership, few

resources have been dedicated to building it.

- Transformative leadership embraces all domains of influence, including public sector, private sector, traditional ruling structures, civil society, and entities at international national, regional, and local levels. While acknowledging this complexity, it remains apparent that transformative leadership is the key to political, social, and economic development in Africa, as demonstrated by the earlier experience of Western countries and the developmental states of Asia.
- Effective leadership requires support from the citizenry, and that requires public education to raise awareness of the importance of transformative leadership.
- Even though African countries have implemented capacity development initiatives for transformative leadership, these efforts have been sporadic, uncoordinated, and unsustainable. This suggests a lack of commitment to developing capacity for leadership as a priority across all sectors at all levels.
- Institution building is key to development and to building transformative leaders. Both individual leaders who can derive change and strong institutions that endure beyond individual leaders' tenure in office are important.

Policy recommendations

Based on the findings and the key messages, the following policy recommendations are

highlighted and categorized for various key stakeholders.

African governments

- Because the transformation agenda is anchored in visionary leadership, public sector competence, and a developmental coalition that cuts across sectors, capacity building efforts should target the top political leaderships, including the top management in the public and private sectors.
- Governments must invest massively in building competencies in their public services. Capabilities, systems, and processes must be strengthened in policy entities such as economic planning and finance units and those responsible for social, health, and education strategies. Equally important is strengthening the capacity of accountability and compliance entities, such as ombudspersons and anti-corruption and audit units. To achieve all this, African countries should earmark dedicated budgets for developing leadership capacity. Despite competing priorities and dire economic conditions in many African countries, this investment is important because having a sustained budget for leadership capacity development will advance Africa's development in the long run. Budgeting for this purpose is a strategic decision to enhance prospects for Africa's development and good governance.

- The diversity of the initiatives and interests in fostering transformative leadership has led to these efforts being spread too thin. Mandate overlaps, turf wars, and a silo mentality have also impaired efforts to achieve the desired impact. There is a need for better coordination and monitoring, to make the initiatives more strategic.
- The capacity of governments to implement these recommendations needs to be considered. The weaknesses identified in the capacity of the state to design and implement policies and programs and deliver services means that improving understanding of the imperative of transformative leadership on the continent is imperative.
- Each country might consider designating at least one strategy and policy institution as a level 1 center of excellence. This center would provide the broadest range and highest quality of transformative leadership capacity development services. It would be capable of providing full training in every aspect of leadership and could serve as a referral resource for other institutions in the region.

Capacity coordinating institutions

- Current capacity development initiatives on transformative leadership need to be sustained and deepened. Institutions such as the ACBF that are coordinating capacity development will have to roll out a series of programs to build leadership

capacity at all levels. In its Strategy for 2017–21, ACBF identifies “institutional weaknesses and inadequate leadership and human resource capacity” as a key obstacles to achieving the AU Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. Accordingly, it calls for expediting “change and transformative capacity,” including especially transformative leadership.

- In addition, capacity coordinating institutions should design and implement targeted capacity development interventions that are tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of individual countries, among both the top performers in Africa on the ACI and the low performers. For example, all the top performing countries still score poorly on capacity development outcomes. Thus, targeting policy recommendations to improve capacity development outcomes would be most advantageous for these countries. It might be instructive for ACBF to take a special interest in the countries that are most challenged in capacity development and champion their capacity needs.

Private sector

- The private sector is a powerful engine of growth, but it needs more support from African governments to overcome the challenges that block the emergence of transformative business leadership.
- The principles of good corporate governance should be followed in a manner

that does not disadvantage any class of corporate actor or create trade barriers. The standards of corporate governance must be seen as African standards that are developed, formulated, and ratified by Africans for the well-being of Africa.

- There is a need to develop systems for monitoring and evaluating compliance with good corporate governance practices and strengthening the incentives for adherence to these principles. This requires the development and strengthening of institutions that can implement and model best practices.

Traditional leaders, civil society, and the media

Traditional leaders, civil society, and the media should be encouraged to play a larger role in building leadership capacity on the continent by:

- Setting up platforms of peer learning that periodically bring together opinion makers in key sectors, leading experts and practitioners, and young people with demonstrable leadership potential to deconstruct complex challenges and find solutions. Putting in place networks of alumni from these events could also serve as a mechanism for discovering successor generations of leaders and policy-makers.
- Fostering socioeconomic leadership coalitions that will outlast individual leaders and can uphold the long-term strategic agenda.

- Building leadership capacities across domains, including public and private sectors, traditional leaders, and civil society.
- Institute measures to build social capital that includes political leaders, traditional leaders, top public sector managers, the media, civil society leaders, trade union leaders, academicians, and representatives of professional standards organizations, business associations, and religious bodies.
- Nurturing leadership succession through inclusive capacity building involving young people.
- Expanding organizations offering training programs in leadership and refocus them on demand-driven issues.
- Promoting the diversity of leadership by encouraging participation of people of different ages, competencies, and learning habits.
- Reassessing methods of selection and recruitment of leaders at all levels to recruit more competent and qualified individuals.

Development partners

- Initiatives on transformative leadership and capacity building supported by development partners need to take into account the context within which African countries operate. Many capacity development initiatives have been unsustainable because of a failure to do so and to ensure country ownership.

Continental and regional levels

- The African Union and the regional economic communities, such as the Economic Community of West African States, Southern African Development Community, and East African Community, should strengthen the capacities of their leaderships. These entities should systematically conduct training programs for their senior cadres to strengthen their skills in key areas of leadership capabilities, such as visioning, change implementation, and ability to induce shifts in mindset.
- As long-term political stability is critical to transformation, there is a need to strengthen national, regional, and continental capacities in social dialogue and in conflict analysis, prevention, mediation, and resolution. The continental and regional bodies should also strengthen capacities in peace-building, regional integration, and leadership development.

Citizenry

- Citizen support or lack of support can make and unmake leaders.
- Citizens from all parts of society (elites, youths, men, women, students, workers, entrepreneurs, and others) need to understand the nuances of transformative leadership and to be psychologically prepared for what it means. This entails learning how to identify what capabilities, values, mindsets, and personal

attributes are needed for transformative leadership to work in society.

All stakeholders

- Leadership development and renewal require commitment and support from all stakeholders—political leadership, citizens, non-state actors, and development partners in particular.
- Monitoring, evaluation, and coordination are needed to reveal what works and what does not in the design and implementation of development policies, strategies, and programs at all levels, including issues of ownership and institutional arrangements for implementation and sustainability.
- Africa's evolving social structures—organizations and networks—will provide opportunities for more transformative leaders to emerge to replace less effective incumbent leaders.

Agenda for future research

The case studies, surveys, and other research underlying this Report have some shortcomings:

- The diversity of the 10 countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa), each with its own complex contextual variables, makes it difficult to draw broad inferences about policies and trends. Nonetheless, in-depth case studies of a larger number of countries based on

comparative methodology would contribute significantly towards some actionable generalizations.

- Inadequate data, coupled with the complexity of transformative leadership, prevented deep analysis of some issues, particularly related to civil society and private sector leadership.
- The Report does not address the selection of leaders outside the political arena. Leadership is important at all levels and in all domains of society, and Africa's capacity to realize the goals, targets, and aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the SDGs depends on having transformative leadership across society. Thus, understanding the recruitment and selection of leaders is an integral part of understanding and developing transformative leadership. Research and practice relating to the selection of leaders in Africa is underdeveloped, and ACBF may want to take a lead in advancing knowledge and best practices in this area.
- The dataset for the ACBF survey of 46 countries could not be explored as deeply as envisaged because of the several unanticipated data, technical and resource challenges. More analysis

of country capacity based on evidence from the surveys would have improved the balance between primary and secondary data sources.

Accordingly, for more meaningful comparative analysis, future research and analysis should:

- Focus on remedying these deficiencies, including by selecting and comparing countries with similar experiences, size, and stage of development and by more closely examining private sector and civil society leadership.
- Integrate the dataset from the survey with the secondary source material.
- Explore the link between the ACI scores and transformative leadership. This would require, for example, examining the extent to which the ACI scores complement the results of the case studies presented in chapter 4.
- Consider the relevance of transformative leadership for Africa's informal economy, which in most countries is the single biggest employer and generates a large share of GDP.
- Examine in more detail the nexus between the development of effective institutions and transformative leadership.

Notes

1. The ACBF flagship Report was originally called the *Africa Capacity Indicators Report* (ACIR). In 2014, it was renamed the *Africa Capacity Report* (ACR).
2. An individual with domain competence has the specific set of knowledge, skills, and abilities, as well as the personal attributes, required to maximize the probability of successful job performance in a particular area of work.
3. “The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established in 2003 by the African Union in the framework of the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). APRM is a tool for sharing experiences, reinforcing best practices, identifying deficiencies, and assessing capacity-building needs to foster policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration,” <http://aprm-au.org/pages?pagelid=history>. Retrieved 10/11/17.
4. The recent economic performance has led to some questioning of the “Africa rising” narrative. This pessimism is premature. When the three largest Sub-Saharan African economies are excluded, aggregate growth for 2017 rises to almost 4 percent, higher than the 3.5 percent rate for the global economy. Moreover, 5 of the world’s 10 fastest growing economies are in Africa; about two-thirds of the region’s economies are expanding faster than the global economy this year, and one-third of them are expanding at a rate of 5 percent or higher. In particular, roughly half the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to expand over the next five years at an average rate similar to or higher than the rate that prevailed in the heyday of the Africa rising narrative (Coulibaly 2017).
5. The major conferences include the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which popularized the notion of sustainable development, and the World Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen in 1995, which promoted the idea of poverty eradication as an “ethical, social, political and economic imperative.” The UN Assembly Special Session adopted the Millennium Declaration, which was followed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be implemented over 15 years. The SDGs are successors to the MDGs and they attempt to address the structural barriers to sustainable development—such as inequalities and exclusion, unsustainable production and consumption patterns, weak institutional capacities, and climate change and environmental degradation—that the MDG agenda did not fully consider.

6. A group consisting of some former heads of state and heads of government and some current and former senior political officers
7. The World Bank and the governments of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, together with the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, created the commission, which consists of leading practitioners from government and business. The commission's mandate over a two-year period was to deepen the understanding of economic growth for development and poverty reduction. Nobel laureate Michael Spence, former dean of the Stanford Graduate Business School, chaired the Commission, and Danny Leipziger, World Bank Vice President for Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, served as the vice-chair (World Bank 2006a).
8. Meles Zenawi, president of Ethiopia from 1995 to his death in 2012, was widely considered a visionary leader, and his successors have stayed substantially on Meles' agenda. Paul Kagame has been president of Rwanda since 2000 and is considered to have been the *de facto* leader when he served as vice-president and minister of defense from 1994 to 2000.
9. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>.
10. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview>.
11. Hong Kong also achieved remarkable growth, but forged its economic development path under unique circumstances.
12. The theme of the relationship between the colonial experience and postcolonial political and economic development in Africa has also been discussed. For instance, Crawford Young (1988, 1994, 1995) argued that the structure of the colonial state and the manner in which a country attained its independence determined its postcolonial development trajectory. He contends that the colonial powers' policies of ruthless extractive action are partly responsible for the postcolonial vicious cycle of unstable politics and weak economies in Africa. Rwanda is particularly remarkable in this context as an example of predatory colonial policies and a model of transcendence of its historical legacy.
13. Land reform is considered an important explanatory factor in the difference between East Asian and Latin American states (Evans 1995).
14. In Japan this alliance included trade unions while in Korea it excluded them and was even hostile to workers' organizations. However, Korea's strategy also contained a substantial element of inclusiveness. This was evident in the country's land reform and its education and health policies. Moreover, in the early days of its industrialization, Korea ensured significant protection for industrial workers through a corporate welfare system (Chang 2011).
15. This high-quality bureaucracy often had to be created as part of the transformation process. In Korea of the early 1960s, the government was poorly insulated from the demands of the private

- sector and penetrated by patron-client networks, and the bureaucracy was subject to political interference from both the executive and the ruling party (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 1990: 11).
16. “Innovativeness” is used advisedly because the emphasis is on the behavioral attribute or characteristic of being innovative rather than particular acts of introducing something new (innovation).
 17. The Korean government also established a number of specialist centers of excellence that drove the development of advanced technologies for key sectors, such as steel, chemicals, and electronics. Among these were the Korea Institute for Industry and Science established in 1966 and the Korean Advanced Institute for Science and Technology established in 1971.
 18. Lee subscribed strongly to the notion that a leader must be feared: “If you take me on, I will put on knuckle-dusters and catch you in a cul de sac.... Anybody who decides to take me on needs to put on knuckle dusters. If you think you can hurt me more than I can hurt you, try. There is no other way you can govern a Chinese society.” (Han et. al. 1998 :126. Italics added).
 19. Although Johnson (1982) noted that Japan was a regime in which the dominant party plus the bureaucracy “ruled,” while the legislature “reigned” but did not “rule.”
 20. It should be borne in mind, however, that Botswana is de facto a one-party state or, more accurately perhaps, “an elite democracy with authoritarian tendencies” (Meyns 2010: 55).
 21. The Malaysian experience is widely seen as particularly relevant to Africa. The ambition of Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad in 1991 was for Malaysia to become a fully developed country by 2020. This aspiration, expressed in Vision 2020, was elaborated as nine general challenges that Malaysia must overcome: establishing a united nation, attaining psychological liberation, fostering democracy, establishing a moral and ethical society, establishing a tolerant society, establishing a scientifically advance society, establishing a caring culture, ensuring economic justice, and establishing prosperity based on a dynamic economy (Malaysia EPU 1991). The Economic Planning Unit (EPU), under the division of the prime minister, directed national efforts to make this vision a reality. The country crafted several layers of policy documents such as the Industrial Master Plan (Ministry of International Trade and Industry), Perspective Plans (EPU), and five-year plans (EPU). While the mechanisms and processes appear complex, Malaysia has been successful in expediting them effectively.
 22. The term was first used by Peter Evans, “The State as a Problem and Solution: Predation. Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change” in Haggard and Kaufman (1992).
 23. Obasanjo 2013.
 24. Crossette 1998.

25. The Mo Ibrahim Achievement in African Leadership recognizes and celebrates African executive leaders who, under challenging circumstances, have developed their countries and strengthened democracy and human rights for the shared benefit of their people, paving the way for sustainable and equitable prosperity. This ensures that Africa continues to benefit from the experience and wisdom of exceptional leaders after they leave power. The award is expected to enable them to continue in other public roles on the continent. Prize criteria: Former African head of state or government who has left office in the last three years and who was democratically elected to serve his/her constitutionally mandated term and who demonstrated exceptional leadership. Award \$5 million over 10 years and \$200,000 a year for life thereafter. See Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2018).
26. Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2018.
27. Toyana 2018.
28. Nine related leadership styles (which vary from period to period) have been identified in the literature. See, for example, Mazrui (1970, 1971).
29. The Singapore Civil Service is known for its high level of meritocracy, strong focus on integrated strategic planning, high capacity to support public and private companies, lack of corruption, and ability to ensure a high level of scientific and humanistic knowledge through an innovative educational system. Furthermore, the experience of Singapore reveals virtuous cycles between the public service and national development in multiple realms, political history, geographic location, party politics, macroeconomic considerations, adaptability of the civil service, and farsightedness of political leaders. These are critical factors in determining outcomes, the type of change, and the scope of reform initiatives, see Haque (2009) and Saxena (2011).
30. ACET (African Centre for Economic Transformation). 2018. "Private Sector Leaders Explore Opportunities to Unlock Investment in Africa", held on 31 May–1 June 2017 in Accra, Ghana organized by the World Bank and supported by ACET. Available at: <https://acetforafrica.org>. A similar point was also made by Nana Akufo-Addo, President of the Republic of Ghana, speech delivered at the Post-AGM Private Sector Forum of the Private Enterprise Federation (PEF) in Accra, Ghana on 21 December 2016. Available at: <https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2016/december-21st/full-text-akufo-addos-speech-at-the-post-agm-private-sector-forum.php>.
31. Former President John Kufuor speaking at a forum organized by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) on the theme: "Destiny or Policy? Development Prospects for Ghana aimed at examining policies that determine a country's development prospects" in Accra, Ghana on 14 July 2017. Available at: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Africa-lacks-leadership-that-can-build-public-sector-Kufuor-559042>.

32. Mumbere 2018.
33. UN 2015.
34. African Presidential Archives and Research Center (Boston). Available at: <http://www.bu.edu/aparc/>.
35. African Presidential Archives and Research Center (Boston). Available at: <http://www.bu.edu/aparc/>
36. Prof. Emmanuel Nnadozie, ACBF's Executive Secretary speaking to multiple stakeholders convened to an inaugural meeting of the African Partnership Coordination Platform which was held in Harare, Zimbabwe in December 2017.
37. <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sortby/rank/sortorder/asc/cols/stats>. <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/best-universities/best-universities-africa>, retrieved 8/11/17.
38. It may be argued that the military experience of public leaders should not be considered as mentorship in political leadership. However, the discipline, strategic and tactical training, and attention to detail, among other aspects of the military experience, are core elements of leadership that are as relevant in the political domain as in the military domain. Moreover, many successful political leaders had a military background. Well-known examples include former Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Dwight Eisenhower of the United States and former German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.
39. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established in 2003 by the African Union in the framework of the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). APRM is a tool for sharing experiences, reinforcing best practices, identifying deficiencies, and assessing capacity building needs to foster policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development, and accelerated subregional and continental economic integration. <http://aprm-au.org/pages?pageId=history>. Retrieved 10/11/17.
40. Kenya is one of the few countries that insist that candidates for the office of president or vice-president possess a university degree.
41. African Peer Review Mechanism. <http://aprm-au.org/pages?pageId=history>. Retrieved 13/11/17.
42. <https://www.uneca.org/idep>. Retrieved 31/3/18.
43. Not included in the table but also noteworthy, particularly because of its target audience, is the Michael Imoudu National Institute for Labour Studies. Named after a pioneer labor leader, the institute provides workers' education as a means of enhancing the role of trade unions in the social and economic development of the country. It organizes and facilitates study courses, conferences, lectures, seminars, and research for public and private sector workers and trade union leaders.
44. Nigerian Institute of Directors. <http://www.iodnigeria.org/>. Retrieved 8/11/17.
45. Ghana Web 2018.

46. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Fourth African Development Forum, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 12 October 2004.
47. <https://hds.harvard.edu/multimedia/video/nigeria-and-the-world-seminar-the-role-of-traditional-nigerian-leaders-in-governanc>. Retrieved 1/11/17.
48. See, for instance, Sanusi (2017).
49. <https://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda>.
50. Commitment means maintaining consistent policies over time to ensure that government promises are delivered. Coordination refers to providing a framework that enables complementary actions by key institutions and individuals. Cooperation is about limiting opportunistic behavior among policy agents to prevent free riding (World Bank 2002).
51. In 2014, the United States Agency for International Development requested partners engaged in its health systems strengthening projects to share their experiences by submitting case examples. Of more than 145 cases voluntarily submitted, the CBHI was one of the top 10 cases evaluated as demonstrating compelling evidence for sustainably improving country health system performance and health impact. Management Sciences for Health. <http://www.msh.org/news-events/press-room/msh-case-studies-selected-as-part-of-usaid%E2%80%99s-top-ten-health-systems>. Retrieved 16/11/17.
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53. It is often the case, however, that the private sector invests substantially in internal leadership development programs. Traditional leaderships, too, typically have an inherent grooming system.

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Technical note

ACR Team Organization

The ACR Team comprises a dedicated ACBF group supported by various stakeholders and partners at different levels (figure TN1).

ACBF ACR Team


A dedicated group of individuals (ACR Team) within the ACBF Secretariat is constituted to spearhead the process from conceptualization through to the publication of the ACR Flagship Report. Team members come from the various units and departments within the Secretariat.

External Reference Group (ERG)

The ERG is created to provide motivation and intellectual guidance, as well as to challenge the ACBF ACR team to develop its thinking behind the assessment and ensure that the team achieves its objective of delivering a quality publication. To this end, the External Reference Group acts as the ACR team's strategic partner to ensure that:

- The approach and methodologies employed in preparing the Flagship are theoretically sound, conceptually appropriate, rigorous, and balanced, drawing in divergent view as appropriate.

Figure TN1 | ACR Team organogram



- The data capturing instruments are adequately reviewed and appropriate.
- Comments on the ACR survey template, selected indicators, case studies and stories are provided in a timely manner.
- The presentation of findings balances views from across the broad spectrum of opinion and reflect current and innovative practice.
- The review and report balance public, legal and operational perspectives appropriately.
- There is feedback on implementation support and costing tools for specific topics examined, and on the appropriateness of, for example, the costing assumptions and the approach adopted within the tools as well as peer review of the background papers.
- Where needed, ACBF is supported in the identification of appropriate networks and/or experts with whom to engage to assist in the development of the tools.
- All conclusions drawn and policy recommendations provided are sound and evidence-based.

Policy Institutes

To produce the ACR 2019, the ACBF has commissioned the drafting of case studies on transformative leadership that will serve as background materials to produce the Report. Nine ACBF-supported think tanks conducted the case studies in their respective countries of location. The case studies are primarily aimed at documenting the

experience of the country with respect to leadership and drawing lessons for the rest of the countries. The specific objectives include the following:

- Understand the current leadership landscape regarding its suitability in achieving Africa's socio-economic transformation.
- Situate transformative leadership within the context of the capacity imperatives facing African countries, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), continental bodies as well as non-states actors.
- Identify the transformative leadership capacity gaps (including mind-set elements) that would hinder attainment of the Agendas 2063 and 2030 as well as national development frameworks.
- Identify cases of effective transformative leadership—state and non-state—on the continent that can be adapted across Africa—building on what has worked or not and why.
- Propose appropriate strategies for addressing the capacity gaps identified around transformative leadership (disaggregated into state and non-state leadership) in Africa.
- Define the appropriate roles for governments, RECs, continental bodies, non-state actors, and development partners in addressing the capacity imperatives for the development of a transformative leadership in Africa.
- Through the use of country case studies, serve as a knowledge product that encourages further policy-oriented research

aimed at extending the frontiers of knowledge around what works, what doesn't work and why in the area of building capacity for transformative leadership.

- Mobilize high level political and financial support for development and implementation of sustainable capacity building solutions around transformative leadership necessary for catalyzing Africa's socio-economic transformation.

Data experts

At the country level, a national familiar with the country context, was identified and selected through an open and competitive process, invited to a training session on the

annual theme (Leadership) as well as the ACI survey instrument. That person then conducted the administration of the questionnaire in his/her country.

Data collection

Coverage

In line with the target of covering all African countries, the number of countries covered during this sixth edition stood at 46 (table TN1).

Training workshop

A training workshop was organized from 29 May-1st June 2017 for all the selected

Table
TN1 | List of countries covered by the study

Group 1 West and North English-speaking countries	Group 2 West and North French-speaking countries	Group 3 Central Africa and other French- speaking countries	Group 4 East Africa	Group 5 Southern Africa
Egypt	Algeria	Burundi	Ethiopia	Botswana
Gambia	Benin	Cameroon	Kenya	Eswatini
Ghana	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Malawi	Lesotho
Liberia	Côte d'Ivoire	Chad	Rwanda	Mauritius
Nigeria	Guinea	Comoros	Somalia	Mozambique
Sierra Leone	Guinea-Bissau	Congo	South Sudan	Namibia
	Mali	DR Congo	Tanzania	South Africa
	Mauritania	Djibouti	Uganda	Zambia
	Morocco	Gabon		Zimbabwe
	Niger	Madagascar		
	Senegal	Tunisia		
	Togo			

in-country data experts who were to administer the main questionnaire. During the workshop, the data experts were familiarized to the annual theme (Leadership), the data collection instrument was reviewed, revised and the final version adopted. Also during the workshop, the potential sources of information per country were discussed and agreed upon. However, it was acknowledged and agreed that the list could be adjusted during the field data collection to suit country-specific needs (e.g. Ministry of Finance in country A, could be Ministry of Economic and Finance in country B, etc.).

Field data collection

The field data collection was conducted further to the training workshop. Reporting was done on a weekly basis. At the end of the field data collection, the data experts submitted their completed questionnaires along with their final field report, including the sources of the information they collected.

Computing the indices

Scoring the answers to questions

Each question is assigned an associated variable indicator whose nature depends on the type of question asked. The scoring of the variable indicators is in relation with their respective natures. The scores are standardized on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.

Qualitative variables

A value is attributed to each expected answer. Questions with a YES or NO answer are scored 0 or 100. Questions with three possible answers are scored 0, 50, and 100. Questions with 4 answers are scored 0, 33.3, 66.7, and 100. Questions with 5 answers are scored 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100.

Some examples appear in table TN2.

Numerical variables

a. The answer is a proportion

The score is the answer (assuming that moving from 0 to 100% is improving, otherwise, one may just read backwards)

b. Numerical variable in the form of ordinal scales

The values on the predetermined scale are brought to a scale ranging from 0 to 100.

Example:

Level of implementation of the African Charter on the Right of the Youth by the Member State (very weak, 1, to very strong, 6)						
Answer	1	2	3	4	5	6
Score	0	20	40	60	80	100

Computation of the Indices

The ACI Composite Index

During the first edition of the ACR Report, the exploratory approach was used to define the components of the ACI composite index. To this end, the hierarchical cluster analysis was carried out, using the Ward’s method applying squared Euclidian distance as the distance or similarity measure. From

Table
TN2 | Examples of qualitative variables

Question no.	Question	Expected answers	Score
B1	Does the country have a National Development Strategy (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, National Development Plan, Vision Strategy, and so on?)	YES	100
		NO	0
B4	Is Capacity Development (CD) integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy/National Development Plan?	CD is not mainstreamed in the current PRSP/National Development Plan	0
		CD is mainstreamed, but with no clear objectives and targets	50
		Clear objectives and targets set in the PRSP/National Development Plan	100
B13b	How effective is the dialog mechanism with development partners?	Very High	100
		High	75
		Average	50
		Low	25
		Very Low	0

the findings of the analysis, four groups of factors appeared to be the most relevant.

- Cluster 1: Policy environment
- Cluster 2: Processes for implementation
- Cluster 3: Development results
- Cluster 4: Capacity development outcomes.

Four cluster indices are then calculated, each one being the arithmetic mean of its cluster variable indicators.

Cluster index j ($j = 1, 2, 3, 4$) is the arithmetic mean of variable indicators within cluster j .

$$CL_j = \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{i=1}^{i=n_j} V_{ij}$$

V_{ij} = Score assigned to variable i within cluster j

n_j = Number of variable indicators within cluster j

The ACI Composite Index is the harmonic mean of the four cluster indices. The rationale for choosing the harmonic mean formula is that capacity development is an indivisible whole of its dimensions. As such, none of the capacity development factors as given by the four clusters should be neglected. Weakness in one of the four components should be easily captured by the harmonic mean formula, which is sensitive to small values.

$$ACI = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{4} \sum_{j=1}^{j=4} \frac{1}{CL_j}}$$

Thematic indices

In addition to the clusters indices, a four thematic indicators are also calculated as follows:

No.	Name of the thematic indicator
1	Policy choices for capacity development
2	Partnering for effective development cooperation
3	Partnering for capacity development
4	Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion

The value of the indicator is the arithmetic mean of variables indicators Indexes within that Section.

Ranking the countries

According to the index values, the countries are ranked into five categories:

	Index value	Category	Color
1	0 to less than 20	Very Low	Red
2	20 to less than 40	Low	Brown
3	40 to less than 60	Medium	Yellow
4	60 to less than 80	High	Light Green
5	80 and above	Very High	Dark Green

Africa Capacity Indicators 2019

Table A1 ACI composite index by countries (in alphabetical order)

No.	Country	ACI 2019	Level of capacity development	Rank
1	Algeria	40.2	Medium	40
2	Benin	58.4	Medium	12
3	Botswana	53.1	Medium	22
4	Burkina Faso	67.0	High	2
5	Burundi	53.9	Medium	18
6	Cameroon	42.4	Medium	37
7	Central African Republic	37.0	Low	43
8	Chad	42.9	Medium	35
9	Comoros	51.0	Medium	28
10	Congo	42.5	Medium	36
11	Côte d'Ivoire	56.2	Medium	15
12	Djibouti	52.1	Medium	24
13	DR Congo	57.1	Medium	14
14	Egypt	40.1	Medium	41
15	Eswatini	41.3	Medium	39
16	Ethiopia	51.2	Medium	27
17	Gabon	48.4	Medium	30
18	Gambia	43.9	Medium	34
19	Ghana	65.2	High	4
20	Guinea	55.8	Medium	17
21	Guinea-Bissau	27.3	Low	46
22	Kenya	46.3	Medium	31
23	Lesotho	53.7	Medium	20
24	Liberia	57.8	Medium	13
25	Madagascar	34.8	Low	45
26	Malawi	66.2	High	3
27	Mali	64.1	High	6

(continued)

Table
A1 **ACI composite index by countries (in alphabetical order)** (continued)

No.	Country	ACI 2019	Level of capacity development	Rank
28	Mauritania	51.7	Medium	25
29	Mauritius	70.8	High	1
30	Morocco	60.5	High	10
31	Mozambique	55.9	Medium	16
32	Namibia	61.1	High	9
33	Niger	53.8	Medium	19
34	Nigeria	59.6	Medium	11
35	Rwanda	63.3	High	8
36	Senegal	53.6	Medium	21
37	Sierra Leone	42.2	Medium	38
38	Somalia	45.4	Medium	33
39	South Africa	52.2	Medium	23
40	South Sudan	36.0	Low	44
41	Tanzania	64.5	High	5
42	Togo	39.9	Low	42
43	Tunisia	63.8	High	7
44	Uganda	48.5	Medium	29
45	Zambia	51.2	Medium	26
46	Zimbabwe	46.1	Medium	32

Map
A1

Geographical distribution of overall capacity level (ACI)






Table A2 Cluster indices

No.	Country	ACI 2019	Cluster 1 Policy environment for capacity development	Cluster 2 Processes for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcomes
1	Algeria	40.2	57.2	20.4	58.3	62.5
2	Benin	58.4	96.7	34.8	100.0	51.7
3	Botswana	53.1	80.9	51.0	100.0	30.0
4	Burkina Faso	67.0	96.1	69.5	100.0	40.2
5	Burundi	53.9	86.8	49.8	100.0	30.7
6	Cameroon	42.4	86.8	59.3	58.3	20.5
7	Central African Republic	37.0	64.5	20.8	50.0	40.6
8	Chad	42.9	77.0	37.6	83.3	24.0
9	Comoros	51.0	86.8	39.8	58.3	40.7
10	Congo	42.5	82.2	25.7	50.0	43.5
11	Côte d'Ivoire	56.2	97.4	47.9	100.0	33.3
12	Djibouti	52.1	78.9	66.2	83.3	27.1
13	DR Congo	57.1	80.3	44.3	83.3	43.5
14	Egypt	40.1	80.3	90.4	58.3	16.9
15	Eswatini	41.3	63.2	42.0	58.3	25.0
16	Ethiopia	51.2	94.7	68.9	66.7	26.2
17	Gabon	48.4	76.3	49.0	33.3	52.1
18	Gambia	43.9	90.1	34.8	50.0	32.0
19	Ghana	65.2	85.5	63.8	66.7	52.7
20	Guinea	55.8	78.3	56.0	100.0	32.2
21	Guinea-Bissau	27.3	69.1	43.2	20.0	16.9
22	Kenya	46.3	85.5	51.0	30.0	46.2
23	Lesotho	53.7	88.2	63.8	100.0	26.7
24	Liberia	57.8	78.3	68.1	66.7	37.4
25	Madagascar	34.8	75.7	28.8	66.7	19.3
26	Malawi	66.2	94.7	83.3	83.3	38.7
27	Mali	64.1	92.1	51.9	100.0	44.8
28	Mauritania	51.7	89.5	41.9	50.0	44.8

(continued)

Table
A2 Cluster indices (continued)

No.	Country	ACI 2019	Cluster 1 Policy environment for capacity development	Cluster 2 Processes for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcomes
29	Mauritius	70.8	93.4	92.3	100.0	40.1
30	Morocco	60.5	88.2	79.0	100.0	31.1
31	Mozambique	55.9	81.6	61.2	83.3	32.3
32	Namibia	61.1	92.1	68.5	66.7	40.0
33	Niger	53.8	88.2	59.3	66.7	32.1
34	Nigeria	59.6	90.8	68.1	66.7	37.8
35	Rwanda	63.3	90.8	82.0	83.3	35.8
36	Senegal	53.6	76.3	37.4	100.0	40.4
37	Sierra Leone	42.2	86.2	60.5	66.7	19.4
38	Somalia	45.4	36.8	41.9	58.3	50.1
39	South Africa	52.2	78.9	67.1	41.7	40.0
40	South Sudan	36.0	51.3	47.7	50.0	19.8
41	Tanzania	64.5	84.2	85.0	91.7	36.5
42	Togo	39.9	81.6	56.2	60.0	18.7
43	Tunisia	63.8	91.4	67.9	75.0	42.3
44	Uganda	48.5	91.4	34.3	58.3	39.6
45	Zambia	51.2	90.8	59.0	50.0	33.1
46	Zimbabwe	46.1	88.2	81.7	50.0	23.1

Table A3 | Thematic indices

No.	Country	Policy choices for capacity development	Partnering for effective development cooperation	Partnering for capacity development	Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion
1	Algeria	39.6	18.8	50.0	60.5
2	Benin	66.8	85.0	50.0	97.4
3	Botswana	60.4	77.5	50.0	76.3
4	Burkina Faso	81.6	88.8	50.0	97.4
5	Burundi	65.7	83.8	75.0	80.3
6	Cameroon	69.2	71.3	50.0	73.7
7	Central African Republic	29.9	68.8	75.0	81.6
8	Chad	65.0	67.5	25.0	60.5
9	Comoros	72.0	63.8	25.0	68.4
10	Congo	48.7	67.5	25.0	90.8
11	Côte d'Ivoire	71.1	97.5	75.0	86.8
12	Djibouti	64.9	67.5	75.0	84.2
13	DR Congo	62.1	82.5	75.0	68.4
14	Egypt	73.8	88.8	50.0	73.7
15	Eswatini	47.0	77.5	25.0	60.5
16	Ethiopia	77.7	76.3	0.0	84.2
17	Gabon	60.0	41.3	75.0	68.4
18	Gambia	53.2	85.0	25.0	86.8
19	Ghana	76.1	73.8	25.0	84.2
20	Guinea	59.9	91.3	75.0	78.9
21	Guinea-Bissau	50.3	43.8	25.0	65.8
22	Kenya	63.9	27.5	50.0	92.1
23	Lesotho	69.8	78.8	50.0	86.8
24	Liberia	71.9	85.0	0.0	73.7
25	Madagascar	56.2	72.5	75.0	48.7
26	Malawi	85.6	86.3	50.0	84.2
27	Mali	68.5	73.8	50.0	94.7

(continued)

Table
A3 | **Thematic indices** (continued)

No.	Country	Policy choices for capacity development	Partnering for effective development cooperation	Partnering for capacity development	Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion
28	Mauritania	61.8	72.5	25.0	89.5
29	Mauritius	82.9	81.3	50.0	97.4
30	Morocco	75.3	88.8	75.0	81.6
31	Mozambique	65.4	82.5	75.0	73.7
32	Namibia	76.2	70.0	0.0	94.7
33	Niger	72.7	52.5	0.0	84.2
34	Nigeria	76.9	72.5	0.0	89.5
35	Rwanda	78.3	97.5	75.0	81.6
36	Senegal	59.1	70.0	50.0	76.3
37	Sierra Leone	67.8	52.5	75.0	84.2
38	Somalia	36.0	66.3	75.0	34.2
39	South Africa	68.3	26.3	50.0	81.6
40	South Sudan	41.7	32.5	50.0	57.9
41	Tanzania	78.5	76.3	50.0	86.8
42	Togo	54.9	97.5	25.0	78.9
43	Tunisia	71.4	75.0	50.0	90.8
44	Uganda	63.2	40.0	25.0	97.4
45	Zambia	71.7	61.3	0.0	81.6
46	Zimbabwe	75.2	76.3	0.0	89.5

Country capacity profiles

ALGERIA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	40.2
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	40
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	39.6
Partnering for effective development cooperation	18.8
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	60.5
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	10.0
Level	Very Low
BENIN	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	58.4
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	12
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	66.8
Partnering for effective development cooperation	85.0
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	7.45
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	40.0
Level	Medium

BOTSWANA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	53.1
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	22

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	60.4
Partnering for effective development cooperation	77.5
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	6.3
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	30.0
Level	Low

BURKINA FASO**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	67.0
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	2

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	81.6
Partnering for effective development cooperation	88.8
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	7.4
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	70.0
Level	High

BURUNDI**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	53.9
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	18

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	65.7
Partnering for effective development cooperation	83.8
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	0.3
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	50.0
Level	Medium

CAMEROON	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	42.4
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	37
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	69.2
Partnering for effective development cooperation	71.3
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	3.7
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	30.0
Level	Low
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	37.0
Level of capacity development	Low
Rank	43
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	29.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	68.8
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	1.6
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	0.0
Level	Very Low
CHAD	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	42.9
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	35
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	65.0
Partnering for effective development cooperation	67.5
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	0.5
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	40.0
Level	Medium

COMOROS**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	51.0
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	28

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	72.0
Partnering for effective development cooperation	63.8
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	8.4
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	70.0
Level	High

CONGO**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	42.5
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	36

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	48.7
Partnering for effective development cooperation	67.5
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	0.8
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	50.0
Level	Medium

CÔTE D'IVOIRE**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	56.2
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	15

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	71.1
Partnering for effective development cooperation	97.5
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	6.8
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	80.0
Level	Very High

DJIBOUTI	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	52.1
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	24
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	64.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	67.5
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.2
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	20.0
Level	Low
DR CONGO	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	57.1
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	14
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	62.1
Partnering for effective development cooperation	82.5
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	68.4
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	40.0
Level	Medium
EGYPT	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	40.1
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	41
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	73.8
Partnering for effective development cooperation	88.8
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	3.7
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	90.0
Level	Very High

ESWATINI**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	41.3
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	44

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	47.0
Partnering for effective development cooperation	77.5
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	0.5
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	20.0
Level	Low

ETHIOPIA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	51.2
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	27

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	77.7
Partnering for effective development cooperation	76.3
Partnering for capacity development	0.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.2
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	80.0
Level	Very High

GABON**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	48.4
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	30

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	60.0
Partnering for effective development cooperation	41.3
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	8.4
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	30.0
Level	Low

GAMBIA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	43.9
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	34
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	53.2
Partnering for effective development cooperation	85.0
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	6.8
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	10.0
Level	Very Low
GHANA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	65.2
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	4
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	76.1
Partnering for effective development cooperation	73.8
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.2
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	60.0
Level	High
GUINEA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	55.8
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	17
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	59.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	91.3
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	8.9
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	40.0
Level	Medium

GUINEA-BISSAU**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	27.3
Level of capacity development	Low
Rank	46

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	50.3
Partnering for effective development cooperation	43.8
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	5.8
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	50.0
Level	Medium

KENYA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	46.3
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	31

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	63.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	27.5
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	2.1
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	60.0
Level	High

LESOTHO**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	53.7
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	20

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	69.8
Partnering for effective development cooperation	78.8
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	6.8
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	20.0
Level	Low

LIBERIA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	57.8
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	13
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	71.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	85.0
Partnering for capacity development	0.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	3.7
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	60.0
Level	High
MADAGASCAR	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	34.8
Level of capacity development	Low
Rank	45
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	56.2
Partnering for effective development cooperation	72.5
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	8.7
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	30.0
Level	Low
MALAWI	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	66.2
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	3
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	85.6
Partnering for effective development cooperation	86.3
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.2
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	80.0
Level	Very High

MALI**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	64.1
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	6

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	68.5
Partnering for effective development cooperation	73.8
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.7
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	70.0
Level	High

MAURITANIA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	51.7
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	25

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	61.8
Partnering for effective development cooperation	72.5
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	9.5
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	50.0
Level	Medium

MAURITIUS**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	70.8
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	1

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	82.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	81.3
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	7.4
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	80.0
Level	Very High

MOROCCO	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	60.5
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	10
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	75.3
Partnering for effective development cooperation	88.8
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	1.6
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	10.0
Level	Very Low
MOZAMBIQUE	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	55.9
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	16
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	65.4
Partnering for effective development cooperation	82.5
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	3.7
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	30.0
Level	Low
NAMIBIA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	61.1
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	9
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	76.2
Partnering for effective development cooperation	70.0
Partnering for capacity development	0.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.7
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	50.0
Level	Medium

NIGER**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	53.8
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	19

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	72.7
Partnering for effective development cooperation	52.5
Partnering for capacity development	0.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.2
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	80.0
Level	Very High

NIGERIA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	59.6
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	11

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	76.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	72.5
Partnering for capacity development	0.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	9.5
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	70.0
Level	High

RWANDA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	63.3
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	8

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	78.3
Partnering for effective development cooperation	97.5
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	1.6
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	60.0
Level	High

SENEGAL	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	53.6
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	21
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	59.1
Partnering for effective development cooperation	70.0
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	6.3
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	20.0
Level	Low
SIERRA LEONE	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	42.2
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	38
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	67.8
Partnering for effective development cooperation	52.5
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.2
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	60.0
Level	High
SOMALIA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	45.4
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	33
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	36.0
Partnering for effective development cooperation	66.3
Partnering for capacity development	75.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	4.2
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	10.0
Level	Very Low

SOUTH AFRICA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	52.2
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	23

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	68.3
Partnering for effective development cooperation	26.3
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	1.6
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	60.0
Level	High

SOUTH SUDAN**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	36.0
Level of capacity development	Low
Rank	44

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	41.7
Partnering for effective development cooperation	32.5
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	7.9
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	0.0
Level	Very Low

TANZANIA**ACI Composite Index**

ACI Composite Index value	64.5
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	5

Thematic indices values

Policy choices for capacity development	78.5
Partnering for effective development cooperation	76.3
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	6.8
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	80.0
Level	Very High

TOGO	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	39.9
Level of capacity development	Low
Rank	42
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	54.9
Partnering for effective development cooperation	97.5
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	8.9
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	60.0
Level	High
TUNISIA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	63.8
Level of capacity development	High
Rank	7
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	71.4
Partnering for effective development cooperation	75.0
Partnering for capacity development	50.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	0.8
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	50.0
Level	Medium
UGANDA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	48.5
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	29
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	63.2
Partnering for effective development cooperation	40.0
Partnering for capacity development	25.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	7.4
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	30.0
Level	Low

ZAMBIA	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	51.2
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	26
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	71.7
Partnering for effective development cooperation	61.3
Partnering for capacity development	0.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	1.6
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	70.0
Level	High
ZIMBABWE	
ACI Composite Index	
ACI Composite Index value	46.1
Level of capacity development	Medium
Rank	32
Thematic indices values	
Policy choices for capacity development	75.2
Partnering for effective development cooperation	76.3
Partnering for capacity development	0.0
Youth, vulnerable groups, gender equality mainstreaming, and social inclusion	9.5
Institutional mechanism for Agenda 2063 and SDGs Index	90.0
Level	Very High

Compendium of statistics

1

Strategic policy choices for capacity development (CD)

No.	Country	National Development Strategy developed	CD is integrated in the country's national development plan (NDP)	Country has a policy/strategy for capacity retention and utilization	Country has allocated resources to CD activities	Joint CD programmes implemented in the country
1	Algeria	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	No	No	No
2	Benin	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	Botswana	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	No
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	Yes
5	Burundi	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
6	Cameroon	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	No	Yes
8	Chad	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	Yes
9	Comoros	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	Yes
10	Congo	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
12	Djibouti	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	NA	Yes
13	DR Congo	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	Yes
14	Egypt	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	Yes	NA	NA

No.	Country	National Strategy developed	CD is integrated in the country's national development plan (NDP)	Country has a policy/strategy for capacity retention and utilization	Country has allocated resources to CD activities	Joint CD programmes implemented in the country
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	No	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
18	Gambia	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	No
19	Ghana	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
20	Guinea	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	Yes
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	No	No
22	Kenya	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	No
23	Lesotho	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
24	Liberia	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
25	Madagascar	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	No	Yes	Yes
26	Malawi	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	No	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	NA	Yes	Yes
29	Mauritius	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	Yes	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	Yes	Capacity development is not mainstreamed in the current NDP	Yes	NA	NA

No.	Country	National Development Strategy developed	CD is integrated in the country's national development plan (NDP)	Country has a policy/strategy for capacity retention and utilization	Country has allocated resources to CD activities	Joint CD programmes implemented in the country
32	Namibia	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	Yes	Yes	NA
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	Yes	No	No
38	Somalia	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	No	No	Yes
39	South Africa	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	Yes	Yes	Yes
40	South Sudan	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	No	No
41	Tanzania	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
43	Tunisia	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	Yes	Yes	Yes
44	Uganda	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	NA	Yes	NA
45	Zambia	Yes	Clear objectives and targets set in the NDP	NA	Yes	NA
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Capacity development mainstreamed, but without clear objectives and targets	Yes	No	Yes

NA is not available.

2

Strategic policy choices for capacity development 2

No.	Country	Country has developed a strategy for the agricultural sector	Country has developed a strategy for the mining sector	Country has developed a strategy/policy for the industrial/manufacturing sector	Country has developed a specific national program for capacity development
1	Algeria	Development of agricultural sector is part of the NDP	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	No
2	Benin	Yes	Yes	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	No
3	Botswana	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	No
4	Burkina Faso	Development of agricultural sector is part of the NDP	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	Yes
5	Burundi	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	No
6	Cameroon	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	No	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
8	Chad	Development of agricultural sector is part of the NDP	Mining strategy in preparation	Industrial strategy in preparation	No
9	Comoros	Yes	Mining strategy in preparation	Industrial strategy in preparation	No
10	Congo	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Industrial strategy in preparation	No
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	Preparation of a NPCD is underway

No.	Country	Country has developed a strategy for the agricultural sector	Country has developed a strategy for the mining sector	Country has developed a strategy/policy for the industrial/manufacturing sector	Country has developed a specific national program for capacity development
12	Djibouti	Yes	Mining strategy in preparation	Yes	Yes
13	DR Congo	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	No
14	Egypt	Development of agricultural sector is part of the NDP	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	Yes
15	Eswatini	Development of agricultural sector is part of the NDP	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	No
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	No	Yes
18	Gambia	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
19	Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
20	Guinea	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	Yes
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
22	Kenya	Yes	Mining strategy in preparation	Industrial strategy in preparation	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
23	Lesotho	Yes	Yes	Yes	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
24	Liberia	Yes	Mining strategy in preparation	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	Yes
25	Madagascar	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

No.	Country	Country has developed a strategy for the agricultural sector	Country has developed a strategy for the mining sector	Country has developed a strategy/policy for the industrial/manufacturing sector	Country has developed a specific national program for capacity development
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	Mining strategy in preparation	Yes	No
28	Mauritania	Yes	Mining strategy in preparation	Yes	No
29	Mauritius	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
32	Namibia	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
33	Niger	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	NA	No
34	Nigeria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	Development of agricultural sector is part of the NDP	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	No
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
38	Somalia	Agricultural strategy in preparation	NA	Industrial strategy in preparation	Preparation of a NPCD is underway
39	South Africa	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
40	South Sudan	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
41	Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	No	Yes
43	Tunisia	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	No

No.	Country	Country has developed a strategy for the agricultural sector	Country has developed a strategy for the mining sector	Country has developed a strategy/policy for the industrial/manufacturing sector	Country has developed a specific national program for capacity development
44	Uganda	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Development of industrial sector is part of the NDP	NA
45	Zambia	Yes	Development of mining sector is part of the NDP	Yes	NA
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NA is not available.

3

Institutional mechanisms for Agenda 2063 and SDGs

No.	Country	Awareness-raising initiatives on Agenda 2063 conducted	Tools designed to assist policy makers in integrating Agenda 2063 into NDP	Awareness-raising initiatives on SDGs conducted	Tools designed to assist policy makers in integrating SDGs into NDP
1	Algeria	No	No	No	Tool being designed
2	Benin	No	No	Yes	Yes
3	Botswana	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
4	Burkina Faso	Preparation is underway	Yes	Yes	Yes
5	Burundi	No	No	Yes	Yes
6	Cameroon	No	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
7	Central African Republic	No	No	No	Tool being designed
8	Chad	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	Comoros	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
10	Congo	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
12	Djibouti	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
13	DR Congo	No	No	Yes	Yes
14	Egypt	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	No	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
18	Gambia	Preparation is underway	No	Yes	No
19	Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
20	Guinea	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
21	Guinea-Bissau	No	Tool being designed	No	Yes

No.	Country	Awareness-raising initiatives on Agenda 2063 conducted	Tools designed to assist policy makers in integrating Agenda 2063 into NDP	Awareness-raising initiatives on SDGs conducted	Tools designed to assist policy makers in integrating SDGs into NDP
22	Kenya	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Yes
23	Lesotho	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
24	Liberia	Yes	Tool being designed	Preparation is underway	Yes
25	Madagascar	No	No	Yes	Tool being designed
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	Preparation is underway	Tool being designed	Yes	Yes
29	Mauritius	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Preparation is underway	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
31	Mozambique	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Tool being designed
32	Namibia	No	Tool being designed	Preparation is underway	No
33	Niger	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	Yes	No	Yes	Tool being designed
35	Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Preparation is underway	Yes
36	Senegal	Preparation is underway	Tool being designed	Preparation is underway	NA
37	Sierra Leone	Preparation is underway	Tool being designed	Yes	Yes
38	Somalia	No	No	Yes	No
39	South Africa	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
40	South Sudan	Preparation is underway	No	Preparation is underway	No
41	Tanzania	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
42	Togo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
43	Tunisia	Yes	Tool being designed	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Awareness-raising initiatives on Agenda 2063 conducted	Tools designed to assist policy makers in integrating Agenda 2063 into NDP	Awareness-raising initiatives on SDGs conducted	Tools designed to assist policy makers in integrating SDGs into NDP
44	Uganda	Yes	Tool being designed	Preparation is underway	Tool being designed
45	Zambia	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NA is not available.

4

Institutional mechanisms for Agenda 2063 and SDGs 2

No.	Country	Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for Agenda 2063	Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for SDGs	CD plan to ensure effective implementation of Agenda 2063 at the national level	CD plan to ensure effective implementation of SDGs at the national level
1	Algeria	No	Mechanism being put in place	No	No
2	Benin	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	No	No
3	Botswana	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Update of existing CD plan underway	Yes
5	Burundi	No	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	Yes
6	Cameroon	Yes	Yes	No	Update of existing CD plan underway
7	Central African Republic	No	Mechanism being put in place	No	No
8	Chad	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway
9	Comoros	Yes	Yes	No	No
10	Congo	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	No	No
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
12	Djibouti	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway
13	DR Congo	No	Mechanism being put in place	No	Update of existing CD plan underway
14	Egypt	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	No	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway

No.	Country	Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for Agenda 2063	Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for SDGs	CD plan to ensure effective implementation of Agenda 2063 at the national level	CD plan to ensure effective implementation of SDGs at the national level
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway
18	Gambia	No	No	No	No
19	Ghana	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	No
20	Guinea	No	Mechanism being put in place	No	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
22	Kenya	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	Update of existing CD plan underway	Yes
23	Lesotho	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	No	No
24	Liberia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25	Madagascar	No	Yes	No	No
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	Yes	No	No
28	Mauritania	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	Update of existing CD plan underway	Yes
29	Mauritius	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway
31	Mozambique	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	No	No
32	Namibia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway

No.	Country	Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for Agenda 2063	Integrated and inclusive follow-up and review mechanism for SDGs	CD plan to ensure effective implementation of Agenda 2063 at the national level	CD plan to ensure effective implementation of SDGs at the national level
36	Senegal	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	NA	NA
37	Sierra Leone	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	Update of existing CD plan underway	Yes
38	Somalia	No	No	No	Update of existing CD plan underway
39	South Africa	No	Yes	NA	Yes
40	South Sudan	No	No	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway
41	Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	No	Mechanism being put in place	No	Yes
43	Tunisia	Mechanism being put in place	Yes	Update of existing CD plan underway	Update of existing CD plan underway
44	Uganda	Mechanism being put in place	Mechanism being put in place	Update of existing CD plan underway	No
45	Zambia	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NA is not available.

5

**Institutional mechanisms for Agenda 2063 and
SDG (Sustainable Development Goal) 3**

No.	Country	Institution to coordinate the implementation of Agenda 2063 and SDGs in place	Institution to mainstream Agenda 2063 & SDGs into NDP in place	Technical assistance available for M&E of Agenda 2063 and SDGs	A guide for the M&E of the implementation of the SDGs and Agenda 2063 developed	Implementation work plan for first 10-Year of the Agenda and/or SDGs indicators available in relevant ministries/ government entities
1	Algeria	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	No	No	No
2	Benin	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
3	Botswana	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4	Burkina Faso	No institutional mechanism identified	Yes	No	No	No
5	Burundi	Specific institution created	Yes	Yes	No	No
6	Cameroon	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	No	Yes	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	Yes	No
8	Chad	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	No	No
9	Comoros	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	No	No
10	Congo	Specific institution created	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	No	No
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Specific institution created	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
12	Djibouti	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	No	No	No

No.	Country	Institution to coordinate the implementation of Agenda 2063 and SDGs in place	Institution to mainstream Agenda 2063 & SDGs into NDP in place	Technical assistance availed for M&E of Agenda 2063 and SDGs	A guide for the M&E of the implementation of the SDGs and Agenda 2063 developed	Implementation work plan for first 10-Year of the Agenda and/or SDGs indicators available in relevant ministries/ government entities
13	DR Congo	Specific institution created	Yes	No	No	No
14	Egypt	Specific institution created	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	No	Yes	No
16	Ethiopia	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
17	Gabon	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	No	No	No
18	Gambia	Unit created within an existing institution	No	No	Yes	No
19	Ghana	Specific institution created	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
20	Guinea	No institutional mechanism identified	Yes	No	No	Yes
21	Guinea-Bissau	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	No	No	No
22	Kenya	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	No	No	No
23	Lesotho	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	No	No
24	Liberia	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	No	No
25	Madagascar	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	No	No	No
26	Malawi	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	No	Yes

No.	Country	Institution to coordinate the implementation of Agenda 2063 and SDGs in place	Institution to mainstream Agenda 2063 & SDGs into NDP in place	Technical assistance availed for M&E of Agenda 2063 and SDGs	A guide for the M&E of the implementation of the SDGs and Agenda 2063 developed	Implementation work plan for first 10-Year of the Agenda and/or SDGs indicators available in relevant ministries/ government entities
27	Mali	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	NA	NA	NA
29	Mauritius	Specific institution created	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	Specific institution created	No	Yes	Yes	No
32	Namibia	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Specific institution created	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	Specific institution created	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	Specific institution created	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	NA	NA	NA
37	Sierra Leone	Specific institution created	Yes	No	Yes	No
38	Somalia	Unit created within an existing institution	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	No	Yes	No
39	South Africa	NA	Yes	NA	NA	NA
40	South Sudan	No institutional mechanism identified	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	No	No	No
41	Tanzania	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Institution to coordinate the implementation of Agenda 2063 and SDGs in place	Institution to mainstream Agenda 2063 & SDGs into NDP in place	Technical assistance availed for M&E of Agenda 2063 and SDGs	A guide for the M&E of the implementation of the SDGs and Agenda 2063 developed	Implementation work plan for first 10-Year of the Agenda and/or SDGs indicators available in relevant ministries/ government entities
42	Togo	No institutional mechanism identified	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
43	Tunisia	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
44	Uganda	Specific institution created	Yes	No	No	Yes
45	Zambia	Specific institution created	Mainstreaming Agenda 2063 and SDGs underway	Yes	No	No
46	Zimbabwe	Unit created within an existing institution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

6

Policy environment

No.	Country	Level of legitimacy of the National Development Strategy	Levels of incentives for compliance provided by the National Development Plan	Level of flexibility of the National Development Plan
1	Algeria	High	Average	Average
2	Benin	High	High	Low
3	Botswana	High	Average	Average
4	Burkina Faso	High	High	High
5	Burundi	High	High	High
6	Cameroon	High	High	High
7	Central African Republic	High	High	Average
8	Chad	High	High	High
9	Comoros	High	High	Average
10	Congo	High	High	High
11	Côte d'Ivoire	High	High	High
12	Djibouti	Average	Average	Average
13	DR Congo	Low	High	Average
14	Egypt	Average	Average	Average
15	Eswatini	High	Average	Average
16	Ethiopia	High	Average	Average
17	Gabon	Average	Average	Average
18	Gambia	High	High	High
19	Ghana	High	High	Average
20	Guinea	High	Average	High
21	Guinea-Bissau	High	Low	Average
22	Kenya	High	High	High
23	Lesotho	High	High	High
24	Liberia	High	High	High
25	Madagascar	Low	Low	Low
26	Malawi	High	High	High
27	Mali	High	High	High
28	Mauritania	High	High	Average
29	Mauritius	High	High	High

No.	Country	Level of legitimacy of the National Development Strategy	Levels of incentives for compliance provided by the National Development Plan	Level of flexibility of the National Development Plan
30	Morocco	Average	Average	Average
31	Mozambique	High	Average	High
32	Namibia	High	High	Average
33	Niger	High	High	High
34	Nigeria	Average	Average	High
35	Rwanda	High	High	High
36	Senegal	Average	Average	Average
37	Sierra Leone	High	High	High
38	Somalia	Low	Low	Low
39	South Africa	Average	Average	Average
40	South Sudan	Low	Low	Average
41	Tanzania	Average	Average	High
42	Togo	High	High	High
43	Tunisia	Average	Average	Average
44	Uganda	High	High	Average
45	Zambia	Average	Average	Average
46	Zimbabwe	High	Average	Average

7

Dialog and accountability mechanisms for capacity development

No.	Country	Effective dialog mechanism (and other links as appropriate) among domestic institutions (civil society, private sector) engaged in CD	State and non-state actors meet to engage in national dialogue for development	Level of effectiveness of accountability mechanism ^a
1	Algeria	Institutionalized mechanism established	No	NA
2	Benin	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	3.5
3	Botswana	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
4	Burkina Faso	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	3.5
5	Burundi	Institutionalized mechanism established	No	2.4
6	Cameroon	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	3.0
7	Central African Republic	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	2.2
8	Chad	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	2.7
9	Comoros	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	2.7
10	Congo	No institutionalized mechanism identified	No	2.5
11	Côte d'Ivoire	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	3.2
12	Djibouti	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
13	DR Congo	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	2.5
14	Egypt	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
15	Eswatini	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
16	Ethiopia	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	3.5
17	Gabon	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	NA
18	Gambia	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	2.9
19	Ghana	Institutionalized mechanism established	NA	3.6

No.	Country	Effective dialog mechanism (and other links as appropriate) among domestic institutions (civil society, private sector) engaged in CD	State and non-state actors meet to engage in national dialogue for development	Level of effectiveness of accountability mechanism ^a
20	Guinea	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	2.9
21	Guinea-Bissau	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	2.2
22	Kenya	Institutionalized mechanism established	NA	3.4
23	Lesotho	Institutionalized mechanism established	No	3.3
24	Liberia	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	2.9
25	Madagascar	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	2.8
26	Malawi	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	3.2
27	Mali	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	3.0
28	Mauritania	Informal dialog	Yes	3.3
29	Mauritius	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
30	Morocco	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
31	Mozambique	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	3.2
32	Namibia	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
33	Niger	Informal dialog	Yes	3.1
34	Nigeria	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	2.8
35	Rwanda	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	3.7
36	Senegal	Informal dialog	Yes	3.6
37	Sierra Leone	Informal dialog	Yes	3.1
38	Somalia	Informal dialog	NA	NA
39	South Africa	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
40	South Sudan	Institutionalized mechanism established	NA	1.5
41	Tanzania	Informal dialog	Yes	3.4

No.	Country	Effective dialog mechanism (and other links as appropriate) among domestic institutions (civil society, private sector) engaged in CD	State and non-state actors meet to engage in national dialogue for development	Level of effectiveness of accountability mechanism ^a
42	Togo	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	2.7
43	Tunisia	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	NA
44	Uganda	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	3.0
45	Zambia	Institutionalized mechanism established	Yes	3.2
46	Zimbabwe	No institutionalized mechanism identified	Yes	2.8

a. WB CPIA Cluster D, Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in Public Sector, measured on a scale of 1, very weak performance, to 6, very strong performance.

NA is not available.

8

Dialog and accountability mechanisms for capacity development 2

No.	Country	Dialogue mechanism established by Government with development partners relating specifically to CD	Level of effectiveness	Country taken any initiative to ensure multi-stakeholders' participation in the implementation of Agenda 2063	Country taken any initiative to ensure multi-stakeholders' participation in the implementation of SDGs
1	Algeria	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	No	No
2	Benin	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	Yes	Yes
3	Botswana	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	Average	Yes	Yes
4	Burkina Faso	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	High	Yes	Yes
5	Burundi	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Low	Yes	Yes
6	Cameroon	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	High	No	Yes
7	Central African Republic	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	No	Yes
8	Chad	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	NA	Yes	Yes
9	Comoros	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	High	Yes	Yes
10	Congo	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	Yes	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	Yes	Yes
12	Djibouti	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Average	NA	Yes
13	DR Congo	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Average	Yes	Yes
14	Egypt	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	High	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	No	Yes
16	Ethiopia	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Average	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Dialogue mechanism established by Government with development partners relating specifically to CD	Level of effectiveness	Country taken any initiative to ensure multi-stakeholders' participation in the implementation of Agenda 2063	Country taken any initiative to ensure multi-stakeholders' participation in the implementation of SDGs
18	Gambia	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	Yes	Yes
19	Ghana	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Average	Yes	Yes
20	Guinea	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	No	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Very Low	Yes	Yes
22	Kenya	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	Yes	Yes
23	Lesotho	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Very High	Yes	Yes
24	Liberia	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
25	Madagascar	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	Very High	Yes	Yes
26	Malawi	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	Average	No	Yes
27	Mali	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Average	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
29	Mauritius	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	Very High	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	High	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
32	Namibia	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	High	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	Average	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Dialogue mechanism established by Government with development partners relating specifically to CD	Level of effectiveness	Country taken any initiative to ensure multi-stakeholders' participation in the implementation of Agenda 2063	Country taken any initiative to ensure multi-stakeholders' participation in the implementation of SDGs
37	Sierra Leone	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Very High	No	Yes
38	Somalia	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	No	Yes
39	South Africa	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	Average	NA	Yes
40	South Sudan	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	Average	No	Yes
41	Tanzania	Institutionalized dialog mechanism established for CD	High	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	No institutionalized mechanism identified	NA	No	No
43	Tunisia	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
44	Uganda	NA	NA	Yes	Yes
45	Zambia	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	High	Yes	Yes
46	Zimbabwe	CD discussed within a broader dialog mechanism	Very High	Yes	Yes

NA is not available.

9

Strategic policy choices for improving the statistical system

No.	Country	Existence of a National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS)	NSDS is fully operational	Statistics taught at any of the higher training institutions	National Statistics Office operates an in-service training center	Signing of the African Charter on Statistics (adopted on 3rd February 2009)
1	Algeria	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
2	Benin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	Botswana	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5	Burundi	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
6	Cameroon	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
8	Chad	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
9	Comoros	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
10	Congo	Yes	NA	Yes	No	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
12	Djibouti	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
13	DR Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
14	Egypt	No	NA	Yes	Yes	No
15	Eswatini	No	NA	Yes	No	No
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Yes	NA	Yes	No	Yes
18	Gambia	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
19	Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
20	Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
21	Guinea-Bissau	No	NA	No	No	Yes
22	Kenya	No	No	No	No	Yes
23	Lesotho	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
24	Liberia	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
25	Madagascar	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	Yes	NA	NA	NA	NA
29	Mauritius	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Existence of a National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS)	NSDS is fully operational	Statistics taught at any of the higher training institutions	National Statistics Office operates an in-service training center	Signing of the African Charter on Statistics (adopted on 3rd February 2009)
30	Morocco	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
32	Namibia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
36	Senegal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
38	Somalia	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
39	South Africa	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
40	South Sudan	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
41	Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	No	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes
43	Tunisia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
44	Uganda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
45	Zambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

NA is not available.

10

Agricultural Strategy Implementation

No.	Country	Agricultural census conducted since 2000	Agricultural survey conducted during the last 5 years	Country has completed the CAADP Investment Plan	Country has completed the CAADP Donors roundtable	Country has complied with the 2003 Maputo declaration by allocating at least 10% of national budgetary resources to agriculture
1	Algeria	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
2	Benin	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
3	Botswana	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	In some years and not others
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
5	Burundi	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
6	Cameroon	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
7	Central African Republic	No	No	Yes	No	NA
8	Chad	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	In some years and not others
9	Comoros	Yes	No	No	NA	No
10	Congo	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
12	Djibouti	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
13	DR Congo	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
14	Egypt	Yes	Yes	No	No	In some years and not others
15	Eswatini	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	In some years and not others
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
18	Gambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
19	Ghana	No	No	Yes	Yes	In some years and not others
20	Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
22	Kenya	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
23	Lesotho	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
24	Liberia	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
25	Madagascar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

No.	Country	Agricultural census conducted since 2000	Agricultural survey conducted during the last 5 years	Country has completed the CAADP Investment Plan	Country has completed the CAADP Donors roundtable	Country has complied with the 2003 Maputo declaration by allocating at least 10% of national budgetary resources to agriculture
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	In some years and not others
28	Mauritania	NA	NA	NA	No	No
29	Mauritius	Yes	Yes	NA	No	No
30	Morocco	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
32	Namibia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	In some years and not others
34	Nigeria	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
35	Rwanda	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
36	Senegal	No	Yes	NA	No	NA
37	Sierra Leone	No	No	No	Yes	No
38	Somalia	No	No	No	NA	No
39	South Africa	Yes	Yes	No	NA	In some years and not others
40	South Sudan	No	No	No	No	No
41	Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
42	Togo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
43	Tunisia	Yes	Yes	No	NA	No
44	Uganda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
45	Zambia	No	No	Yes	Yes	In some years and not others
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No

NA is not available.

11

Agricultural Strategy Implementation 2

How did countries fare in each of the four CAADP pillars?

No.	Country	Pillar 1 Extending the area under sustainable land management	Pillar 2 Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access	Pillar 3 Increasing food supply and reducing hunger	Pillar 4 Agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption
1	Algeria	Average	Average	Very High	Average
2	Benin	Average	Average	High	High
3	Botswana	Very Low	Very Low	Average	Average
4	Burkina Faso	High	High	High	Average
5	Burundi	Average	Average	Average	Average
6	Cameroon	Average	Low	High	Average
7	Central African Republic	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
8	Chad	High	Average	Low	Average
9	Comoros	NA	NA	NA	NA
10	Congo	Low	Average	Average	Average
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Average	Average	Average	Low
12	Djibouti	Low	Average	Average	Average
13	DR Congo	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low
14	Egypt	Average	Average	Average	Average
15	Eswatini	Average	Average	Average	Average
16	Ethiopia	High	Average	High	Average
17	Gabon	High	High	Very High	Low
18	Gambia	Average	Average	Average	Average
19	Ghana	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High
20	Guinea	Average	High	High	High
21	Guinea-Bissau	Low	Average	Average	Very Low
22	Kenya	NA	Average	High	High
23	Lesotho	Low	Low	Low	Average
24	Liberia	Very High	Very High	High	Average
25	Madagascar	Average	Average	Average	Average
26	Malawi	Average	Average	High	Average
27	Mali	Average	High	High	High

How did countries fare in each of the four CAADP pillars?					
No.	Country	Pillar 1 Extending the area under sustainable land management	Pillar 2 Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access	Pillar 3 Increasing food supply and reducing hunger	Pillar 4 Agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption
28	Mauritania	NA	NA	Very High	Average
29	Mauritius	High	Average	High	Very High
30	Morocco	High	High	High	High
31	Mozambique	Average	Low	Average	Average
32	Namibia	High	Very High	Very High	Very High
33	Niger	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High
34	Nigeria	High	Average	High	High
35	Rwanda	Very High	Very High	High	Average
36	Senegal	High	High	High	High
37	Sierra Leone	Low	Average	Low	Low
38	Somalia	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low
39	South Africa	NA	NA	NA	NA
40	South Sudan	Average	Average	Low	Low
41	Tanzania	Average	Average	High	Average
42	Togo	Average	Average	High	Low
43	Tunisia	Average	High	High	High
44	Uganda	Average	Average	High	High
45	Zambia	Average	Average	Average	Average
46	Zimbabwe	High	Average	Very High	High

NA is not available.

12

Agricultural Strategy Implementation 3

No.	Country	Assessment of the level of the implementation of the Strategy/Policy for agriculture ^a							Overall rating of the quality of the current agricultural strategy
		Agricultural productivity	Training	R&D	Rural infrastructure and marketing	Water management	Land management	Level of organization for implementation of the CAADP Program	
1	Algeria	Good	Good	Poor	Poor	Good	Good	NA	Good
2	Benin	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
3	Botswana	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good
4	Burkina Faso	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor
5	Burundi	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good
6	Cameroon	Good	Good	Good	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good
7	Central African Republic	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	NA	Poor	Poor
8	Chad	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
9	Comoros	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
10	Congo	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Good	Good	Good	Good	Very Good	Very Good	Poor	Very Good
12	Djibouti	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
13	DR Congo	Good	Poor	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good	Good
14	Egypt	Good	Poor	Good	Good	Good	Poor	NA	Good
15	Eswatini	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor
16	Ethiopia	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Poor	Poor	Good	Good
17	Gabon	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good	Good	Good
18	Gambia	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
19	Ghana	Good	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Poor	Very Good	Good
20	Guinea	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
21	Guinea-Bissau	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good
22	Kenya	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Very Good	Good
23	Lesotho	Poor	Good	Poor	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good
24	Liberia	Very Good	Very Good	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Very Good	Very Good

No.	Country	Assessment of the level of the implementation of the Strategy/Policy for agriculture ^a							Overall rating of the quality of the current agricultural strategy
		Agricultural productivity	Training	R&D	Rural infrastructure and marketing	Water management	Land management	Level of organization for implementation of the CAADP Program	
25	Madagascar	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Good	Poor	Poor	Very Good
26	Malawi	Good	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Good	Good	Good
27	Mali	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
28	Mauritania	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Good	Good	Very Good	Very Good
29	Mauritius	Good	Very Good	Good	Excellent	Good	Good	Good	Very Good
30	Morocco	Good	Good	Good	Good	Very Good	Good	Good	Very Good
31	Mozambique	Poor	Good	Good	Poor	Poor	Good	NA	Good
32	Namibia	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	NA	Good
33	Niger	Very Good	Poor	Poor	Very Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
34	Nigeria	Very Good	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Poor	Good	Good
35	Rwanda	Very Good	Very Good	Good	Good	Very Good	Very Good	Very Good	Good
36	Senegal	Very Good	Good	Good	Very Good	Very Good	Very Good	Good	Very Good
37	Sierra Leone	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Good	Poor	Good	Good
38	Somalia	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor
39	South Africa	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
40	South Sudan	Good	Poor	Poor	Good	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor
41	Tanzania	Poor	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
42	Togo	Poor	Very Good	Poor	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Good
43	Tunisia	Good	Very Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	NA	Good
44	Uganda	Poor	Good	Good	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Good
45	Zambia	Poor	Good	Poor	Good	Poor	Poor	Very Good	Very Good
46	Zimbabwe	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good

a. Assessment was done by a representative respectively from two international organizations; two ministries; one farmers' association; and one private sector.

NA is not available. R&D is research and development.

13

Regional integration: Geography and membership

No.	Country	AU region ^a	Number of border countries	Country landlocked	Country membership to:				
					APPA	OPEC	Commonwealth	OIF	ICO
1	Algeria	Northern	7	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
2	Benin	Western	4	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
3	Botswana	Southern	4	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
5	Burkina Faso	Western	6	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
4	Burundi	Central	3	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
6	Cameroon	Central	6	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Central	6	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
8	Chad	Central	6	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
9	Comoros	Eastern	0	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
10	Congo	Central	5	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Western	5	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
12	Djibouti	Eastern	3	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
13	DR Congo	Central	9	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
14	Egypt	Northern	4	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	Southern	2	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
16	Ethiopia	Eastern	6	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
17	Gabon	Central	3	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
18	Gambia	Western	1	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
19	Ghana	Western	3	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
20	Guinea	Western	6	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
21	Guinea-Bissau	Western	2	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
22	Kenya	Eastern	5	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
23	Lesotho	Southern	1	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
24	Liberia	Western	3	No	No	No	No	No	No
25	Madagascar	Eastern	0	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
26	Malawi	Southern	3	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
27	Mali	Western	7	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	Northern	4	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
29	Mauritius	Eastern	0	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
30	Morocco	Northern	2	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	Southern	6	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes

No.	Country	AU region ^a	Number of border countries	Country landlocked	Country membership to:				
					APPA	OPEC	Commonwealth	OIF	ICO
32	Namibia	Southern	5	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
33	Niger	Western	7	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	Western	4	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
35	Rwanda	Eastern	4	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
36	Senegal	Western	5	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
37	Sierra Leone	Western	2	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
38	Somalia	Eastern	3	No		No	No	No	Yes
39	South Sudan	Eastern	6	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
40	South Africa	Southern	6	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
41	Tanzania	Eastern	8	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
42	Togo	Western	3	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
43	Tunisia	Northern	2	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
44	Uganda	Eastern	5	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
45	Zambia	Southern	8	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
46	Zimbabwe	Southern	5	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

a. AU Member States are divided into the following five geographic regions: Central Africa, East Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa. The groups were defined by the OAU in 1976 (CM/Res.464QCXVI).

OIF is Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. ICO is Islamic Conference Organization.

14

Regional integration: Membership AU-recognized RECs

No.	Country	CEN-SAD	EAC	ECCAS	ECOWAS	COMESA	IGAD	SADC	UMA
1	Algeria	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
2	Benin	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
3	Botswana	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
5	Burkina Faso	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
4	Burundi	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
6	Cameroon	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
7	Central African Republic	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
8	Chad	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
9	Comoros	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
10	Congo	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
12	Djibouti	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
13	DR Congo	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
14	Egypt	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
15	Eswatini	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
16	Ethiopia	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
17	Gabon	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
18	Gambia	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
19	Ghana	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
20	Guinea	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
22	Kenya	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
23	Lesotho	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
24	Liberia	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
25	Madagascar	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
26	Malawi	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
27	Mali	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
28	Mauritania	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
29	Mauritius	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
30	Morocco	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
31	Mozambique	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No

No.	Country	CEN-SAD	EAC	ECCAS	ECOWAS	COMESA	IGAD	SADC	UMA
32	Namibia	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
33	Niger	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
34	Nigeria	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
35	Rwanda	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
36	Senegal	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
38	Somalia	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
39	South Africa	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
40	South Sudan	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
41	Tanzania	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
42	Togo	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
43	Tunisia	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
44	Uganda	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
45	Zambia	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
46	Zimbabwe	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

15

Regional integration: Membership other RECs

No.	Country	CEMAC	CEPGL	IOC	MRU	UEMOA	SACU
1	Algeria	No	No	No	No	No	No
2	Benin	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
3	Botswana	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
5	Burkina Faso	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
4	Burundi	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
6	Cameroon	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
7	Central African Republic	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
8	Chad	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
9	Comoros	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
10	Congo	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
11	Côte d'Ivoire	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
12	Djibouti	No	No	No	No	No	No
13	DR Congo	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
14	Egypt	No	No	No	No	No	No
15	Eswatini	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
16	Ethiopia	No	No	No	No	No	No
17	Gabon	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
18	Gambia	No	No	No	No	No	No
19	Ghana	No	No	No	No	No	No
20	Guinea	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
22	Kenya	No	No	No	No	No	No
23	Lesotho	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
24	Liberia	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
25	Madagascar	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
26	Malawi	No	No	No	No	No	No
27	Mali	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
28	Mauritania	No	No	No	No	No	No
29	Mauritius	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
30	Morocco	No	No	No	No	No	No
31	Mozambique	No	No	No	No	No	No

No.	Country	CEMAC	CEPGL	IOC	MRU	UEMOA	SACU
32	Namibia	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
33	Niger	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
34	Nigeria	No	No	No	No	No	No
35	Rwanda	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
36	Senegal	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
37	Sierra Leone	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
38	Somalia	No	No	No	No	No	No
39	South Africa	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
40	South Sudan	No	No	No	No	No	No
41	Tanzania	No	No	No	No	No	No
42	Togo	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
43	Tunisia	No	No	No	No	No	No
44	Uganda	No	No	No	No	No	No
45	Zambia	No	No	No	No	No	No
46	Zimbabwe	No	No	No	No	No	No

16

Policies, strategies, and initiatives for domestic resource mobilization

No.	Country	Strategy for domestic resource mobilization in place	Country is member of the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF)	Country is member of the Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiatives (CABRI)	Yaoundé Declaration on Combatting Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (7th June 2014) signed	The Yaoundé Declaration on Tax and Development (9th September 2010) signed	Country has signed the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (Maputo, 11 July 2003)	Country has put in place an Agency to fight illicit financial flows
1	Algeria	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
2	Benin	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
3	Botswana	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
5	Burundi	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
6	Cameroon	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
8	Chad	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
9	Comoros	Yes	Yes	No	NA	No	Yes	Yes
10	Congo	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	NA	Yes	NA	No	Yes	Yes
12	Djibouti	In process	No	No	NA	No	Yes	Yes
13	DR Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
14	Egypt	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
15	Eswatini	Yes	Yes	No	No	NA	No	Yes
16	Ethiopia	In process	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
18	Gambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
19	Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
20	Guinea	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
22	Kenya	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
23	Lesotho	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
24	Liberia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25	Madagascar	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Strategy for domestic resource mobilization in place	Country is member of the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF)	Country is member of the Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiatives (CABRI)	Yaoundé Declaration on Combatting Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (7th June 2014) signed	The Yaoundé Declaration on Tax and Development (9th September 2010) signed	Country has signed the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (Maputo, 11 July 2003)	Country has put in place an Agency to fight illicit financial flows
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
27	Mali	No	No	Yes	No	NA	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes	NA
29	Mauritius	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
31	Mozambique	Yes	Yes	No	NA	No	Yes	Yes
32	Namibia	Yes	Yes	NA	NA	NA	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	In process	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
38	Somalia	In process	No	No	No	No	No	No
39	South Africa	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
40	South Sudan	In process	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
41	Tanzania	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
43	Tunisia	In process	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
44	Uganda	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
45	Zambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

NA is not available.

17

Institutional and regulatory framework for science, technology, and innovation

No.	Country	Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) developed	Capacity development is part of the Strategy	Country has joined the African STI Indicators (ASTII) Program	country's STI policy integrated the STI Strategy for Africa (STISA 2024)	Country has joined a REC initiative for the promotion of STI
1	Algeria	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	No	Yes	No
2	Benin	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes
3	Botswana	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes
5	Burundi	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	No
6	Cameroon	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	NA	Yes
7	Central African Republic	No	NA	Yes	No	No
8	Chad	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	Comoros	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	NA	Yes	Yes
10	Congo	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
12	Djibouti	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
13	DR Congo	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) developed	Capacity development is part of the Strategy	Country has joined the African STI Indicators (ASTII) Program	country's STI policy integrated the STI Strategy for Africa (STISA 2024)	Country has joined a REC initiative for the promotion of STI
14	Egypt	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes
16	Ethiopia	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	Yes	No	NA
18	Gambia	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
19	Ghana	Yes	CD is not part of the Strategy	Yes	Yes	Yes
20	Guinea	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	No	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	NA	NA	NA
22	Kenya	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
23	Lesotho	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
24	Liberia	No	NA	No	No	Yes
25	Madagascar	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	No	No
26	Malawi	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	NA
28	Mauritania	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	No
29	Mauritius	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	No	Yes	Yes

No.	Country	Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) developed	Capacity development is part of the Strategy	Country has joined the African STI Indicators (ASTII) Program	country's STI policy integrated the STI Strategy for Africa (STISA 2024)	Country has joined a REC initiative for the promotion of STI
31	Mozambique	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	NA	Yes
32	Namibia	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	CD is not part of the Strategy	Yes	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes
38	Somalia	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	No	No	No
39	South Africa	Yes	CD is not part of the Strategy	Yes	Yes	Yes
40	South Sudan	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, but without clear objectives	No	No	No
41	Tanzania	Promotion of STI is part of the country's NDP	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
43	Tunisia	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
44	Uganda	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes
45	Zambia	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	CD is part of the Strategy, with clear objectives	Yes	No	Yes

NA is not available.

18

Development cooperation effectiveness related to capacity development activities

No.	Country	Endorsement of the Busan Global Partnership	Country took part in the 2016 monitoring survey of the Global Partnership implementation	Aid coordination mechanism in place	Mutual accountability framework in place	Assessment of coordination of support to capacity (1, very weak, to 6, very strong)	Mutual assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments between the government and the community of donors conducted	Tracking system on CD allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment
1	Algeria	No	No	No	No	1	Yes	Yes
2	Benin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	Yes
3	Botswana	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	2	Yes	No
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	Yes
5	Burundi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2	Yes	No
6	Cameroon	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2	NA	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	1	NA	No
8	Chad	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	Yes	No
9	Comoros	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	4	Yes	No
10	Congo	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	3	NA	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	Yes
12	Djibouti	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	NA	Yes
13	DR Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	No
14	Egypt	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	2	Yes	No
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	Yes	No	No	No	5	Yes	No
18	Gambia	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	No
19	Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	No	No
20	Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	No
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	No	No	No	1	No	No
22	Kenya	Yes	Yes	No	No	2	No	NA
23	Lesotho	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	No

No.	Country	Endorsement of the Busan Global Partnership	Country took part in the 2016 monitoring survey of the Global Partnership implementation	Aid coordination mechanism in place	Mutual accountability framework in place	Assessment of coordination of support to capacity (1, very weak, to 6, very strong)	Mutual assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments between the government and the community of donors conducted	Tracking system on CD allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment
24	Liberia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	No
25	Madagascar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	Yes
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	Yes	Yes
28	Mauritania	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes	5	Yes	Yes
29	Mauritius	No	No	Yes	Yes	6	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	Yes
31	Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	No
32	Namibia	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	4	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	2	NA	No
34	Nigeria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	No	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	No
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2	NA	No
38	Somalia	No	NA	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	No
39	South Africa	No	NA	No	No	4	NA	Yes
40	South Sudan	Yes	No	No	No	4	No	No
41	Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	Yes	Yes
42	Togo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	Yes	No
43	Tunisia	Yes	No	Yes	No	0	Yes	Yes
44	Uganda	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	2	NA	Yes
45	Zambia	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	3	No	No
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	4	Yes	Yes

NA is not available.

19

**Development cooperation effectiveness related
to capacity development activities 2**

No.	Country	M&E framework to assess progress against NDS developed	A National Assistance Coordinating Unit for capacity development established
1	Algeria	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
2	Benin	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
3	Botswana	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
4	Burkina Faso	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
5	Burundi	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
6	Cameroon	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
7	Central African Republic	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
8	Chad	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	No institutional Unit identified
9	Comoros	National M&E system is effective	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
10	Congo	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	No institutional Unit identified
11	Côte d'Ivoire	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
12	Djibouti	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
13	DR Congo	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
14	Egypt	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
15	Eswatini	National M&E system is effective	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
16	Ethiopia	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	No institutional Unit identified
17	Gabon	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
18	Gambia	National M&E system is effective	NA
19	Ghana	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	No institutional Unit identified
20	Guinea	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established

No.	Country	M&E framework to assess progress against NDS developed	A National Assistance Coordinating Unit for capacity development established
21	Guinea-Bissau	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	NA
22	Kenya	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
23	Lesotho	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
24	Liberia	National M&E system is effective	No institutional Unit identified
25	Madagascar	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
26	Malawi	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Clear Unit established
27	Mali	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
28	Mauritania	National M&E system is effective	No institutional Unit identified
29	Mauritius	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
30	Morocco	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
31	Mozambique	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
32	Namibia	National M&E system is effective	NA
33	Niger	National M&E system is effective	NA
34	Nigeria	National M&E system is effective	No institutional Unit identified
35	Rwanda	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
36	Senegal	National M&E system is effective	Clear Unit established
37	Sierra Leone	No M&E mechanism in place	Clear Unit established
38	Somalia	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
39	South Africa	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
40	South Sudan	No M&E mechanism in place	No institutional Unit identified
41	Tanzania	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
42	Togo	National M&E system is effective	No institutional Unit identified
43	Tunisia	National M&E system is effective	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
44	Uganda	National M&E system is effective	Coordination is being done, but not formally instituted
45	Zambia	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	NA
46	Zimbabwe	M&E tools and process in place, but not in an adequate or sufficient way	No institutional Unit identified

NA is not available or not applicable.

20

Youth promotion

No.	Country	Policy and/or Strategy for the promotion of youth in place	Strategy to promote youth self-employment in place	African Youth Charter ratified	Year of ratification	Country being implementing the African Youth Decade Plan of Action 2009–2018
1	Algeria	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	No	NA	Yes
2	Benin	Yes	Yes	Yes	2012	No
3	Botswana	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	No	NA	No
4	Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
5	Burundi	Yes	Yes	No	NA	Yes
6	Cameroon	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2011	Yes
7	Central African Republic	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	NA	No
8	Chad	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Yes	Yes	2008	Yes
9	Comoros	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	NA	NA	Yes
10	Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Yes	Yes	2009	Yes
12	Djibouti	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
13	DR Congo	Yes	Yes	No	NA	Yes
14	Egypt	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2008	Yes
15	Eswatini	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	No	NA	No

No.	Country	Policy and/or Strategy for the promotion of youth in place	Strategy to promote youth self-employment in place	African Youth Charter ratified	Year of ratification	Country being implementing the African Youth Decade Plan of Action 2009–2018
16	Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
17	Gabon	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2007	Yes
18	Gambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	2009	Yes
19	Ghana	Yes	Yes	No	NA	Yes
20	Guinea	Yes	Yes	No	NA	Yes
21	Guinea-Bissau	Yes	No	Yes	2008	No
22	Kenya	Yes	Yes	No	NA	Yes
23	Lesotho	Yes	Yes	Yes	2008	No
24	Liberia	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Yes	Yes	2011	Yes
25	Madagascar	Yes	Yes	Yes	2008	Yes
26	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	2012	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	2007	Yes
28	Mauritania	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	1982	Yes
29	Mauritius	Yes	Yes	Yes	2006	Yes
30	Morocco	Yes	Yes	No	NA	Yes
31	Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	2008	Yes
32	Namibia	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2008	No
34	Nigeria	Yes	Yes	Yes	2008	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	2007	Yes
36	Senegal	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2009	NA
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2014	Yes

No.	Country	Policy and/or Strategy for the promotion of youth in place	Strategy to promote youth self-employment in place	African Youth Charter ratified	Year of ratification	Country being implementing the African Youth Decade Plan of Action 2009–2018
38	Somalia	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	No	NA	No
39	South Africa	Yes	Yes	Yes	2012	Yes
40	South Sudan	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	No	No	NA	No
41	Tanzania	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2016	Yes
42	Togo	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	2008	No
43	Tunisia	Promotion of youth is in the country's NDP	Yes	Yes	2010	NA
44	Uganda	Yes	Promotion of youth self-employment is in the country's NDP	Yes	NA	NA
45	Zambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	2009	NA
46	Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	2009	Yes

NA is not available or not applicable.

21

Gender equality mainstreaming

No.	Country	Ratification of CEDAW	Year	Report to the Committee	Institutional mechanisms to implement the CEDAW
1	Algeria	Ratified with reservations	1996	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
2	Benin	Ratified without reservations	1992	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
3	Botswana	Ratified with reservations	1996	Some reporting done	Focal person without special mandate
4	Burkina Faso	Ratified without reservations	1984	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
5	Burundi	Ratified without reservations	1991	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
6	Cameroon	Ratified without reservations	1994	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
7	Central African Republic	Ratified without reservations	1991	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
8	Chad	Ratified without reservations	1993	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
9	Comoros	Ratified without reservations	1994	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
10	Congo	Ratified without reservations	1982	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Ratified without reservations	1995	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
12	Djibouti	Ratified with reservations	1998	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
13	DR Congo	Ratified without reservations	1986	Some reporting done	Focal person without special mandate
14	Egypt	Ratified without reservations	1996	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
15	Eswatini	Ratified without reservations	2004	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
16	Ethiopia	Ratified reservations	1981	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
17	Gabon	Ratified without reservations	1983	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level

No.	Country	Ratification of CEDAW	Year	Report to the Committee	Institutional mechanisms to implement the CEDAW
18	Gambia	Ratified without reservations	1992	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
19	Ghana	Ratified without reservations	1986	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
20	Guinea	Ratified without reservations	1982	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
21	Guinea-Bissau	Ratified without reservations	2008	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
22	Kenya	Ratified without reservations	1984	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
23	Lesotho	Ratified with reservations	1995	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
24	Liberia	Ratified without reservations	2009	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
25	Madagascar	Ratified without reservations	1998	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
26	Malawi	Ratified without reservations	2000	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
27	Mali	Ratified with reservations	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
28	Mauritania	Ratified with reservations	2000	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
29	Mauritius	Ratified without reservations	1984	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
30	Morocco	Ratified without reservations	2012	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
31	Mozambique	Ratified without reservations	1993	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
32	Namibia	Ratified without reservations	1995	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
33	Niger	Ratified with reservations	1999	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
34	Nigeria	Ratified without reservations	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
35	Rwanda	Ratified without reservations	1981	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate

No.	Country	Ratification of CEDAW	Year	Report to the Committee	Institutional mechanisms to implement the CEDAW
36	Senegal	Ratified without reservations	1985	Some reporting done	Focal person without special mandate
37	Sierra Leone	Ratified without reservations	1988	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
38	Somalia	Not ratified	NA	NA	NA
39	South Africa	Not ratified	NA	NA	NA
40	South Sudan	Not ratified	NA	NA	NA
41	Tanzania	Ratified without reservations	2004	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
42	Togo	Ratified without reservations	1983	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
43	Tunisia	Ratified without reservations	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special mandate
44	Uganda	Ratified without reservations	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
45	Zambia	Ratified without reservations	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
46	Zimbabwe	Ratified without reservations	1991	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level

NA is not applicable.

Gender equality mainstreaming 2

No.	Country	Gender equality policy is integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy	Government allocated financial resources to gender related activities	Mainstreaming gender in statistics
1	Algeria	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	No budget line allocated	Clear guide
2	Benin	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
3	Botswana	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
4	Burkina Faso	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
5	Burundi	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
6	Cameroon	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
7	Central African Republic	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
8	Chad	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
9	Comoros	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
10	Congo	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
12	Djibouti	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
13	DR Congo	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	No budget line allocated	Clear guide
14	Egypt	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
15	Swaziland	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
16	Ethiopia	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
17	Gabon	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
18	Gambia	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
19	Ghana	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide

No.	Country	Gender equality policy is integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy	Government allocated financial resources to gender related activities	Mainstreaming gender in statistics
20	Guinea	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
21	Guinea-Bissau	Clear objectives and targets set	No budget line allocated	No clear guide
22	Kenya	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
23	Lesotho	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
24	Liberia	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
25	Madagascar	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
26	Malawi	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
27	Mali	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
28	Mauritania	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
29	Mauritius	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
30	Morocco	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
31	Mozambique	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
32	Namibia	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
33	Niger	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
34	Nigeria	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
35	Rwanda	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
36	Senegal	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
37	Sierra Leone	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
38	Somalia	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
39	South Africa	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide

No.	Country	Gender equality policy is integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy	Government allocated financial resources to gender related activities	Mainstreaming gender in statistics
40	South Sudan	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
41	Tanzania	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
42	Togo	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
43	Tunisia	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
44	Uganda	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
45	Zambia	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
46	Zimbabwe	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide

Capacity profiling and assessment of needs

No.	Country	Capacity profile conducted since 2012	Date of last capacity profile conducted	Capacity profiling commissioned by	Capacity needs assessment conducted since 2012	Capacity needs assessment commissioned by:	Any study or review of existing strategies and plans to identify the, capacity needs and ways of mainstreaming Agenda 2063 at the national level carried out	Any study or review of existing strategies and plans to identify the, capacity needs and ways of mainstreaming SDGs at the national level carried out
1	Algeria	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	No
2	Benin	No	NA	NA	NA	NA	Yes	Yes
3	Botswana	Yes	2011	Gov. body	Yes	Gov. & dev. partner	No	No
4	Burkina Faso	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	Yes
5	Burundi	Yes	2012	Dev. partner	No	NA	Yes	Yes
6	Cameroon	No	NA	NA	Yes	NA	No	Yes
7	Central African Republic	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	No
8	Chad	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	No
9	Comoros	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	Yes
10	Congo	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	Yes
11	Côte d'Ivoire	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	No
12	Djibouti	No	NA	NA	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
13	DR Congo	No	NA	NA	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
14	Egypt	NA	NA	NA	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
15	Eswatini	No	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
16	Ethiopia	Yes	NA	Gov. body	Yes	Gov. body	Yes	Yes
17	Gabon	NA	NA	NA	Yes	NA	No	No
18	Gambia	Yes	2015	Dev. partner	No	NA	No	No
19	Ghana	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	Yes
20	Guinea	No	NA	NA	Yes	Gov. & dev. partner	Yes	NA
21	Guinea-Bissau	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	No

No.	Country	Capacity profile conducted since 2012	Date of last capacity profile conducted	Capacity profiling commissioned by	Capacity needs assessment conducted since 2012	Capacity needs assessment commissioned by:	Any study or review of existing strategies and plans to identify the, capacity needs and ways of mainstreaming Agenda 2063 at the national level carried out	Any study or review of existing strategies and plans to identify the, capacity needs and ways of mainstreaming SDGs at the national level carried out
22	Kenya	Yes	2011	NA	No	NA	No	Yes
23	Lesotho	Yes	2012	NA	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
24	Liberia	Yes	2013	Gov. body	Yes	Gov. body	Yes	Yes
25	Madagascar	No	NA	NA	No	NA	No	No
26	Malawi	Yes	2013	NA	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
27	Mali	Yes	2015	NA	Yes	NA	No	No
28	Mauritania	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
29	Mauritius	Yes	2015	NA	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
30	Morocco	Yes	2015	Dev. partner	Yes	Dev. partner	No	No
31	Mozambique	Yes	2015	NA	Yes	Gov. body	Yes	Yes
32	Namibia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Yes	Yes
33	Niger	Yes	2016	NA	Yes	Dev. partner	Yes	Yes
34	Nigeria	No	NA	NA	Yes	Gov. body	No	Yes
35	Rwanda	Yes	2014	Gov. body	Yes	Gov. body	Yes	Yes
36	Senegal	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	No	No
37	Sierra Leone	Yes	2013	Gov. & dev. partner	NA	Gov. body	No	Yes
38	Somalia	Yes	NA	Gov. body	NA	NA	NA	Yes
39	South Africa	Yes	2012	Gov. body	Yes	Gov. body	No	Yes
40	South Sudan	Yes	2013	Dev. partner	NA	NA	No	No
41	Tanzania	Yes	2015	Gov. & dev. partner	Yes	Gov. & dev. partner	No	No
42	Togo	No	NA	NA	Yes	Dev. partner	No	Yes

No.	Country	Capacity profile conducted since 2012	Date of last capacity profile conducted	Capacity profiling commissioned by	Capacity needs assessment conducted since 2012	Capacity needs assessment commissioned by:	Any study or review of existing strategies and plans to identify the, capacity needs and ways of mainstreaming Agenda 2063 at the national level carried out	Any study or review of existing strategies and plans to identify the, capacity needs and ways of mainstreaming SDGs at the national level carried out
43	Tunisia	Yes	2014	NA	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes
44	Uganda	No	NA	NA	No	NA	NA	NA
45	Zambia	Yes	2016	Gov. body	Yes	Gov. body	No	Yes
46	Zimbabwe	NA	NA	NA	Yes	Dev. partner	No	No

Gov. body is government body. Dev. partner is development partner. NA is not available or not applicable.



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Specialized Agency of the African Union

HEAD QUARTERS

2 Fairbairn Drive, Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe

T: +263-4 304663, 304622, 332002, 332014; Ext. 274

M: +263 782 005 950, +263 772 185 308-10

Email: root@acbf-pact.org

Twitter: @ACBF_Official

Website: www.acbf-pact.org

ACBF REGIONAL OFFICE, WEST & CENTRAL OFFICE

The Rhombus, Plot 24 Tumu Street, Kanda Estates Accra, Ghana

T: +233 302200738, 209552115 Ext. 800

Email: accra@acbf-pact.org

ACBF REGIONAL, EAST & SOUTHERN AFRICA

Bishops Rd, 1st Ngong Ave, ACK Garden Hse, 2nd Flr, NAIROBI, Kenya

T: + 254-20 5160052, + 254 727116276

Email: root@acbf-pct.org

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